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Abstract 
 
Disparate research traditions in the study of experience have led to contentious arguments 
over the use of first-person methods in psychological research (Dennett, 2001; Schwitzgebel, 
2003). Some believe that researchers are inclined to avoid qualitative techniques due to their 
many limitations (Vermersch, 2004), largely because these methods may resist replication 
and fail to control for the subtleties of meaningful experience, as well as the effects these 
methods have on the examined behaviour (Petitmengin, 2006; Hurlburt & Aktar, 2006; 
Schwitzgebel, 2008). However, recently emerging approaches within Psychology and 
Cognitive Science have argued strongly that experience should play a more central role in our 
examination of behavioural data. Despite this emerging consensus, the relationship between 
experience and behaviour remains very poorly understood. Placing emphasis on 
understanding subjective experiences calls for a re-examination of the methods we commonly 
use in psychology, with the aim to gain a better understanding of the person's experiences, 
and the meaning of their actions, at the time that the behaviour of interest is carried out. In 
order to further investigate this phenomenon, the current project has built on research using 
integrative and phenomenologically-informed methods in the study of experience. Five 
experiments were conducted to explore the potential use of such methods in the laboratory, 
with the initial series of experiments aiming to find an experimental paradigm that engages 
the participant in meaningful ways. The final experiments of this thesis directly gather data 
on participant experiences during a contextualised lab-based paradigm. Findings suggest that 
the use of integrative methods in the laboratory may have extraneous effects on task 
behaviour and we are still in the early stages of the development of more far reaching 
methods in the study of experience. This work highlights the challenges and necessity of 
understanding how we can use revised methods to further explore the relationship between 
experience and behaviour in meaningful, but controlled, ways. 
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Chapter One 
Overview and summary 
 
 
The aim of this work is to explore whether more phenomenologically inspired 
methods might usefully augment or complement standard laboratory practices in 
psychological research. Though it remains a significant challenge to current scientific 
methods, the relationship between experience and behaviour is increasingly recognised as an 
important topic in Psychology and Cognitive Science. Experiential data are notoriously 
difficult to examine, with many different methods available that each bring with them a host 
of supporters and critics. Throughout most of the history of experimental Psychology, we 
have had a distrust of first-person accounts of behaviour. This is partly due to the kinds of 
problems with describing and verifying details of the conscious experiences of people, which 
led to the rejection of introspection as a scientific method (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Johansson et al. 2005). It is also partly due to numerous empirical studies illustrating how 
little insight people appear to have into their own behaviour (e.g. Piccinini, 2003; 
Schwitzgebel, 2008). 
Despite this history, recent developments within the broader field of Cognitive 
Science have given rise to dissatisfaction with the way in which first-person experience has 
been marginalised in mainstream laboratory research (Kagan, 2012). Theoretical advances, 
driven by a greater awareness of the embodied, situated nature of psychological processes, 
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have made it clear that while a simple relationship between a person's conscious experience 
and their behaviour is not the case, the meaning of the entire situation for the person is 
impossible to ignore. Despite this acknowledgement, it remains very difficult to quantify or 
account for such nebulous concepts (Barrett, Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Kagan, 2012). Simple 
descriptions of experience may not provide us with a direct understanding of the causes of 
particular behaviours, but some means of making sense of a person's meaningful experience 
of the situation is needed if we are to adequately explain the ways in which the meaning, or 
context, of the stimuli affect the way people behave. 
Some researchers have called for a complete overhaul of the way in which 
psychological research is conducted as a result of these criticisms, with the introduction of 
strikingly different research techniques, for example neurophenomenology (Lutz & 
Thompson, 2003)  and  descriptive experience sampling (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006). The 
current project, however, is an attempt to take an  evolutionary rather than a revolutionary 
approach. The project aims to explore ways of integrating first-person reports of experience 
with behavioural measures in standard experimental laboratory tasks, but with the additional 
aim of using minimal changes in practice so as not to affect the rigour and replicability of 
such scientific methodologies.  
Chapter Two of this thesis focuses on phenomenologically informed methods that are 
currently used in the study of experience. It highlights some promising methodologies that 
aim to explore experiential data in rigorous ways that are being applied in a number of 
settings. The chapter gives an overview of some criticisms of the standard methodological 
approaches to psychological research that have led to the call for more emphasis on 
experience and meaning. Different approaches and their implications are critically examined. 
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Some considerations are made concerning how more phenomenologically informed research 
practices might complement traditional methods of investigation in psychology. 
Chapter Three discusses currently developing perspectives within Psychology, such as 
the “embodied” approach (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Wilson, 2002; Ziemke, 2003), 
that argue that we need to replace our existing modes of research with models that also afford 
more synthetic thinking without sacrificing the rigour and discipline of proper scientific 
practice. In contrast to traditional approaches, more embodied approaches view the overall 
experience and meaning of a given situation as playing a significant role in how we construct 
our thinking and acting at a given time, instead of just the individual aspects of a stimulus or 
situation. This chapter explores in more detail some of the theoretical background of 
embodied and situated cognition underlying the greater recognition of a need for 
methodological change. It also outlines some of work to date that considers the examination 
of experience in controlled settings, rather than naturalistic explorations that are seen in much 
of the qualitative literature.  
Building on this, Chapter Four examines three experimental paradigms that may 
afford us the opportunity to explore the coupling of experience and behaviour using 
minimally altered laboratory  methods. The aim of these experiments is to identify an 
experimental task that could act as a useful paradigm for methods that use more 
phenomenological approaches. Using standardised laboratory tasks, we explore ways of using 
more “meaningful” versions and applications of the experimental paradigms. That is, can 
these experiments be altered or carried out in such a way as to expose more straightforward 
links between what the participant experiences and how they behave in the setting? 
Experiment 1 describes the Go-No-Go Association Task (GNAT), which is a standard test of 
executive function, usually conducted with relatively meaningless stimuli (or at least 
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meaningless in the context of the task behaviour). Using both more and less meaningful 
stimuli, different patterns of behaviour in response are identified in a between-participants 
experiment. The stimuli used for this experiment consisted of culturally loaded images that 
provide a clear task-relevant meaning for participants, while other images were more abstract. 
Ways of exploring experience using this task are discussed, as well as the implications of 
integrating qualitative or phenomenological methods to such an experimental paradigm. 
Experiment 2 presents a decision making experiment called the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task (BART). This is a simple decision making task where participant choices are 
measured over the course of the experiment, but in a less abstract way than the GNAT. As the 
task progresses, research has shown that some individuals make different choices if they are 
predisposed to making high risk choices in their everyday lives (Lejuez et al. 2002). For our 
purposes, however, we used the task in a clearly defined way, presenting the experiment in a 
contextualised way to explore how the experimental setting affected performance. As the aim 
of the thesis is to explore ways of studying experience in more controlled ways, we 
developed a socially contextualised framing for the task (where participants were told their 
scores affected other participants) as well as a standard individual version of the task with 
identical task stimuli in a between-participants study. This creates a specific meaning 
framework for the task, and we aimed to measure behavioural differences in the task that was 
specifically related to how the task was presented to participants.  
Building on this, Experiment 3 describes a more dynamic task – the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT). This task is specifically designed to be “realistic” in that the participant interacts 
with it and adapts their behaviour over the duration of the task. Using the socially 
contextualised framing for the task from the previous experiment, promising findings show 
that it may be possible to use more qualitative methods with the IGT. This leads to the 
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following experiments using more integrative methods with the IGT, in an attempt to fully 
flesh out an experimental method that aims to understand the relationship between the 
experience and behaviour.   
Chapter Five of this thesis outlines Experiment 4, which uses the IGT with framing 
contexts similar to Experiment 3. This experiment also uses a more structured exploration of 
the participants' experience of the IGT between the framing groups, with the aid of a tailor-
made questionnaire for the task. As the literature strongly suggests that participants have 
difficulty describing their experiences in a clear and useful manner, some of the participants 
were given introspective training and practice in description of their experiences before the 
task. A questionnaire designed by Maia and McClelland (2004) was used for the collection of 
experiential data, with alterations to the questionnaire carried out to focus descriptions of the 
subjective experience of the participant. Introspective training for this experiment was 
influenced by the work of Hurlburt and Akhtar (2006), whereby participants were given 
several training session in the days prior to taking part in the IGT. Using similar decision 
making tasks, participants in the training group were trained to focus on the way in which 
they naturally described their experiences in a lab-based setting.  
As drawing links between phenomenological and behavioural aspects of the task is a 
challenging endeavour that requires much effort on part of the participant, our next task was 
to carry out controlled but unstructured collection of experiential data in the lab, outlined in 
Chapter Six. Experiment 5 integrates direct forms of phenomenological data collection in the 
laboratory. In order to advance the development of phenomenologically informed laboratory 
practice, practice that makes the experience of the participants a key part of the experiment, 
we examined the effect of context-setting on performance in the lab using experience 
sampling methods. This took the form of a simplified version of Hurlburt & Akhtar's (2006) 
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Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). DES purports to sample “pristine” experiential data 
of an open, relatively unprejudiced sort. Findings from the previous experiment raised some 
interesting questions on the way participants are asked to describe their experiences. 
Specifically, whether direct qualitative questioning had an effect on the overall experience for 
participants. For Experiment 5 it was decided that data would be collected without the 
lengthy training of participants, in the hope of avoiding changing their experience of the task 
and thereby making it more likely that we were sampling the kind of “pristine” experience 
that DES is intended to access. Given the plethora of introspective research that incorporates 
phenomenological training in to their methods, we discuss whether this could be used to 
ascertain the kind of differences in responses that training participants to describe their 
experience might have, especially in more controlled settings and the ways in which these 
methods can be used.  
Finally, Chapter Seven of this thesis discusses the implications of adopting 
phenomenologically informed methods in lab-based tasks. The limitations of our use of DES 
and introspective training are discussed, with suggestions for future research using open-
ended questioning and the type of ‘minimal change’ we originally hoped for in earlier 
chapters. While there are growing concerns that we need to replace our existing investigative 
procedures with methodologies that also afford more synthetic thinking, we must also take 
care that we do not sacrifice the rigour and discipline of proper scientific practice. This 
chapter also discusses some issues with the current models and theories of how we study 
experience in Psychology at present, and limitations facing the area of phenomenologically 
informed methods. In this way it calls on theorists to re-evaluate the use of unfocused data 
collection methods seen in some of the literature, with the findings of our experiments 
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indicating that qualitative questioning may affect participant behaviour in ways that are not 
yet fully understood.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Phenomenology in Psychological Research: 
An Overview 
 
 
From the beginnings of experimental Psychology, introspection was seen as the 
disciplined study of consciousness. Within the English-speaking world, the name probably 
most commonly associated with the method in Psychology’s early years was E. B. Titchener 
(1867 – 1927). A student of Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920), he developed an approach in the 
study of consciousness that relied on verbal reports of internal mental states. By many 
researchers working during these initial days of the discipline, Psychology was seen as an 
attempt to understand the human mind, believing that consciousness could be broken down to 
its basic elements without sacrificing any of the properties of the whole.  However, 
introspection lost much of its traction soon after these earliest stages of its development. 
Instead, behaviouristic methods became increasingly popular in the following decades. 
Introspective investigations led to intractable disagreements and incommensurable 
descriptions of the phenomena of conscious experience. Behaviouristic techniques, 
emphasising third-person observations of movement and behaviour, were seen as a scientific 
necessity (though perhaps most famously linked with the likes of Watson, 1913, the approach 
is associated with a number of different schools of thought; e.g. Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1945; 
Tolman, 1932). Psychology moved away from the fundamental question of the human psyche 
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in order to address more measureable, tangible issues that could properly be addressed by 
developing scientific methods.  
Even though there was a shift from introspection to behaviouristic methods, early 
psychologists believed that there was a tangible link between understanding experience and 
behaviour. While Wundt proposed that the person’s descriptions of how an environmental 
stimulus made participants think and feel was important for understanding this, behaviourists, 
such as B. F. Skinner (1904 – 1990), argued that if introspective methods could be verified at 
all, it was only because observable behaviour can be objectively measured. Present in both of 
these approaches was the close association of experience and behaviour. The shift in focus 
was largely concerned with the methods used in the study of behaviour, with introspective 
methods leading to highly subjective data that was open to interpretation and difficult to 
define. 
Jerome Bruner (1915 - ), one of the most influential psychologists of the twentieth 
century, looked at how needs, motivations and expectations influenced perception. Often 
associated with the movement known as the ‘New Look’, his work was concerned with the 
development of human cognition and the role of strategies in the process of human 
categorisations. His early cognitive work showed how environmental and experiential factors 
played pivotal roles in human cognitive development. However, by the 1960’s, researchers 
had designed computer  programs that  could  solve  difficult  logic problems,  a  domain  
previously  thought  to  be  a unique quality of humans. This led to the development of 
computer models for human cognition, where information-processing paradigms were used to 
help understand behaviour in more objective ways (Newell and Simon, 1972). Experience 
was seen as an integral part of the process, but efforts became more concerned with 
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explaining and understanding cognitive functioning rather than defining the properties of 
experience, as experimental methods moved further away from descriptive research.  
As cognitive psychological approaches developed, the link between consciousness 
and behaviour became more attenuated. Research, such as Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) study, 
a classic in the field, showed that there seemed to be little connection between experience and 
behaviour concluding that "people may have little ability to report accurately on their 
cognitive processes" (p. 246). That is, people had little conscious insight into the factors that 
affected their actions. Although people can usually produce an explanation for their 
behaviour, this explanation may not be accurate and difficult to calibrate with the observed 
behaviour.  In reviewing several studies that experimentally manipulated the cause of a 
participant's behaviour, then asking the participant to explain their behaviour, Nisbett and 
Wilson found that participants would tell the experimenter more than could have been known 
given the experimental manipulation. This led many to believe that participants would readily 
contrive information, due to influences of intersubjectivity and experimenter bias. 
In contrast, developments in recent cognitive science suggest that isolation of 
behaviour from experience is problematic. With advancements made in neuroscience over the 
last few decades, computer modelling of cognitive behaviours has become more contentious 
as our understanding of the relationship between experience and behaviour is still not clear 
(Froese & Spiers, 2007; Gallagher, 2000; Stuart, 2012). Current mainstream psychological 
research is dominated by the cognitive, information processing paradigm, which has come 
under increasing criticism in recent years (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; DeJaegher, DiPaolo, & 
Gallagher 2010; DiPaolo & Thompson, 2014; Mesquita, Barrett & Smith, 2010; Shapiro, 
2011; Wilson, 2013). Researchers with a more qualitative or phenomenological focus argue 
that many mainstream methods fail to adequately account for the ways in which the 
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psychological situation, participant knowledge, context and experience play key roles in 
understanding the relationship between behaviour and mind. These criticisms stem from how 
third-person approaches predominantly focus on counting behaviours in controlled settings. 
While this has allowed for relatively easy and usable ways in which scientists can measure 
behaviour and apply it to some aspect of the phenomenon investigated, it tends to 
“compartmentalise” psychological processes (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008).  
Concerns about compartmentalisation refer to the way many theorists characterise the 
mind, body, and various psychological functions as essentially distinct and separate entities 
that influence one another during the generation of behaviour. Such thinking tends to under-
represent the ways in which the various aspects of the psychological system – environment, 
body, brain, and behaviour – are coupled to one another and are substantially interdependent 
(DiPaolo & Thompson, 2014; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). This also results in experience 
being marginalised, as it is difficult to describe in relation to behavioural responses, confined 
by the limitations of experimental methodologies. Levine (1983) argued that behaviour is 
often described in terms of its underlying processes: that is, researchers are quite adept at 
explaining the causal roles involved in the functions of behavioural processes, but overlook 
the meaning of the behaviour. This is inextricably linked with how we categorise the role of 
experience in much of Psychology and Cognitive Science. As such, it can be ill-defined and 
may be overlooked in its relation to behaviour.  
Barrett, Mesquita and Gendron’s (2010) concept of the “psychological situation” is an 
alternative approach that tries to understand behavioural processes in more dynamic or 
multifaceted ways that go beyond characterisations generated from traditional first or third-
person methods. They define a psychological situation as containing numerous aspects that 
are relevant to the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of a particular person at a particular 
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time. The experiential, phenomenological aspects of the situation tend to be overlooked by 
traditional quantitative methods which typically examine phenomena in terms of stimulus-
response pairs, with cognitive mediating processes inferred from the observed relationship. 
This may be due to “essentialising”, which Barrett, Mesquita and Smith (2010) argue is 
evident in much of Psychology. This refers to using terms in such a way as to suggest that 
there is some deep reality to a (usually inferred) psychological category in the material world. 
This criticism has a long history in phenomenological Psychology. However, most 
mainstream research still overlooks the implications of describing the mind and body as 
intrinsically independent, separable phenomena. This may need to be re-evaluated in light of 
the growing body of research that suggests that the two are deeply interdependent and 
mutually constraining (Barrett et al, 2010; Barrett, 2011; .Clark, 1997; Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch, 1991).  
True to good science, cognitive theories are largely based on evidence generated by 
experimental investigations. Kagan (2012) states that the hope in Psychology is that the 
concept and explanation applied to the observation in one setting with one procedure would 
remain appropriate in other settings with similar procedures. He argues, however, that few 
theories explicitly account for the social and physical context in which a particular cognitive 
or behavioural process occurs (these things are always held constant by the fact that 
experimental research is almost all carried out in laboratories or other academic settings 
isolated from “normal” or naturalistic social and cultural practice). The power of an 
individual’s psychological situation and context in structuring people's thinking and 
behaviour has nevertheless been in evidence for decades (Barker, 1968; Gibson, 1960). 
Kagan (2012) also states that cognitive theorists too readily generalise behavioural outcome 
across contexts. This has facilitated contentious disagreements about the defining properties 
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of many popular concepts. The conclusion to draw from such work incorporating the 
relationship between the cognitive-behavioural system and its environment is that the 
meaning of any action, and the cognitive processes involved in behaviour, cannot be 
adequately understood until that action is properly situated in some environment-organism 
functional unit (Heft, 2010). That is, the meaning of the whole situation for the person 
matters if we are to understand the observed behaviour. 
More recent cognitive research has highlighted the need for adopting more integrative 
approaches (DiPaolo, 2009; Froese, Gould & Seth, 2011). However, few options are 
available to try to integrate first- and third-person methods in controlled settings by 
psychologists, a challenge that is also faced by cognitive scientists (Olivares et al. 2015; 
Wilson & Golonka, 2013). Controlling the myriad of possible variables that exist in real-
world situations is impossible, but even in the highly structured setting of the psychological 
laboratory there seem to be potential issues of situation and meaning for the participant that 
are not systematically examined. The goal of this thesis is to explore ways in which the gap 
between behavioural, laboratory-based, and more phenomenologically informed approaches 
might be bridged without the need to dramatically transform normal professional practice in 
the discipline.  
The remainder of this chapter is in 4 sections. The first gives an overview of the 
limitations of contemporary research methods. The second section gives an overview of 
phenomenological methods in Psychology and experimental philosophy. These methods stem 
from a particular subset of qualitative research, deriving from specific philosophical 
traditions and placing importance on how and why experience may help understand cognition 
and behaviour.  The third section illustrates how this phenomenological understanding can 
inform behavioural science by trying to move beyond mere classifications of experience and 
 
 
~ 14 ~ 
 
uncover the structures of lived experience (helping to characterise the psychological situation 
more broadly) which will help us understand cognition more thoroughly. The fourth section 
looks at “contextualised methodologies” and introduces how alternative mixed-method 
approaches may offer tentative suggestions for how we can generate more robust experiential 
or phenomenological data that may inform third-person behavioural science.  
 
2.1  Limitations of contemporary research methods  
Traditional quantitative methods are designed to generalise behaviour across context 
and offer rigorous, tried and tested means of investigating psychological phenomena. The 
strengths of such science are many, but come at the cost of uncertainty regarding their 
generalisability, and difficulty in understanding the ways in which the range of psychological 
processes involved in any situation interact with one another (Kagan, 2012). Qualitative 
research is intended to balance and help contextualise finely focused data collected in 
naturalistic settings. Vermersch (2004) warns, however, that qualitative research is currently 
in a problematic state as psychologists have not made much progress in finding meaningful 
ways to utilise descriptive data to understand human behaviour. Within qualitative methods, 
current first-person methods, in particular, also have a number of limitations.  
Despite very different methods and different kinds of data being involved, both 
traditional first-person and third-person methodologies in Psychology share some common 
limitations.  First- and third-person methodologies compartmentalise psychological processes 
because they may be intrinsically designed to do so. Qualitative approaches, for their part, 
tend to focus more strongly on the experiences or attitudes of people, but tend to be 
conducted at a level of analysis that removes the possibility of closely examining the links 
between a person’s experience and their individual behaviours. Third-person, quantitative 
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data is sometimes not much concerned with authentic lived experience (Levine, 1983; Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977) and as a result, mind and body are discussed as quite separate entities in 
much of mainstream Psychology (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Varela et al. 1991). This has 
perpetuated the idea that the two must be separated. This stems from phenomenologically 
informed approaches that suggest that the methodological techniques commonly used in 
Psychology stem from an approach that typifies behaviour as automatic to external stimuli.  
More embodied research approaches may be advantageous as they acknowledge the 
mind and body as mutually informing entities, or more, different aspects of the same 
phenomenon of an organism making sense of the world (DiPaolo, 2009). Embodied 
approaches hold that we must include environmental and situational aspects in understanding 
behaviour. However, in experimental paradigms we still lack integrative methodologies that 
overcome the limitations of traditional methods. Embodied approaches still somewhat lack a 
fundamental theoretical framework (Wilson & Golonka, 2013), with a tangible framework 
that is still in development (DiPaolo & Thompson, 2014; Froese & Spiers, 2007). 
There have been a number of attempts to overcome the limitations of scope imposed 
by standard research paradigms. For example, “secondary approaches” developed in the past 
few decades have tried to integrate first- and third-person methodologies. However, they may 
still perpetuate the notion that the mind and body need to be studied separately (Varela & 
Shear, 1999). The data in many forms of secondary approach are gathered separately and 
subsequently integrated through data interpretation, as this is currently the clearest and 
generally accepted form of analysis (Lutz & Thompson, 2003). Contemporary theories are 
adopting more ‘open’ approaches, acknowledging that embodiment, experience and context 
are impossible to completely balance or control, but must be included explicitly in the 
description of a task or the explanation of the behaviour involved (Allen & Williams, 2011; 
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Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  However, even though researchers are claiming that our actions 
are shaped by the entirety of a situation in which we find ourselves, few have actually 
implemented this in the analysis (Doan, 2009; Piccini, 2003; Schwartz, 2010). When the 
situation is looked at, it is usually done so in a rudimentary way where facets of the 
phenomena are manipulated to illustrate the causal role of a particular psychological process. 
For example, researchers commonly use time pressure, expertise, deliberate practice and a 
multitude of experimental manipulations to show how behaviour is made of a specific set of 
processes. This may be more limiting than previously supposed. Few attempts directly 
consider that participants’ experience and interpretation of environmental stimuli is an 
important part of understanding the behaviour. If there are ways of directly investigating 
experience in terms of how it shapes behaviour, then we need to develop more holistic 
methods.  
In principle, qualitative approaches, which commonly elicit descriptions of a situation 
and behaviour from people who experienced them, seem perfectly suited to such a holistic 
approach, but are not commonly applied in the kinds of controlled settings of laboratory 
work. Qualitative work largely focuses on behaviour in naturalistic settings. It is typically 
retrospective or general in its approach, involving the recall of past events or descriptions of 
frequently occurring aspects of a person’s experience. Though “mixed” or integrated methods 
exist, their target is generally not the specific manner in which behaviour and experience 
interact in the process of performing the kinds of cognitive tasks explored in laboratory 
research. 
A number of attempts to develop more integrative methodologies are underway 
(Olivares et al. 2015; Doan, 2009; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). However, these all seem to be 
in the very early stages of development. No approach has built up a wide base of support 
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amongst researchers. In the last three decades, the study of consciousness has moved from the 
realm of philosophy into the spotlight of interdisciplinary scientific research. Cognitive and 
brain sciences have come together in an attempt to meet the challenges posed by the scientific 
study of consciousness and unconscious processes. This modern endeavour has yielded 
important insights about neural mechanisms and their relation to human cognition and 
behaviour, findings that give rise to new answers to age-old questions (Weisberg, 2011). 
While the principles are promising (meaning and context are important; subjective experience 
may be key to understanding behavioural phenomena), a lot of these approaches are 
establishing themselves, but tend to involve dramatically different forms of data collection, 
well outside the standards of practice in normal laboratory research (DiPaolo &Thompson, 
2014; Gallagher, 2000; Olivares et al. 2015). They may attract a few eager rebels, but have 
yet to see widespread adoption. Additionally, these approaches may be somewhat 
rudimentary and hard to adopt in other research areas (Dennett, 1991). Yet, the principles are 
encouraging, for example, the technique known as neurophenomenology attempts to generate 
phenomenological “markers” that would allow neurological data to be interpreted. 
Phenomenological markers are coded descriptive data relating to a particular experience. 
These markers are sometimes developed through standard phenomenological forms of 
analysis. That is, interviews are often analysed through a disciplined method, such as Content 
Analysis, one of the most widely used methods in phenomenological research (Langdridge, 
2004). This method allows researchers to code the descriptive data which are used as 
markers, numerical representations of descriptive experiences, so that links could be drawn 
with neurological data. The aim with neurophenomenology is not just to explore brain 
regions and related experiences; rather, it was a significant advancement in 
phenomenological research that attempted to generate methodological techniques of 
substantiating descriptive data with hard empirical data. 
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However, instead of trying to develop a completely new approach, there remains a 
question as to whether we may be able to explore the effects of meaningful experience in the 
lab. That is, an evolution of research practices, rather than a revolution, may be our best next 
move. Instead of attempting to reinvent empirical practice, the intention of the present work 
is to search for useful ways in which our understanding of what happens in experiments can 
be improved by disciplined phenomenological or experience-focused methods.  
 
2.2  Introduction to phenomenological methods 
Phenomenology can be described as the study of experience and consciousness, 
specifically their structures and how we come to understand them.  Phenomenological 
Psychology, drawing directly from the eponymous tradition of philosophy aims to focus on 
human experience and “how the things that are perceived, appear in consciousness” 
(Langdridge, p. 21). To explore psychological phenomena, we aim to go beyond the 
description of subjective experience and attempt to explore the structures underlying the 
experience for the person. It is quite different to the kind of intuitive “Cartesianism” common 
amongst psychological researchers, where the mind and body are seen as separate, knowable 
objects. Instead, phenomenology attempts to characterise both the mind and body in terms of 
lived experiences. Phenomenologists argue that attaining descriptions of subjective conscious 
experience is of great importance as it may help us more clearly understand the psychological 
phenomena being explored (Langdridge, 2004).  
Phenomenological Psychology aims at describing lived experience and involves 
exploring what is meaningful for an individual at a specific point of time, typically through 
the use of focused interviewing (Langdridge, 2007; Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005). This 
characterisation of phenomenology appears in many modern psychological studies of 
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consciousness as well as literature on experimental philosophy (Burr, 2003; Schwitzgebel, 
2003). However, the traditional study of phenomenology is rooted in a philosophical 
discourse of describing what appears to consciousness in an “authentic” manner. This refers 
to the process of describing experience in a reductive and disciplined way, often called 
phenomenological reduction. Precisely how this reduction is achieved depends on the 
researcher’s theoretical outlook. 
The philosophy of phenomenology is not just a single approach, although they all 
share some key beliefs and underpinnings. There are three distinct schools in the history of 
phenomenology: transcendental phenomenology; hermeneutic phenomenology; and 
existential phenomenology. The original phenomenological philosophy proposed by Husserl 
(1859 – 1938) claimed that it is possible to suspend personal opinion and arrive at a single 
descriptive representation of the phenomenon being investigated. Scholars differ in how to 
practice this phenomenological reduction in the Husserlian tradition. Husserl’s main disciple, 
Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) proposed a phenomenology that turned instead to 
interpretative narration, termed hermeneutic phenomenology. This school of phenomenology 
believes that it is not possible to separate personal opinions and beliefs in phenomenological 
reduction. Instead, interpretative narration provides the means of arriving at an accurate 
description of the phenomenon. This approach emphasises the importance of considering the 
subjective experience of individuals and groups. Essentially, it attempts to find the objective 
truth of a phenomenon through individuals’ life-world stories using narratives attained 
through phenomenological reduction. For hermeneutic phenomenology, description is already 
interpretation, so a pure phenomenology with its pure ego is impossible. From historical and 
methodological perspectives, this is a form of understanding that is not concerned with the 
subjective experiences of the individual.  
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Existential phenomenology, on the other hand, is a movement based on the rejection 
of Cartesian rationalism (Kafle, 2011). Kierkegaard (1813-55) is usually referred to as the 
founder of modern existentialism (Langdridge, 2007). Existential phenomenologists claim 
that philosophical investigations could not be conducted from an objective standpoint and 
reject Husserl’s belief of a possibility of a complete reduction. Instead, existential 
phenomenologists attempt to flesh out a description of direct contact with the world. They 
stress the importance of everyday experiences as it is perceived and described by the 
individual. As such, the name is common to the thought of Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre (1905 
– 1980), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961) and other twentieth century philosophers 
influenced by them. Grouping these scholars under the term existential phenomenology is 
said to be justified as they share commonalities in their understanding of the phenomena on 
which they focused as well as the phenomenological method they used to account for the 
description of such phenomena (Kafle, 2011).  
The importance of phenomenological approaches for Psychology is that they aim to 
understand the meanings and fundamental structures of experience. To do this, researchers 
attempt to describe experience in a pure or pristine way, using what is often referred to as 
‘bracketing’ or the Epoché. This is a process by which we attempt to abstain from 
presuppositions or preconceived ideas that we may have about the things we are 
investigating. This is often used as an essential criticism of third-person sciences: while we 
attempt to avoid biases of everyday knowledge and critically examine the phenomenon being 
investigated, we minimise attempts to expose knowledge of the participant to clarify the 
meanings of their experience (Gallagher, 2005). Burr (2003) argues that this is due to 
experience being marginalised as a by-product in quantitative studies and an effect of the 
mainstream perspective being dominated by third-person descriptions of behaviour. This is 
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also echoed in Levine (1983) who worries that third-person science is trying to ‘explain 
away’ behaviour, instead of understand it.  
Husserl criticised Psychology as a science that had gone wrong by attempting to apply 
methods of the natural sciences to human issues. He argued that human existence is 
characterised by a ‘natural attitude’, referring to the basic way in which we experience the 
world. We rarely attempt to critically examine our experience. Husserl’s criticism of 
psychological methods stems from how Psychology deals with living subjects who are not 
simply reacting automatically to external stimuli, but are instead responding to their own 
perception of what these stimuli actually mean. From his perspective, psychologists at the 
time were attending to external, physical stimuli that could be isolated and correlated with 
each other in isolated responses. This not only misses important variables but it also ignored 
context and created highly artificial situations, a criticism echoed by many cognitive 
scientists in recent years (DiPaolo et al, 2014;Froese et al. 2011; Lutz et al. 2002; Stuart, 
2011). Phenomenologists largely argue that  most of mainstream Psychology is guilty of this, 
overlooking the manner in which the data collected are constrained or pre-shaped by the 
theory that led to the researcher asking the question in the first place (Langdridge, 2007). 
This is where schools within phenomenology diverge. Transcendental phenomenologists 
believe that Epoché can be truly achieved through phenomenological inquiry, clarifying the 
true meaning of the phenomena being studied. Existential phenomenologists, on the other 
hand, believe that it is worthwhile trying to achieve Epoché, however we never fully bracket 
off our presuppositions. Instead, phenomenological inquiry tries to elucidate the experience 
so that we can describe and understand it. Regardless of the adopted approach, 
phenomenological methods attempt to bracket preconceptions about the phenomenon 
investigated and allow for the participants’ experience to inform their descriptions as they 
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consciously appear. From this disciplined description of experience, some of the structures 
and key relationships within our experience (perhaps including how consciousness and 
behaviour are related, for instance), can be determined.  
 
2.3  Phenomenological methods in behavioural science 
Froese, Gould and Seth (2011) argue that a phenomenological approach to cognitive 
science may offer pragmatic ways of developing new research methodologies for 
Psychology. It may be that the difficult problem of relating first-person qualitative data to 
third-person behavioural data could be overcome through finding novel ways of evoking and 
interpreting descriptive data of lived experience in more controlled environments. That is, 
data from less naturalistic and more controlled settings may provide ways of calibrating 
experiential data with observed behaviours. However, the authors note that we lack a 
satisfactory methodology that can generate phenomenological data that are as rigorous as the 
traditional, tried-and-tested, methods that exist in empirical approaches. We need to first 
develop a “systematic way of accessing and measuring the phenomenology of consciousness” 
(p. 38; Froese, Gould & Seth, 2011), but the current models do not offer ways of gathering 
descriptive data outside the realm of naturalistic behaviour that can be applied in multiple 
domains of experience. Another serious limitation for a phenomenological cognitive science 
is that some of the key principles for addressing an integrative approach are also still in their 
early developmental stages. DiPaolo (2009) argues that a tangible embodied cognitive 
science involves incorporating research from a number of diverse fields and this involves 
working through a number of interdisciplinary ideas. While embodied theorists generally 
agree that experience and bodily activity matter a great deal for cognition, precisely how they 
matter remains a bone of contention amongst researchers.  
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At present, first-person data usually consist of subjective introspective reports where 
participants give detailed accounts of their experience, facilitated by questions from a trained 
researcher (Langdridge, 2007; Weisberg, 2011). A commonly used approach is Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) where the interviewer uses the data to create a meaningful 
description of the phenomena being explored. This is an approach in qualitative Psychology 
that aims to offer insights into how a given person, in a given context, makes sense of a given 
phenomenon. That is, the participant’s lived experiences are “coupled with a subjective and 
reflective process of interpretation […] and in contrast to some other qualitative approaches, 
the analyst is still on familiar territory in terms of the inferences that can be made from the 
data” (Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005, p. 20). The meaning of the experience for the 
participant forms a crucial part of the description. While IPA has its roots in psychology and 
recognises the central role of the analyst in understanding the experiences of participants, it 
brings with it a number of methodological considerations. For example, the skills of the 
interviewer need to be addressed. The interview framework is not altogether clear, and has 
for the most part, been relatively unrestricted in terms of how the researcher frames the 
phenomena being explored (Pringle, Drummond, McLafferty & Hendry, 2011). The issue of 
experimenter bias has been raised for most qualitative approaches (Dennett, 2011; 
Langdridge, 2004) and may not be overcome unless there are clear procedural requirements 
on how the data are collected, with clearer distinctions of how certain lines of questioning 
may be affecting participants’ responses. IPA has gained momentum in the literature as the 
data from these studies are interpreted in collaboration with the participant, where the 
participant is given more of a say on what they meant by their descriptions. That is to say, 
they are afforded the opportunity to describe their interpretations and the language they used 
to describe particular experiences.  
 
 
~ 24 ~ 
 
Heron and Reason (1997) state that people’s actions are grounded in their idea of the 
world and that which it affords through momentary experience. Participatory Inquiry is 
Heron and Reason’s method for exploring experience in a naturalistic way, placing 
importance on framing situational instances and placing the person in environments that are 
meaningful for them at the time of investigation – usually the person’s normal day-to-day 
environment. Participatory Inquiry uses the person’s reported conscious knowledge and has 
been used to develop strategies for improving relations in real world descriptions. For 
example, Traylen (1989) identified particular stresses associated with medical professionals. 
Participants were not willing to readily disclose information relating to their occupational 
stresses. However, Participatory Inquiry was used allowing the participants to identify 
hurdles in their work environment while on the job, through cooperative interviews. The key 
feature of the method is that the participants define the questions they wish to explore further 
and the methodology for that exploration, insofar as the participant feels that there is a 
democratic dialogue with the researchers, fully engaging the participant as co-investigator.  
 Heron and Reason (1997) propose that there are ways of exploring conscious 
experience by detailing accessible knowledge. Descriptions are taken as meaningful and used 
to shed light on a particular aspect of behaviour. Where Participatory Inquiry differs with 
other introspective approaches is that it requires minimal interaction with the principal 
researcher as the participant is in charge of identifying and detailing what it important for 
them. It aims to describe situational experience in placing the person in situations of meaning. 
As such participants are actively involved in identifying the experience being investigated. 
This is different to other phenomenologically informed approaches as experience is pre-
framed by the research question and it does not involve the training of participants in giving 
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experiential reports like other methods. Rather, the inquiry aims to use the person’s natural 
language as they describe their experience.  
In Participatory Inquiry, participants are often regarded as co-researchers in the study. 
The technique acknowledges that there will be differences in both the quality and quantity of 
participants' contributions but the approach claims that we can attain an understanding of the 
person’s experience and their ‘idea’ of the world.  This framing of a person and their world is 
concerned with how people become immersed in their experience of the world. While 
phenomenological techniques often develop detailed experiential reports, a Participatory 
Inquiry aims at focusing participant knowledge on how the experience can be improved, 
altered or integrated with other skills – that is, it is primarily practical in nature, focusing on 
improving participants’ making sense of their experiences. Traylen (1989) has found that 
participants often become hesitant when told that they are to identify what is meaningful in 
their experience, however when allowed to describe what is meaningful to them, the salient 
features of their behaviour gradually emerge. For example, in his study on stress during 
skilful activities in the workplace, Traylen found that subjects were not initially forthcoming. 
This hesitation was due to the stress involved with the skilful activity being investigated 
(expert use of medical equipment). Reason (1994) detailed methodological steps that could 
be used to encourage meaningful descriptions of experience. This involves working to 
identify salient experiences for the participant and encouraging honest reflection on specific 
moments. For Participatory Inquiry, the main aim is to integrate it with more positive 
experiences and find practical solutions for the participants involved. This shows that people 
are not comfortable giving meta-cognitive descriptions of their experience (e.g. identifying 
stressors), but are happy to describe their experience, from which observations about things 
like stressors can be clearly made.  
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Introspective methods need to be rigorous in isolating descriptions of natural 
experiences in order for these descriptions to provide insight of lived experience. Descriptive 
Experience Sampling, proposed by Hurlburt (1990; 1993), is said to a tool for describing 
ongoing behaviour in an accurate and unbiased way. The details of use of Descriptive 
Experience Sampling (DES) are contentious, even amongst its advocates (Hurlburt & 
Schwitzgebel, 2008), as some of the concepts of consciousness are elusive and we don’t have 
a set of clear definitions to rely on (Froese et al, 2011). The approach shows promise in its 
openness, however.  
DES is an experience sampling methodology, originally proposed by Hurlburt (1990; 
1993) where the researcher uses a subject’s natural environment in order to flesh out 
descriptions of real-life experiences. Instead of isolating experience in a laboratory or using 
first-person reports as a means for interpreting meaning, this approach attempts to allow 
subjects to characterise what is meaningful to them at a particular moment, through notes or 
recordings made at the time, and subsequent facilitation by an interviewer (somewhat similar 
to Participative Inquiry). The method involves training periods where subjects become 
practised in how to give detailed accounts in ways that they are comfortable with (be it voice 
recorder, a notepad to jot down notes and/or drawing pictures representing how they felt at a 
particular time, etc). They are then fixed with a beeper and instructed to give detailed 
descriptions of what is experienced right at the moment when they hear the beeper. In other 
experience sampling methods, the participant may have been instructed to give their 
responses at pre-established intervals or at the occurrence of a specific event. For Hurlburt’s 
DES however, the beeper would go off at random intervals and participants typically wear 
the device for at least 3 consecutive days. Following this, the participant sits down with an 
interviewer where they are probed to flesh out exactly how and what they felt at the time of 
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each beep, going over every note/recording they made over the 3 days. This is discussed in 
great detail in Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel’s (2008) book, Describing Inner Experience. 
Throughout the book the authors have dedicated sections where they comment on each 
other’s approach to the method and from this point on, if Hurlburt and/or Schwitzgebel are 
referred to individually without reference to a publication year, it refers to this particular text.  
Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2008) differ in opinion on some of the fundamental 
concepts of consciousness and the validity of descriptions generated from DES. This doesn’t 
suggest that DES is a valueless methodology, quite the contrary. It is possibly one of the only 
methods that currently allow us to directly comment on the most contentious arguments in the 
study of consciousness. But it remains clear that the method still requires some refinement. 
Schwitzgebel states that there are a number of problems with introspection in general that can 
be extended to most introspective methodologies. These are that (1) conscious states change 
moment to moment and there is rarely, if ever, a continuous and stable conscious state; (2) we 
lack the vocabulary and skill for generating detailed introspective reports as we are not 
accustomed to it; (3) we lack descriptive concepts of conscious experience, e.g. is it the apple 
or the apple experience that is red. This particular concern is metaphysical in nature and 
becomes an abstract and problematic concern for researchers. To tackle this issue we need to 
deliberately use very clear descriptions of concepts so that we avoid confusion and 
ambiguity; (4) introspection requires focus on the experience, which alters the very 
experience attended to. Retrospection may be a more accurate term for what most current 
introspective studies are generating as descriptions are arguably reflections on past 
experiences rather than notes on immediate ones; (5) personal interpretation of experiences is 
ever present in introspective descriptions.  
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For Schwitzgebel, this last issue seems to be a key point. Basic introspective 
descriptions may be biased and distorted, a problem where there seems to be substantial 
disagreement in opinions for the authors. It is problematic as there is little we can do to 
control how a subject implicitly interprets their experience. These concerns may have 
worrying consequences for any introspective method, yet no other approach in the study of 
consciousness is so concerned with understanding lived experience. Considering some of the 
points mentioned above, we may be able to provide a tentative solution by carefully 
considering these concerns in designing studies of experience. This may provide clarity on 
some of the abstract problems faced by researchers who study consciousness. These 
considerations are largely methodological and may offer empirical evidence to help inform 
future studies.  
Starting with point 1 (conscious states change from moment to moment), more recent 
investigations of experience have argued that these moment to moment exchanges are guided 
by the situational instance being studied. For example, context helps shape our understanding 
and in turn guides situational behaviour (Barrett, Mesquita& Smith, 2010). Some researchers 
have argued that we need to place the subject in an environment-organism functional unit to 
understand the processes involved in experience (Heft, 2011), which may be a more effective 
method that trying to describe and understand consciousness as an isolated momentary 
phenomenon. The meaning of any action, the cognitive processes involved in behaviour, and 
the experience of the situation, cannot be adequately understood until that action is properly 
situated in the organism’s psychological situations (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Wilson & 
Golonka, 2013). 
Regarding points 2 and 3 (that we lack the vocabulary and skill for generating detailed 
reports/lack of descriptive concepts), typical studies have trained individuals to give more 
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detailed descriptions of experience. During the DES training period, this is exactly how 
Hurlburt attempts to address this problem. Subjects are asked to give descriptions of 
experience in artificial circumstances before using the DES beeper in their natural 
environment. Additionally, they attempt to control for difficulties in describing experience by 
briefing participants to say whatever comes naturally to them, and that there is no answer that 
is irrelevant. During the interview after the 3 day period with the beeper, the interviewer 
attempts to get the subject to elaborate on their descriptions so the reports do not consist of 
ambiguous statements. Training has also been used in neurophenomenological studies (which 
will be examined more closely in the following chapter) and is seen as an essential part of the 
process (Burr, 2002; Langdridge, 2004/2007; Lutz, 2002, Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 
1996). 
Another point needs to be addressed however: phenomenologically training subjects 
may be an ineffective was of eliciting subjective reports. Hurlburt (1990) viewed this training 
as a pivotal part of the way in which descriptive data should be collected. Introspective 
descriptions are not easily accessible for the subject (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006). However, 
when individuals are phenomenologically trained, the context of the experience is changed. 
Lutz and Thompson (2003), for instance, claim that this is a non-issue, however they do not 
fully illustrate why, instead proposing that individuals become more sensitive to their own 
experience through “the systematic training of attention and self-regulation of emotion” (p. 
33). The second part of this claim is problematic. How individuals regulate their emotions to 
increase sensitivity to experience is never fully explained and it doesn’t seem to have 
empirical grounding (Levine, 1983). Another problem becomes apparent: emotion is a vague 
and broad term with many implications. As Fehr and Russell (1984) state, “everyone knows 
what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems no one knows” (p. 464). 
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There is little research carried out specifically addressing this emotion-body phenomenon of 
increasing sensitivity to experience. Additionally, there are no research methodologies 
capable of addressing this kind of body-phenomena at present. Trying to illustrate original 
and refined first-person data for cognitive science may be premature if we don’t have the 
tools to sample it carefully and to analyse it.  
Subjects in these studies may not need to be phenomenologically trained to actively 
reflect on their experience. Overgaard (2004) argues that participants actively reflect as they 
engage in a controlled cognitive task. That is, participants may actively reflect on their 
experience throughout the tasks, which shapes their experience. However, how this active 
participation may affect performance is little understood and is an important aspect to clarify. 
If participants are more actively involved in the process of investigation than we currently 
give them credit for, then this has ramifications for the generalisation of results in much 
psychological research. This is echoed in Kagan (2012) who worries that we are overlooking 
experience in our current descriptions of behaviour.  Researchers that are more sympathetic 
to phenomenological approaches suggest that we need to invest in developing more practical 
first-person methods (Wilson & Golonka, 2013; Schwitzgebel, 2008). That is, we may need 
to invest in finding methods that render descriptions of experience that are just as tried-and-
tested as current experimental methods.   
Some form of training methods are seen in most, if not all introspective approaches 
(Lutz & Thompson, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2003). Introspective training aims to provide a 
clearly defined experience where reports are gathered before taking part in the study. One 
classic case is that of Titchener’s introspective methodology, where participants were 
presented with distinctive tones and asked to detail their salient features. Schwitzgebel (2003) 
notes that this is a rudimentary form of introspection, yet it is seen in phenomenologically 
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informed research (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996) and offers a means of reflecting 
on consciousness that is distinct and separate from other more familiar forms of experience. 
By this, we refer to the nature of describing an experience which is (1) not normally 
experienced by the person, therefore novel and (2) an opportunity for genuine introspection 
as the person must reflect on a distinct experience that cannot be confused for another or for a 
separate temporal experience. In Schwitzgebel’s (2003) view, these warrant much more 
exploration in the study of consciousness. However, Hurlburt and Ahktar (2011) are not 
concerned with trying to understand consciousness as an isolated momentary phenomenon. 
While the reiteration of moments and descriptions through the DES method are important, the 
training involved to attain thee descriptions aims to avoid unnecessary and potentially 
misleading reflections, similar to the Husserlian phenomenological project. However, some 
methodological issues remain as DES argues that it can attain accurate accounts of 
experience. The authors state that the method attains descriptions that are as close to the 
natural flow of experience as descriptive methods have been able to accomplish thus far.  
Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2008) argue that through first-person methods, the 
elicitation period of describing experience is more like retrospective experience as the subject 
creates their narrative accounts. Hulbert avoids this criticism by redefining what he means by 
pre-reflective states. He claims DES accesses ‘pristine experience’, and characterises pristine 
experience as isolating the moment-to-moment consciously accessible descriptions – what is 
meaningfully attended to at that very moment in time in a natural environment. DES accepts 
that subjects only attend to or notice just a few of the experiences available to them at a 
particular time, and these individual accounts are the pristine experiences.  This represents an 
experiential state that is not reflected upon and thus, he claims, avoids the retrospective 
experience criticism. Participants don’t have the opportunity to reflect on it as they are 
 
 
~ 32 ~ 
 
trained to give accounts of the ‘pristine’ experiences. Froese et al (2011) termed this 
reflective consciousness, though Hurlburt (2011) would likely resist this characterisation as it 
implies an ‘after-the-moment’ phenomenon. This illustrates a key difference in the 
researchers’ objectives. Schwitzgebel doesn’t believe that DES can fully explicate moment-
to-moment experiences. Hurlburt acknowledges that while it is far from ideal, DES may 
currently be the best way of formulating descriptions of momentary experiences. However, 
neither Participatory Inquiry nor DES properly examines how a subject’s experience might 
change when they actively reflect on it. For Hurlburt, his aim with DES is to pick out 
structures within the verbal iterations, for example, the multiplicity or paucity of elements 
within attention, the mood of the participant and its effects on experiential accounts. Pristine 
experience concerns itself with the natual and the fidelity to the natural (Hurlburt, 2011). 
However, how the experience changes is ill-defined  (Kane, 2010) and if the experience alters 
once an agent actively focuses on it, then surely the act of training individuals in such studies 
is problematic.  
Firstly, how we can ever use first-person reports to inform us if they represent a realm 
of experience only accessible through active reflection is unclear. Secondly, the 
phenomenological reports only tell of experience of phenomenologically trained individuals. 
The reports are removed from the lived experience of the typical untrained individual, or the 
way we naturally attend to the environment. Thirdly, we should be extremely cautious when 
using introspective methods without considering temporality. That is, when the experiences 
are identified, what they are currently doing in their natural environment and whether or not 
this experiential data can be meaningfully used to understand some aspect of how the 
participant behaves in that context. By allowing random beeping in DES, participant’s pre-
conceptions and expectations about the experience they are to describe are strongly limited, 
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and it makes the descriptions of experience near impossible to integrate with any sort of 
meaningful generalisation of how experience may be structured – information about the 
environment and the person’s behaviour at that moment cannot easily be collected or 
corroborated with others’ descriptions in similar situations. That seems to be what Hurlburt is 
suggesting with ‘pristine’ experience: that an individual will meaningfully seek out what is 
meaningful to them, yet there is no systematic way to compare it to any other individual’s 
experience or calibrate it with the participant’s behaviour. The benefits of the person’s natural 
environment in providing access to uncontrived experiences eliminate standards for 
comparison, which is also true for Participatory Inquiry. To put it in different terms, it is 
unclear if descriptions of similar situations, attained from a number of people, could be used 
to understand their behaviour in that situation, or more generally in similar contexts.  
 
2.4  Psychological methods and context 
In recent years there have been a number of attempts to reintroduce experience in lab 
based settings, not just conceptually but pragmatically (Barrett et al. 2010). In examining 
behaviour and experience in context these approaches draw on the history of 
phenomenological research. Some of the traditional phenomenological studies have been 
particularly influential. As Merleau-Ponty (1965) stated, “the world is inseparable from the 
subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is 
inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects” (p. 499). A 
number of approaches developed in the following decades by viewing the individual as a 
more active agent in how they understand the world around them. For example Barker’s 
(1968) study on child behaviour observed that children’s behaviour is not easily explained 
purely in terms of response to immediately preceding stimuli, particularly when those stimuli 
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are adult behaviours. He coined the term ‘behaviour setting’ in ecological psychology which 
refers to the physical and social settings in which behaviours occur and by which they are 
often structured. By placing importance on the psychological situation of the individual, his 
work showed social and physical context is a good predictor of behaviour.  
Mesquita et al. (2010) argue that we must understand that behaviour is entrenched in 
multifaceted processes involving emotion, sociality and the environment. The experiential 
aspect of this dynamic relationship with the world is fundamental to cognitive function. 
Understanding subjective experience is particularly important if we are to view the individual 
as an active agent in cognitive functioning. As such we need to develop more systematic 
ways of using individuals’ understanding of the world as a means to categorise behaviour. A 
cognitive agent engages in meaningful interaction with the world, which is context dependent 
and embedded in their social world.  
Slaby (2010) argues that an analysis of contextual patterns as well as conceptual 
difficulties and their potential consequences for empirical work need to be carefully 
considered. He used the term ‘critical neuroscience’ to refer to an approach that strives to 
understand, explain, contextualise and critique developments in and around the social, 
affective and cognitive neurosciences. Aiming to be an interdisciplinary approach, Slaby 
argues against thinking of the work of the humanities and natural sciences as inhabiting 
intrinsically different epistemologies. Instead, he argues that negative critique must remain 
important within collaborative experimentation, but that this cannot be the only viable avenue 
for collaboration. However, this is also needed more broadly for psychological science. In 
actuality, some of Slaby’s critiques may be premature for the neurosciences when, at its core, 
research practices in Psychology overlook some of the concerns he raised. He argues that we 
need a ‘critical’ scientific approach which delves into the phenomenological aspects of 
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behaviour and aims to understand the mind in terms of holistic principles.  If a critical study 
of meaning and subjectivity can be integrated with the research practices, then we may be 
better equipped to explore situation. This is a pragmatic way that more qualitative work 
might contribute to cognitive and social research, especially when detailing aspects of lived 
experiences.  
Even decades-old studies have shown that the mind does not select out individual 
elements – isolated stimuli – of the environment to respond to (Barker, 1968; Levine, 1983; 
Maturana & Varela, 1980; Milgram, 1974; Rosenberg, 1969). As Schwartz (2010) states, our 
actions are shaped by the entirety of the situation in which we find ourselves (Schwartz, 
2010). When people respond to a stimulus they are rarely, if ever, reacting just to the 
specifics of the stimulus itself, but to the meaning and entire situational context, and doing so 
not as a collection of separate cognitive, emotional and other systems, but as a person 
interacting with their world (Golonka & Wilson, 2012). One classic example that illustrates 
this fact is that of Rosenberg and a team of researchers (1969), who conducted a study using 
two contextualised situations in an experimental task on social perception, asking participants 
how much they liked or disliked various pictured persons. Both groups were informed that 
past research indicated that liking-disliking reactions to strangers correlated with maturity. 
These studies show just how sensitive participants in the lab are to contextual changes and 
social cues. 
In one of their experiments, one group were told that psychologically mature and 
healthy individuals show greater liking for strangers than immature people and were given 
fabricated journal article citations. The other experimental group were informed the opposite 
– that research indicated that immaturity was associated with greater liking of strangers, with 
fabricated journal articles cited. Both groups however were informed that they were not going 
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to take part in a study of liking-disliking images of strangers, but rate pictures of strangers to 
create a standardised list of photographs. Participants believed that these photographs were 
then going to be used in a liking-disliking task in future research. It isn’t surprising that there 
were significant differences between the groups, but the obvious manipulation here is not the 
full story. Rosenberg's work is a clear illustration of evaluation apprehension, which can be 
made to affect experimental responding. However, Rosenberg also included a control group 
with no information about maturity and liking. The results indicated that male participants 
rated male pictures much lower than both experimental groups, in particular they rated the 
images substantially lower than the group that were informed that lower ratings was 
associated with maturity. The meaning of stimuli played an integral role in the experiment 
that overshadowed the social cue groups. 
Males rated male images substantially lower when they were not aware that literature 
(although fabricated) indicated that it had a bearing on one’s psychological maturity and 
health. It seems that meaning of the task within the entire psychological situation, not just the 
stimulus, plays a fundamental role in experimental paradigms and, in the case of the group 
with no priming, Rosenberg (1969) concluded that individual’s ratings were influenced by 
needing less approval from others. In a follow-up interview of participants, Rosenberg found 
that individuals in the social cue conditions behaved in such a way to win favourable 
judgement from the experimenter. Schwartz (2010) states that even in abstract, lab-based, 
cognitive tasks, the meaning of a situation for the participant can be sufficiently powerful, in 
that it has serious implications for cognitive theories. Schwartz argues that qualitative 
differences in cognitive tasks, personality, and situational factors influence behaviour in the 
lab and this leads to conceptual difficulties when drawing instances and making 
generalisations about cognitive processes. As Molden and Dweck (2006) claim, trying to 
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make generalisations about the “average person” leads us to describing no one in particular. 
People and situations are not simply separable sources of variation that interact and influence 
each other.  
In another experiment, Rosenberg (1968) attempted to directly manipulate context in 
a behavioural task involving finger tapping. At the beginning of the experiment, participants 
were asked if they had taken a general abilities test during freshman week. The purpose of 
this was to prompt participants toward evaluation apprehension. They were subsequently 
asked to focus on their performance through pre-tests on verbal and symbolic skills. Results 
indicated that primed participants performed more accurately in the finger tapping task than 
non-primed peers. Shortly after, Rosenberg conducted another study using the finger tapping 
task, and instead of priming participants on performance evaluation, informed them that the 
task was recently conducted at other universities and results implied that people with higher 
intelligence performed differently. Although this was fabricated information, results showed 
that participants performed more accurately. Additionally, in both experimental conditions 
outlined, participants received either full feedback or partial feedback on their performance 
during the task. Both groups performed better in the task than the non-primed groups; 
however the group with full feedback performed slightly better than the group who received 
partial feedback. 
Wilson and Golonka (2013) argue that social priming has become a worrying issue in 
Psychology in more recent years. Priming research states that behaviour is often triggered by 
the mere presence of relevant situational features (Bargh, Chen and Burrows, 1996). 
However, the lack of control over the information contained in social priming experiments 
results in unreliable outcomes for specific examples (Wilson, 2013). Cesario (2014) argues 
that semantic and social priming seen in these studies should be concerned with trying to 
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identify possible issues with priming in the methodologies used. This is sympathetic with 
critiques of  introspection. The effects of context and situational instances on more general 
psychological methods are currently overlooked, despite more recent research highlighting 
how important it is on the resulting behaviour.   
One of the conclusions that Rosenberg draws is that participants regulate their 
responding so as to win favourable judgement from the experimenter. However, the study has 
additional implications. By altering momentary situations, participants perceived the task 
differently. The meaning of the task, and the participants’ experience of it, was altered. Even 
if participants were guided by favourable judgement of experimenters, cues in the 
experimental paradigm created different phenomenological meanings, the implications of 
which are not fully explored. Rosenberg describes this as bias in experimental responding 
through arousal of evaluation apprehension and cueing particular response patterns likely to 
foster positive evaluation. However, it may be that stimulus meaning had an integral role in 
the experiments and at present, psychological literature either overlooks the influence of 
context (which alters meaning) or as a research field, methodological principles don’t yet 
address such phenomena. 
Research methodologies need to be scrutinised as a number of issues have emerged in 
consciousness and cognitive studies over the last number of years. Traditional methods of 
investigation are limiting in their scope. First- and third-person methodologies tend to 
compartmentalise psychological processes as they are intrinsically designed to do so. Current 
research models are designed to address information processing systems and aim to limit 
their scope to add scrutiny to the individual process being investigated. As we move toward 
more dynamic and holistic approaches to cognition, there have been a number of attempts to 
overcome this. Secondary approaches have tried to integrate first- and third-person 
 
 
~ 39 ~ 
 
methodologies for more inclusive data. However, these methods are still in the early stages of 
development. They tend to make assumptions about the effects (or non-effects) of training 
participants in reflection, and run continual risk of producing confabulated data. Attempts to 
integrate them remain one of the most difficult problems in cognitive science (Chalmers, 
1995), that of using first-person data to guide behavioural interpretation. This makes it hard 
to adapt to other research paradigms in psychological studies. Rather than try to vilify the 
methods, we need to be open and inclusive of ideas that may avoid mind/body categorisations 
yet produce concise and reliable data.  
 
2.5  Conclusion  
Compartmentalisation of psychological processes is common in much of Psychology 
and has led to the mind and body being discussed as quite separate entities (Barrett & 
Lindquist, 2008). This happens in both consciousness and cognitive studies, and is 
problematic as it perpetuates the idea that they must be addressed individually, and  have 
little relationship with each other. Research often marginalises experiential processes in some 
way or another. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Generally, more recently 
developed theories are adopting holistic approaches and acknowledging that experience is an 
important concept for understanding cognition. However, even though many studies claim 
that our actions are shaped by the entirety of a situation in which we find ourselves, how to 
study this interdependence in a reasonable and practicable way remains unclear. When the 
situation is looked at, it is usually done so in a rudimentary way where phenomena such as 
time pressure or task skill is altered. Few attempts directly consider the processes that may be 
involved in the meaningful interpretation of environmental stimuli. Understanding these 
processes may be the key to developing more holistic methods of investigation. 
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While viewing meaning and context as important, new approaches to research 
sensitive to this issue are still in development, and only a handful of research fields are 
dedicated to exploring the subtleties of meaningful experience. Instead of trying to develop a 
completely new approach, it may be more worthwhile to explore the effects of meaningful 
experience in the lab through secondary approaches. This involves not only adopting a 
holistic approach to consciousness, but a refocus of the way we carry out normal 
experimental research. 
Ideally, we need an approach that clarifies the experience investigated, yet does not 
alter that experience (or limits the ways in which the experience is altered). This will result in 
more meaningful data where the situational experience is explored.  There are growing 
concerns that we need to replace our existing investigative procedures with methodologies 
that also afford more synthetic thinking (Varela, 1996). However we must take care that we 
do not sacrifice the rigour and discipline of proper scientific practice (Wilson & Golonka, 
2013). While traditional research principles take an analytic perspective to understanding the 
organism, often characterising the person as a passive observer in the world, we should 
instead focus our attention on trying to characterise the individual as an active participator in 
the cognitive process. From this chapter, we see that phenomenology plays such an important 
role in Psychology as it goes beyond qualitative descriptions informing not just how, but why 
we place such value on understanding experience in behavioural and cognitive science.   
The following chapter discusses the challenge of studying experience in controlled 
settings and some of the extant approaches that are being used in current research. While 
standard experimental methods tend to isolate behaviour in the laboratory, qualitative 
methods tend to focus on naturalistic settings, where the links between behaviour and 
experience can only be made in general terms. If we are to examine how experience plays a 
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role in behaviour in more precise and controlled fashion, we need methods that include the 
collection of data on experience in the controlled setting of the laboratory. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Integrative Methods in Psychology 
 
One researcher’s obvious phenomenological truth, grounding an entire research programme, 
is another’s theory-laden confabulation. And once this is grasped, all the sound and fury of 
the debate loses its interest; the debaters are talking about different things. Consciousness 
studies cries out for a reasonably accurate introspective method (Weisberg, 2011, p. 5). 
 
 
The literature discussed in the previous chapter has highlighted how 
phenomenological research aims to explore the underpinnings of consciousness, experience, 
and behaviour. However, these research paradigms are largely concerned with qualitative 
descriptions of experience, most often in naturalistic settings, making it difficult to integrate 
findings with behavioural and cognitive science (Froese, Gould & Barrett, 2011; Varela and 
Shear, 1999). A plethora of research in the past few decades highlight embodiment as an 
important paradigmatic shift in Psychology for understanding these concepts further (Barrett, 
2011; Colombetti, 2007; DiPaolo, 2009; Heft, 2011; Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela et al. 
1991). The most common definitions of embodied cognition involve the straight-forward 
claim that states of the body modify states of the mind. However, it is argued that the 
implications of embodiment are actually much more radical than this (Chemero, 2009; Stuart, 
2011; Varela, 1996; Wilson, 2002). It involves a shift in focus from the way much of 
cognitive science is characterising cognitive processes at present. If cognition spans the brain, 
body, and the environment, it can no longer be considered a “disembodied” state, modified 
by experience. Rather than an input-output system of some kind which is most commonly 
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seen in the literature on higher-order cognitive functioning, the cognitive system is an 
extended system assembled dynamically, in context, from a broad array of resources 
including bodily, neural, and environmental. Taking embodiment seriously therefore requires 
new methods and theory, as experience plays a different role in how behaviour is understood. 
The central claim is that the brain is not the sole cognitive resource available to us to solve 
problems, a claim seen as radical for many researchers as many of our cognitive theories stem 
from defining the individual as a processor of information (Allen & Williams, 2011). The 
shift in embodiment argues that “our bodies and their perceptually guided motions through 
the world do much of the work required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex 
internal mental representations” (Wilson & Golonka, 2013, p. 263). This simple 
characterisation changes our idea of what cognition involves, and thus embodiment is not 
simply another element to be added to the cognitive system, it changes what we think about 
cognition from the ground up.  
The term ‘machine-metaphor’ has been used to refer to cognitive system being 
understood as information processing systems. Under this view, experience is often 
characterised as causing internal triggers in the organism instead of influencing the person’s 
cognitive processes (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008). However, embodied researchers emphasise 
qualitative features of behaviour that have been previously overlooked to understand the 
cognitive process, usually because they do not easily fit into momentary data sampling 
techniques typical in traditional research (Colombetti, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Slaby, 2007; 
Stuart, 2012). An embodied approach should “never forget that it’s trying to explain the first-
person experience of the organism” (Wilson & Golonka, 2013, p. 9). While these developing 
trends tend to be philosophically motivated, they are gaining traction in more mainstream 
psychological literature (Allen & Williams, 2011, Kagan, 2012; Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  
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Slaby, Paskaleva and Stephan (2013), for instance, investigated components of 
behavioural change that may involve more active engagements with the environment. They 
argue that we lack a systematic way discussing how behaviour is “dynamically set in motion 
[…], unfold[s] dynamically over time […] according to a specific trajectory in which the 
agent’s behaviour and experience is in dynamic, coordinated exchange with significant 
goings-on in the environment” (Slaby, Paskaleva & Stephanp, 2013;. p. 5, 6). As we have 
seen in Chapter Two, traditional research principles may be limiting as they start by viewing 
the organism as a passive observer in the world, absorbing information in an abstract and 
neutral fashion, and address cognitive processes as distinct modules, or components of a 
complex cognitive structure. For example, evaluation, judgement, emotional valence, and 
interpretation are all characterised as occurring after the information has been input into the 
organism through the perceptual system. A number of traditional approaches in Psychology 
characterise behaviour as stimulus-response systems which is said to compartmentalise 
psychological processes, with theories often referring to the mind and the body as 
intrinsically distinct and separate entities that influence one another during the generation of a 
response. Experience, under this view, is an ill-defined and little discussed component of the 
perception process. In other words, the feeling of what happens is completely overlooked, 
which has implications for developing embodied theories as we currently do not know how to 
usefully integrate subjective data with behavioural responses in meaningful ways.  
Some current embodied approaches in Psychology argue that experience needs to be 
seen as a structural component of behaviour, where we understand it in terms of the situation 
in which a person finds themselves (Allen & Williams, 2011; Schwartz, 2010). The kind of 
argument laid out by Slaby et al. (2013) makes clear that cognitive activity is not something 
that occurs in isolated components at discrete moments, but is a prolonged process, one that 
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is continuous and continually evolving over time. While it is vital that we maintain high 
standards of control and systematicity in our observations and measurements of behaviour, it 
seems necessary to broaden our methods to include participants’ experiences (meaningful and 
otherwise) of the situations in which the measurements are made. 
Several attempts to cope with the complex relationship between first- and third-person 
data on experience have been made in cognitive science. Some researchers argue that 
experience has, in much of psychological research, not been seen as an integral part of 
contemporary research methods (Di Paolo, Rohde & De Jaegher, 2007; Varela et al. 1991, 
Wilson, 2013). Varela and Shear (1999) have argued that first-person and subjective 
experiences are an explicit component in how we understand third-person characterisations of 
behaviour; however, separating the two, as is common in the psychological literature, is 
problematic as it isolates our understanding of either facet of the situation. A key issue is not 
just that more phenomenological approaches highlight important aspects of experience, but 
rather that we lack a pragmatic approach for using qualitative descriptions to usefully explain 
and inform behavioural data of empirical studies. 
For more embodied approaches the experience is never characterised as external to 
the process, either just “in here” or “out there”. Instead, it is seen as something that is 
inherent to it: the agent is embedded and continuously immersed in experience (Stuart, 2012). 
The organism is at the centre of activity in the world and individuals play an active role in the 
generation of meaning and behave in ways that matters to them. This clearly involves quite a 
different take on what cognition is and how it should be studied from a straightforward 
computational view. Rather than cataloguing sets of basic cognitive processes (such as 
working memory, problem solving systems and so on), cognition and action must be 
examined in a clearly defined context, as involving structured interactions with the person's 
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environment, instead of processes occurring within the head of the person. The following 
sections outline the current research being carried out in Psychology that is synonymous with 
embodied approaches. Some of these areas of research are calling for substantially different 
ways of collecting and analysing data, than current mainstream approaches.  
 
3.1  Phenomenologically informed methods – The Elicitation Interview method 
Some researchers propose that integrating phenomenologically informed approaches 
in the lab is a worthwhile challenge that may help us find new ways of understanding 
cognition (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Olivares et al. 2015; Piccinini, 2010; Varela, 1996). 
Rather than find faults in typical lab based practices using different lab based tasks, this thesis 
aims to find ways of using certain forms of phenomenologically inspired methods to augment 
and complement standard laboratory techniques. Wilson and Golonka (2013) argue that we 
need to focus on the “unfolding of a complex dynamic in the present time” (p. 2) where a 
more comprehensive understanding of experience is required. As we have seen, there are a 
number of methods that may be available for this; however adapting them for lab based 
practices will be a challenge as these methods often call for additional actions on the part of 
the experimenter (Heron & Reason, 1997; Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006).  
As well as Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), there are a number of 
approaches that attempt to develop methods for examining experience through descriptive 
reports. The “elicitation interview” is Vermersch’s (1992) proposal for attaining accurate 
descriptions of lived experience, most fully developed in the work of Petitmengin (2006). 
The authors argue that when an individual tries to explain reasons for behaving or responding 
in a particular way, the subject is inclined to provide justifications or rationalisations which 
substitute themselves for the actual decision criteria. The elicitation interview is a means of 
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drawing out the particulars of the pure, unconceptualised experience of the interviewee at a 
particular time – performing the phenomenological reduction in collaboration. As 
Petitmengin (2006) states that the method “enables us to bring a person, who may not be 
trained, to become conscious of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great 
precision” (p. 230). It is argued that rigorous training for the interviewer is necessary as the 
process being described by the interviewee is something that is not immediately accessible to 
reflective consciousness and verbal descriptions. We experience it, but often in an 
unrecognised or pre-reflective way. The elicitation interview enables a trained researcher to 
gather experiential information from an untrained participant. 
Petitmengin’s Elicitation Interview (EI) method (2006) provides rigorous step-by-step 
guide for attaining accurate descriptions of experience. Firstly, the interviewer helps the 
subject choose a particular occurrence in the cognitive process to be described in an attempt 
to isolate a singular experience situated in a specific time and space. This is said to reduce 
justifications of experience and encourage descriptions of how the subject imagines or what 
they believe about the experience. Secondly, the interview process involves evoking a 
response, often based on what is called ‘sensorial triggering’. Often we are unaware of 
memorising a particular cognitive event but Petitmengin and colleagues argue that, based on 
Husserl’s description of ‘passive memory’, a particular memory can be triggered by focusing 
the subject on a specific temporal event. For example, focusing attention on how you got to 
work this morning may trigger your memories of the journey. So take for instance how you 
were feeling; the effect the weather had on you; a song on the radio etc. Over the course of 
the interview, the interviewer elicits the visual, auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic, olfactory 
sensations associated with that particular experience. The EI method, however, aims at 
shifting the subject’s descriptions from the content of the experience, the ‘what’ (visual, 
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tactile etc.), to the processes involved, or the ‘how’. Without suggesting content, the 
interviewer asks questions aimed at the process of behaviour, rather than experience of 
sensory modalities. 
Petitmengin’s (2006) work has shown that participants provide descriptions of the 
choice they did not make, supporting Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) findings that introspective 
methods are insufficient ways of accessing our cognitive process as people are quite inept at 
providing authentic descriptions and sensitive to manipulations. In an attempt to overcome 
this, and develop a method which accurately attains experiential data, Petitmengin et al. 
(2013) describe how participants learn to focus on a visual aspect of experience allowing and 
encouraging participants to focus on specific features. This method is largely influenced by 
Johansson et al. (2005) who illustrated that participants often reported descriptions of choices 
they did not make in experimental situations, resulting from a phenomenon termed ‘choice 
blindness’. In this study, the experimenter presents pictures of faces to participants and asks 
them to choose which one the find the most attractive. The experimenter shows the chosen 
picture again and asks them to explain their choices, but in some instances, shows the 
unchosen picture. A large proportion of participants fail to detect that they have been handed 
the unchosen picture, and thus proceed to give a reason for making a choice that they never 
made. 
Using photographs, Petitmengin asks questions such as “where specifically are you 
focusing on the photograph? What features do you notice? What are you feeling when you 
look at this?” and so forth. In contrast to Johansson et al. (2005), this questioning shifts 
subjects’ descriptions from the pictures, towards the actual choice process enabling the 
description of emergent behaviours at that particular moment. While replicating the 
Johansson et al. (2005) study, the EI method introduces an elicitation stage only for some 
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picture choices. This is, the EI method in this study was only introduced for some of the 
picture choices whereby participants were asked a series of questions attempting to uncover 
the choice process itself. At the beginning of the experiment, the subject is told that in some 
trials, he will be asked to describe his choice. Following the representation of the picture, the 
experimenter then conducts an “elicitation interview” in order to get the subject to explain his 
choice process. Through the responses attained during this interview, results were drastically 
different from Johansson et al. (2005) with participants noticing the substitution of pictures in 
the majority of cases. When the elicitation stage was not introduced, results were similar to 
Johansson and colleagues, the changes in pictures going unnoticed.  
In their study, the emphasis is placed on the ability and experience of the researcher. 
According to Vermersch (2011), the better the interviewer is, the more accurate the 
experiential data.  Demands are entirely placed on the researcher and not necessarily the 
situation being investigated. This is similar to much of the traditional principles of 
introspective methods, where the researcher needs to be aware of the subtle effects of 
intersubjectivity. For the EI, the solution was to provide much training experience for the 
researcher to avoid biasing participants’ responses. However, even with such training, or 
perhaps even as a result of such intensive training, this criticism still remains a concern. For 
example, how this could overcome potential participant biasing seems to only exist in theory 
as the EI method inevitably involves the researcher asking specific questions on experiences 
that may otherwise go unnoticed. The effects of introspectively exploring experience are 
going to change that experience in some way for the participant, even with minimal 
questioning. Instead of characterising biases as something that needs to be avoided, we 
instead should be aware that they are going to be involved in the study of experience and find 
ways to balance or account for them.  
 
 
~ 50 ~ 
 
There was also a 45 minute gap between participant choice and the explanation period 
in the interview group, compared to a few seconds gap in the non-interview group. This 
substantial difference in the temporal dynamics of the decision and reason-giving process 
goes unremarked in the paper. It illustrates that the interview technique is very time intensive. 
As well as demanding substantial investment from both researcher and participants, it could 
introduce factors such as boredom and responses based on justifications for their responses. 
Any research method must face this difficult problem, of how the procedure might be 
affecting the phenomena they aim to explore (Schwitzgebel, 2008). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this is especially true for qualitative, introspective and phenomenological 
enquiries as these areas aim to directly comment on the phenomena they are used to 
investigate. For example, Langdridge (2004), as well as Reid, Flowers and Larkin (2005) 
state that the aim of qualitative research is to uncover some previously unknown aspect of the 
phenomena studied, with meaning and experience understood as an inherent part of the 
person’s behaviour. 
Uncovering new aspects of phenomena is important, but it cannot be the end point of 
qualitative research. Integration of experiential data with precise behavioural measures is 
crucial if the whole of “lived bodily experience” is to be adequately addressed. The 
Elicitation Interview attempts to control this through carefully training the interviewer. The 
only other major candidate for an approach to experiential data collection in the laboratory 
takes the alternative tack, of training the participants. 
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3.2 The neurophenomenological approach 
Neurophenomenology, proposed by Varela (1996) attempted to address the problem 
of integrative methodologies in pragmatic ways, combining neuroscience with 
phenomenology in the study of experience, mind, and consciousness, with an emphasis on the 
embodied condition of the human mind. In order to carry out the integration of experiential 
and neurological data, Lutz and Thompson (2003) built on Varela’s concepts and 
characterised a method for attaining experiential data that was divided into categories created 
by the participants. During intensive training sessions that took place prior to the 
experimental task, participants labelled their experiences to create categories termed 
“phenomenological markers” (which are also often called invariants or qualitative 
categories). During the neurophenomenological experiment then, which gathered brain data 
by recording EEG signals, participants would press a button at various stages of the study, 
where the experiential data was gathered by using the pre-established experience categories. 
Neurophenomenological studies often use visual perception tasks (Lutz, 2002; Lutz & 
Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996) as they involve a controlled way of measuring a specific 
experience over time. In Lutz and Thompson’s (2003) task, participants were asked to fixate 
on dot patterns (“random dot stereograms”, perhaps better known as “magic eye” pictures) on 
a screen which gradually became 3D objects. By pressing the button, it initiated a stage in the 
experiment where the participant began to understand the patterns emerging before them, so 
the controlled descriptive data could be correlated with brain signals at specific moments on 
the experiment that could then be calibrated. These data are then analysed in relation to the 
“phenomenological markers” that had been created, and the subjective descriptions guide the 
interpretation of the brain data. What this approach shows then, is that links can be drawn 
with subjective experience and behaviour in controlled ways.    
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Neurophenomenology is said to find tangible links between first- and third-person 
data. Stemming from the embodied approach in cognitive science (Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch, 1991), this field of study has been acknowledged as a useful tool for cognitive science 
(Bayne, 2004; Doan, 2009) however certain ambiguities remain. Phenomenological studies 
often categorise difference types of conscious states of experience. Lutz and Thompson 
(2003) categorise many different types of conscious states, but two in particular are relevant 
in the study of experience in Psychology. These are: pre-reflective conscious states and 
unreflective consciousness states. Legrand (2007) states that through pre-reflective forms of 
bodily experience, the performative body relies on sensori-motor integrative mechanisms that 
process information on the external world in a self-relative way. That is to say, accessing 
lived qualities of the experiencing process with an open and unprejudiced descriptive attitude. 
Unreflective consciousness is a ‘natural attitude’, wherein we are caught up in the world and 
our various belief-constructs and theories about it (Lutz & Thompson, 2003). Unreflective 
consciousness uses our habitual, implicit concepts to structure our experience, and is the kind 
of experience that trained phenomenologists explicitly aim to minimise or eliminate.  
In neurophenomenology, the pre-reflective state is investigated. Participants in these 
studies are “phenomenological trained” to give verbal subjective responses (Lutz, 2002; Lutz, 
Lachaux, Martinerie & Varela, 2001; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1999). As discussed 
in Lutz and Thompson (2003), training subjects involves a number of important features. The 
first is structural description – individuals were encouraged to adopt open and unprejudiced 
descriptive attitudes. This was achieved through intensive training sessions which was said to 
stabilise qualitative details that had “categorical features of experience that are 
phenomenologically describable both across and within the various forms of lived 
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experience” (p. 32), essentially encouraging them to talk about experience in an open and 
confident way. 
However the practicalities and training procedures involved are intense and hard to 
replicate when applying these methodological principles to other psychological and 
behavioural phenomena. Whereas these approaches are tailor made for the particular 
phenomena explored in the initial research (through the use of pre-established experience 
categories), traditional research models are designed to be generalised and applied in 
substantially varied domains. For a technique to find more widespread use it will need to be 
robust and rigorous. To achieve widespread adoption, a method will need to be not just 
practical, but relatively easy to apply.  
In a sense, these methods are ‘closed’, in that they are narrow in focus and not open to 
much manipulation. They naturally produce narrowly focused data, isolating one or two 
facets of the psychological situation. Levine (1983) argues that this may be problematic as 
controlled methods might be overly restrictive, especially considering the wide range of 
possible aspects of the psychological situation, context and meaning have on cognition and 
behaviour (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008). How to use this approach for the study of more 
general experience or behaviour is not understood and has not been proposed in the current 
literature. Researchers are unclear how exactly to adopt the neurophenomenological approach 
in the further exploration of experience, without adopting additional methods for attaining 
experiential data in the laboratory. The tasks used in neurophenomenological studies are also 
specifically designed for perceptual and neurological data (EEG), and there are currently no 
attempts to generalise the methods to behavioural work.  For example, integrating these 
techniques with otherphysiological measures could give strength to the method, especially 
how current technological advancements are not particularly intrusive (smartwatches gather 
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accurate physiological measurements such as heart rate, sleep patterns, and have also been 
used to measure blood pressure).     
Schwitzgebel (2003) argues that the methods we readily use in first-person 
approaches may affect the participants’ experience. If this is true, as some of the 
neurophenomenological work seems to show, then training individuals in qualitative or 
phenomenologically informed studies has the clear limitation of changing experience for 
them. From the introspective training methods used by Titchener (1867 – 1927), participants 
are encouraged to not only actively reflect on experience, but to describe their experience in a 
way that is not necessarily natural for them (Schwitzgebel, 2003). Dennett (1991) argues that 
researchers need to take (at least) some of what naïve participants describe as meaningful or 
authentic. It is, after all, based on their perspective of what the researcher is asking. This is 
also echoed in Gallagher (2005) who calls for a naturalisation of phenomenological methods 
whereby we use experiential data in more controlled ways, exploring specific aspects of 
behaviour. 
In other introspective methods, the onus is put on the researcher. For example, 
Petitmengin (2006) states that the researcher needs to have the appropriate skills before 
collecting introspective data. For the Elicitation Interview, care is needed to reduce 
experimenter or intersubjective biases. For Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2008), they argue that 
only researcher with intensive skills training should contemplate introspective data collection 
techniques. While taking great care in gathering qualitative responses or interviewing 
participants should always be done in a controlled way, Vermersch (2004) notes that 
researchers who would be interested in exploring experience in disciplined ways are moving 
away from introspective methods due to their intensive training practices.  
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For Lutz and Thompson (2003), refining first-person methods is needed to allow 
individuals to “thematize important but otherwise tacit aspects of their experience” (p.39). 
This may be possible through developing first-person methods in novel empirical tasks and 
focussing on the unreflective state of consciousness. How we could go about interpreting this 
data is unclear, with the only method carried out illustrated in neurophenomenological studies 
(which concentrate on a different conscious state – prereflective). Lutz and Thompson 
discuss ‘tuning’ experience so that intersubjective corroboration can be made precise and 
rigorous. This may be possible, but the subjective data reflects that of phenomenologically 
trained subjects. The issue is such: phenomenologically training individuals to generate 
accounts of experience gives us descriptions that can only be confidently generalised to 
phenomenologically trained individuals. It is therefore limited in what it can tell us of lived-
experience on a day to day basis (the unreflective state). These approaches attempt to produce 
systematic, useful, first-person experiential data. Through their efforts, limitations and 
methodological shortcomings are becoming clearer.  
  
3.3 Using Analytic Techniques to Mitigate Limitations of Experiential Data 
The available methods have a clear limitation in the requirement for training, or the 
prolonged and intensive interviewing process. However, qualitative methods from 
Psychology may help mitigate this challenge at the other end of the data collection process – 
by using analysis techniques that help structure the data in a sensible fashion. Generating 
useful first-person methods without phenomenologically training individuals calls for more 
rigorous and structured models of analysis. Fortunately, two such models exist in 
phenomenological research: Content Analysis and Template Analysis. Both of these methods 
are use in the process of IPA and are seen as standard in much of qualitative analysis 
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(Langdridge, 2004). These approaches stem from the Husserlian school of phenomenological 
philosophy.  
A form of Content Analysis has been used in the neurophenomenological studies 
previously discussed, wherein verbal subjective reports were analysed for thematic content 
and phenomenological clusters were created. Phenomenological clusters are categories of 
common thematic content, and can be generated with most types of verbal data. However, the 
individuals in the study were previously trained to report pre-reflective states of 
consciousness. This was carried out by exposing the participants to the experimental task a 
number of times and encouraging them to actively reflect on their experience. Similarly, 
Lutz, Dunne and Davidson (2007) carried out training sessions in a neurophenomenological 
study on meditation. They claim that this training was necessary as it familiarises individuals 
with the moment to moment character of mental events. However, reports of more 
unreflective states could prove an interesting endeavour, and perhaps possible by recording 
first-person reports from unreflective states (where the participant is new to the idea of 
phenomenological reporting) to pre-reflective states (where the individual is aware of what 
phenomenological reports entail, and as such their experience has been modified). For Lutz et 
al’s (2001) study, Content Analysis was said to be the most appropriate method for analysing 
subjective reports as the questions framed an ambiguous aspect of experience a priori.  
However, Template Analysis is a similar method that could investigate unreflective 
states. This lesser known approach uses a coding frame devised theoretically after collecting 
the data (a posteriori). This method explores important aspects of experience while allowing 
the meaning in these particular areas to emerge during the analytic process (Langdridge, 
2007). This could be particularly important for illustrating the relationship between emotional 
states and pre-reflective consciousness in Lutz and Thompson (2003). The main difference 
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between Content Analysis and Template Analysis is that the latter is more focused on coding 
the descriptions. Often used in audience research (Langdridge, 2004), it is seen as an efficient 
way of categorising opinions based on descriptive narrative. The data from Template 
Analysis is often used to directly understand aspects of participants’ behaviour, especially in 
a systematic way. It is also said to be suitable for data that is not particularly 
phenomenological and for larger sample sizes. Whereas content analysis is often used for a 
single interview, template analysis can code large scale qualitative data, especially when used 
to isolate particular experiences or aspects of responses. Waring and Wainwright (2008) 
argue that Template Analysis is an advantageous approach when analysing rich unstructured 
qualitative data following the primary data collection phase and can easily be integrated with 
a number of approaches, making it much more suitable for wide scale use than other 
qualitative techniques.   
Ways of naturalising and formalising a phenomenological method have been 
proposed in current research such as Gallagher and Zahavi’s (2008) book The 
Phenomenological Mind, as well as Overgaard (2004). However there has yet to be coherent 
and commonly used method that takes experiential data from untrained or naturalistic 
sources. The project of naturalising phenomenology in cognitive science has not found a 
coherent basic ground yet (Overgaard, 2004) and for this reason, much more research is 
needed to address some of the problems associated with integrative methods. The two 
primary extant methods both put high demands on training, either of the interviewer (with 
concomitant concerns about leading participants) or the participant (with concerns about 
transformed experiences). The effects of the biasing or changing of experience is not fully 
understood.  
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3.4  Developing Integrative Research Methods  
There are many challenges in developing new methodological approaches, as seen in 
mixed method or secondary approaches. These approaches tailor the measures of either 
qualitative or quantitative data that are then often used to explain the other. Neither the 
Elicitation Interview nor neurophenomenological approach outlined above has been widely 
adopted. This may be due to the methods being both expertise and resource intensive. Few 
attempts at replication have been made as a result, with researchers often using the more 
questionnaire based techniques for gathering aspects of experiential data (Smith, 1992), 
which affords a controlled and relatively easy way of gathering targeted data, while being 
readily adapted to general behavioural research.  
As we have seen, Lutz and Thompson (2003) propose that qualitative data could be 
used to generate phenomenological markers to interpret the empirical data, rather than using 
the third-person data to explain the descriptions.  However, less demanding methods, even in 
the laboratory may be more useful while researchers attempt to address how to best 
investigate experience in a more focused way. Barrett et al (2010) argue that scientific 
exploration aims at categorising specific processes, breaking them down, or “dividing up the 
world into figure and ground, leading scientists to attend to certain features and to ignore 
others” (p. 1), which becomes problematic when trying to define the relationship between 
experience and behaviour. We know that they are related, perhaps even mutually constructive 
concepts, but understanding their relationship often involves suspension of phenomenological 
understanding as the methods used to explore them are limiting, or often involve the adoption 
of practices that are designed to describe them separately.    
Levine (1983) proposes that once the causal role between stimulus and response is 
explained, much of the psychological researchers claim that nothing more needed to 
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understand. The phenomenon is explained, even though little may have been said on the 
nature of the experience. This is problematic as explaining individual level processes (such as 
brain systems, metacognitive functions or some instance where the behaviour has occurred) 
giving rise to behaviour may only be part of the story. Quantitative methods explaining the 
“causal role in our interaction with the environment, […] explains the mechanism underlying 
the performance of these functions” (Levine, 1983, p.357). While it is true that the methods 
explain and help us understand quite a bit about the phenomena studied, it is not the whole 
story. As noted in the previous chapter, Participatory Inquiry (PI) and Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES) claim to obtain accurate descriptions of authentic experience in naturalistic 
settings. These method use some practice or training for participants, but without the kind of 
extensive re-training of experience associated with neurophenomenology. While intended for 
use outside of the laboratory, these approaches may yet have valid uses inside it. 
PI attempts to gather descriptions of experience without trying to pre-categorise it, as 
shown in Traylen (1989) where participants seemed happy to describe their experience, but 
found it difficult to articulate a meta-cognitive judgement on that experience (they found it 
easier to describe stressful experience but more difficult to identify what was stressing them). 
It is typically conducted in the form of a retrospective interview, which does really allow for 
a high resolution description of the relationship between experience and a given behaviour. 
DES is perhaps more promising. A significant feature of DES is the use of a beeper. 
This is said to define specific moments when participants give descriptions of their 
experience. The use of the beeper defines a clear and specific moment of experience for 
users. This may help minimise post-reflection bias as subjects have minimal time to reflect. 
Additionally, DES is to be used in completely naturalistic settings where participants are 
engaging in day-to-day activities, and some researchers are discussing this method as a 
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possible means for use in more controlled settings (Olivares et al. 2015). Hurlburt and 
Heavey (2001) propose that DES could become a widely used tool in psychological research, 
seeing it “as good as, if not better” than other methods used to explore inner experience (p. 
400). However, the authors have serious hesitation when it comes to how DES methods can 
be generalised or expanded into other areas of psychological research. They argue that the 
technique should not be used lightly, and suggest extensive practice on the part of the 
interviewer. 
Participants do typically receive some training before taking part in DES. This 
training involves showing participants how to give detailed accounts of experience. It is said 
to help participants define what is expected of them and the method, as well as training 
participants to use descriptive words effectively. However, there are two significant, and at 
this point familiar, problems here: (1) participants may perceive day to day events differently 
when the beeper is attached directly after such training. Furthermore, accounts cannot be 
explained outside that of subjectively trained subjects. (2) The random beeping eliminates 
any possibility of comparing experiences or replicating results with other accounts of similar 
experience (for example, emotionality and phenomenological methods, as discussed by Lutz 
& Thompson, 2003). The beeper goes off at any given moment so there are no two instances 
that can effectively compare detailed experiences. The authors state that people also use 
different techniques when they describe inner experience. Some use imagery or drawing; 
others use verbal descriptions; others use combinations of different techniques. Under 
normal, naturalistic use of DES there is no way of evaluating how effective these are in 
generating usable descriptions of inner experience. We cannot evaluate how a specific 
context has a bearing on how they perceive it or if specific environmental cues help shape 
understanding amongst participants. Hurlburt and Heavy (2001) are not interested in 
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evaluating DES as a tool for this purpose. As they see it, DES is a tool that accurately 
describes inner experience, not specific aspects of it.  
A further limitation of DES may be how the authors define ‘bracketing 
presupposition’ during their development of the methodologies. The authors claim that using 
the beeper and its randomness helps minimise effects of any investigator’s presuppositions on 
participant responses. This is an important limitation for any qualitative method. Indeed, 
subjective procedures are always at risk for finding out what the investigator expects to find 
rather than what is actually there. This is a problem many researchers face when carrying out 
this type of research. The use of the randomised beeper triggers overcomes this, but the 
associated compromise is that it makes DES difficult to use outside the realm of naturalistic 
day-to-day events. We also lack a means to standardise the observations from findings using 
DES. However, using DES as a guideline, it may be possible to produce meaningful and 
useful data for exploring how participants experience in more controlled ways. Instead of 
questioning the reliability of DES in obtaining accurate descriptions of inner experience, we 
need explore how DES may provide a means of attaining standardised data that could 
potentially be used to clarify behaviour measured in third-person empirical studies.  
There are a number of clear guidelines that the creator of DES, Russell Hurlburt, 
details in order to obtain these descriptions faithfully, minimising biased or inaccurate 
descriptions (Hurlburt, Koch & Heavey, 2002). These relate to the broader conceptual 
difficulties that face most introspective studies. In order to attain accurate descriptions of 
experience, the following are said to help facilitate unbiased and accurate accounts: (1) the 
interval between experience explored and reporting of its characteristics must be short; (2) 
you must explore specific, well defined moments; (3) the experience being explored must be 
kept brief; (4) experience must be explored in varied natural contexts; (5) don’t ask for 
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attributions of causality; and (6) distinguish carefully between describing inner phenomena 
and explaining conscious processes.  
The first guideline (interval between experience explored and reporting of its 
characteristics must be short) is addressed in two ways, facilitated by the DES methodology: 
(1) participants give the detailed responses immediately after the beep and (2) participants are 
to reflect only on the moment they experience the beep. As such, descriptions are hoped to be 
accurate as they define a specific and controlled temporal experience. There may be ways of 
using this as a guideline to define standardised temporal experience in more controlled 
situations. As participants are rigorously trained in DES studies, this may need to be 
readdressed as it could affect the way individuals experience the phenomena in the lab using 
a form of experience sampling in the lab needs attention.  Giving participants adequate 
instruction to generate a description of experience and the opportunity to become familiar 
with what is to be expected from them may also provide important and sufficient information. 
  Regarding the second guideline (you must explore specific, well defined moments), 
this can be developed further than current phenomenologically informed studies. Instead of 
focusing on naturalised day to day events that does not allow comparable data, it may be 
necessary to create controlled contextualised situations for participants. A naturalising (or 
naturalistic framing) of laboratory settings may be attainable through carefully presenting a 
situation to participants in future studies.  
Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2002) third guideline (that experience being explored must be 
kept brief), seems to stem from trying to minimise biased reports. If the experience is a brief, 
clearly defined situation, then it may be easier to create reliable reports with less 
interpretation or confabulation of experience.  As report bias is a serious concern for 
introspective methods (Petitmengin et al. 2013), keeping the experience brief is a means of 
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controlling for more accurate responses as well as minimise the experience being confused 
for another (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2008). This guideline also ties in with the first point. 
By keeping the experience brief it helps define specific momentary experience, something 
that could be used in more standardised instances such as lab based studies.  
Their fourth point (that experience must be explored in varied natural contexts) is one 
of the most important points for generating reliable and comparable reports. Participants must 
interact in a clearly defined context if the behavioural data can be used to investigate the 
specific experience. Cognitive research has long used tasks that aim to create specific 
situations so that participants are minimally affected by mood, personality or social context. 
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that mood, personality and social context are 
exactly what shape how we see the world and interact with the environment (Lewis, 2005; 
Mesquita et al. 2010). While this is clearly a challenge for laboratory practice, and would 
seem to advocate for more dramatic departures from standard research techniques, it might 
still be possible to incorporate these broader aspects of a person’s normal experiences in 
controlled settings where certain behavioural data can be measured with the kind of precision 
and accuracy of interest to psychological researchers. The issue is that we need more 
phenomenologically informed methods that can be used in controlled ways so that the 
experiential data can be linked with the behaviour in tangible ways. We want a task that can 
produce meaningful relations between materials/stimuli and behaviour, but current practices 
makes this challenging.  
The final two points (don’t ask for attributions of causality; and distinguish carefully 
between describing inner phenomena and explaining conscious processes) are common 
phenomenological considerations – avoiding implicit conceptualisation and post-hoc 
rationalisation of experiences. This is largely controlled by using the beeper in the inventive 
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way Hurlburt and Akhtar (2006) utilised, as well as the non-directive way in which 
descriptives are elicited. Attributions of causality are minimal as the participant is not 
required to focus on anything other than how they feel, not why they feel it. Exposure to DES 
could help build a systematic way of building accurate descriptions of subjective experiences.  
The elicitation interview was Petitmengin et al’s (2013) response to the difficulty in 
obtaining accurate descriptions of lived experience. When an individual tries to explain 
reasons for behaving or responding in a particular way, the subject is inclined to provide 
justifications or rationalisations which substitute themselves for the actual decision criteria. It 
is argued that introspective training before describing experience is necessary because 
experience often relates to something that is not immediately accessible to reflective 
consciousness and verbal descriptions (Stuart, 2012). We experience it, but often in an 
unrecognised or pre-reflective way.  
While much of Psychology attempts to explain behavioural phenomena by describing 
the causal roles of individual level processes, Levine (1983) maintains that researchers are 
too keen to ‘explain away’ behaviour without really asking questions on why the behaviour 
may occur, or why conscious states fluctuate from moment to moment. Finding ways of 
understanding emergent behaviour is central to this, as highlighted by a number of 
researchers in recent years (Allen & Williams, 2011; Barrett et al. 2010; Petitmengin et al. 
2013). As DiPaolo et al. (2007) argue “Meaning is not to be found in elements belonging to 
the environment or in the internal dynamics of the agent, but belongs to the relational domain 
established between the two” (p. 10). This idea may be useful in the formulation of research 
methodologies in the future as it changes our presuppositions of behaviour and their 
underlying processes. These approaches are strikingly different to the cognitivist or 
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information-processing paradigms of today (DiPaolo & Thompson, 2014; Noë, 2005; 
Thompson & Stapleton, 2009; Varela et al. 1991).  
Over the decades, Psychology has aimed at exploring all the facets of cognitive 
processes by studying them in defined settings. Current methods are quite adept at explaining 
individual level processes (Barrett et al 2010) such as emotion (Lewis, 2003) or specific 
behaviours in social interaction (Mesquita, 2010). Then again, we may have examples of 
embodied research shifting the question from individual level processes to more inclusive 
embodied networks. For example, Leone et al (2012) show how chess players have strong 
emotional fluctuations in decision making. They measured changes in bodily arousal from 
decision to decision in a game of chess, placing the body as key to understanding underlying 
interrelated processes. They used classic methods to show how bodily arousal was strong 
enough to help guide decision making patterns over the course of the game. As working 
memory, physiological, hormonal and emotional processes are involved in decision making 
(Lewis, 2005), Leone and colleagues aimed to illustrate how bodily correlates measured by 
heart rate could be used to predict specific performance characteristics in the chess game. 
They found that heart fluctuations correlated with specific moments in the game where the 
players were performing high stake moves or overtaking an opponent. This shows us that we 
can study experience and behaviour in controlled ways to relate it meaningfully to the 
environmental setting. Emotionality played a key role in the players’ decision making, 
measured by physiological changes. What is harder to measure, however, is the phenomenal 
feeling underlying this process. In other words, explain what it feels like in these situations 
where meaningful behaviour is observed. It may be that the limitations of these approaches 
need to be overcome before we can fully embrace more embodied models of behaviour, but 
exploring the relationship between experience and behaviour using controlled 
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experimentation may be necessary to identify some the methodological limitation faced by 
many researchers in Psychology.  
Wilson and Golonka (2013) argue that a person is never reacting to a single stimulus. 
Instead, the person is acting within the situation they find themselves and the aspects of the 
environment that become salient to them. This is also argued in Barrett (2011) who proposes 
that we must understand a person’s behaviour in terms of experiential patterns from given 
complete situations. However, it becomes problematic when we try to investigate behaviour 
using these approaches, as highlighted in Levine (1983), it is difficult to avoid referring to 
individual level processes in the descriptions of behaviour or refer to mental representation to 
illustrate how behaviour is emergent from the entire situation a person finds themselves.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Simpler approaches in the study of experiences might provide more effective ways of 
exploring experience. For example, DES has a number of characteristics that highlights that 
experiential data needs to be gathered in a targeted way, but also one which minimally 
changes the experience explored. While this method has only been used in naturalistic 
settings, it shows us that there may be ways to gather experiential data on more controlled 
ways, perhaps even experimental lab-bases ones. This chapter has discussed that creating 
artificial forms of experience in the laboratory is complicated, often with second-person 
methods involving training which can be time and resource intensive. Less training seems to 
be more appealing, but training of description seems necessary in some ways. There is little 
research on just what changes in experience might actually occur due to training on 
introspection. Whatever approach is adopted, what seems very clear is that studying 
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experience in the lab will need a task where the stimuli of the task itself are meaningful for 
the participants, the stimuli and task presented should enable a participant to bring their own 
experience to bear on the task, so that their behaviour is being evoked within a situation that 
makes some sense to them. The following chapter discusses experimental paradigms where 
the task stimuli and context of lab-based settings are considered, with the aim of finding a 
task that both enables a meaningful engagement by the participant based on reliable social or 
cultural context, and could potentially be used with a more open- method of gathering 
descriptive data.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Finding a laboratory based tool to explore experience 
 
 
 
The effects of context on behaviour have been explored for decades (Barker, 1968; 
Heft, 2001; Wicker, 1987) and typically involve the study of situational instances (Barrett, 
2011; Mesquita et al. 2010). In experimental settings, contexts are used to control 
meaningful, rich or culturally valid experiences, aiming to peel away the ‘meaning’ and get to 
the specific cognitive functions or behavioural processes involved. Experimental tasks aim 
for the strength of control and precision that makes psychological exploration rigorous and 
precise. However, we are faced with a clear problem in the laboratory as most behaviour and 
experience do not occur in such meaningless settings. A long but generally disparate tradition 
of research within Cognitive Psychology shows that the meaning of the stimulus (as opposed 
to say, it’s structural or basic perceptual characteristics) may also have significant 
implications for how a person reacts to or uses those stimuli. The classic example is the 
content effects associated with the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966). The task is a 
commonly used test for logical reasoning. People find the Wason task much easier to solve if 
it is placed in the context of a social rule that they are asked to enforce, rather than abstract 
logical rule they are asked to test.  
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Wason found that when a simple inference task uses abstract, less meaningful terms 
(such as single digits and vowels), inference patterns were dramatically different than in the 
same task using more meaningful terms such as letters and their appropriate postage stamps. 
It is generally believed that performance in the task changes when the stimulus content is 
varied, which has been used to argue that human cognitive architecture contains domain-
specific inference systems (Fiddick, Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Content effects have been 
long shown in cognitive tasks, but typically for reasoning or decision making tasks where the 
behaviour involved is an indication of a choice, rather than an engagement with the 
environment or acting on the world in a manner that matters to the task itself. The aim of this 
chapter is to identify key factors for exploring experience in the lab and find an experimental 
tool that may be open to using more phenomenologically informed methods. For this 
purpose, a task is needed that is dynamic, where the meaningfulness of the materials or task 
framing might play clearer roles in the behaviour observed in controlled settings. 
Wicker (2012) states people “attend to, assess, and act on environmental events in 
light of their current knowledge and beliefs” (p. 474). This involves considering the larger 
contexts of the settings we use to measure behaviour. It has been argued that behavioural 
patterns correspond with socio-cultural norms and the physical forms of the environments in 
which the behaviours occur (Barrett et al, 2010).  However, this is an underexplored concept 
in mainstream Psychology as more research is needed to link experiences with environmental 
settings through traditional and contemporary perspectives. It is also a concept whose 
examination is surprisingly rare. Scott (2005) argues that the spatial-temporal characteristics 
and associated social norms encompassing a behaviour that emerges has been problematically 
under-examined in extant psychological research. 
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Traditional information processing approaches to understanding perception and 
behaviour take an analytic perspective to understanding the relationship between a person and 
their environment.  The characteristics of stimuli in cognitive tasks often relate to perceptual 
or structural aspects of those stimuli. For example: their presentation, sequential order, 
duration, and other structural components.  How we understand the observed behaviour is 
often discussed in terms of metacognitive processes (Schwartz, 2010). Metacognition refers 
to an individual's knowledge about their cognition and to the ability to be able to influence 
one's own cognition (Meichenbaum, 1985). Koriat (2002) defines it as concerning people's 
cognitions and feelings about their cognitive states and cognitive processes, involving the 
organisation and activation of other more basic cognitive functions such as memory retrieval, 
decision making, knowledge manipulation and expertise. However, the developing 
perspectives within Psychology and Cognitive Science that emphasise embodiment and 
experience, discussed in previous chapters, argue that we need to replace our existing analytic 
modes of research with models that also afford more synthetic thinking, without sacrificing 
the rigour and discipline of proper scientific research. 
This is often associated with a new view of consciousness as “an interactive, plastic 
phenomenon open to sociocultural influence” (Allen & Williams, 2011, p. 1). These 
approaches see not just the individual aspects of a stimulus or situation as important, but the 
overall meaning of the stimulus or task as playing a significant role in how we construct our 
thinking and behaviour at a given time. While the aim in psychological research is to measure 
behaviour in defined contexts, we have seen in earlier chapters that critics suggest that 
experience is marginalised by the way we ‘do’ Psychology at present (Mesquita et al. 2010) 
and that traditional methodologies generalised behavioural outcome across contexts, currently 
overlooking the meaning and experience (Kagan, 2012). Wilson and Golonka (2013) state, 
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“in its day-to-day life the organism never gets to peer behind the curtain” (p. 9); instead, 
something is either seen as relevant or not, experienced as meaningful or barely experienced 
at all.  
In order to offer potential insights to the patterns of behavioural responses using 
descriptive reports of experience, controlled tasks are needed that enable some kind of 
meaningful activity for the person. As outlined in previous chapters, meaning appears to be a 
concept that incorporates not just the immediate movements or details of particular stimuli, 
but rather the whole context or situation in which a person is involved. Schwartz (2010) states 
that we are “profoundly influenced by the immediate context in which the respective task is 
situated” (p. 105), due to the metacognitive experiences involved in our perceptual 
capabilities and how we make sense of task-based stimuli.  
Balanced against this is the need to use stimuli, tasks, or situations that are sufficiently 
minimal that some kind of experimental control can still be achieved. As the motivation of 
the present work is to take evolutionary steps toward amended methods, rather than 
revolutionary overhaul of existing practice, the intention is to start small. Accordingly, the 
aim of this chapter is to examine the possibility of minimal conditions that enable the 
exploration of meaningful experience in the laboratory. An initial task was identified that 
involved dynamic responses to the stimuli of the task, but also offered a clear set of stimuli 
that might meaningfully support the behaviours appropriate to the task.  
 
4.1 Experiment 1: The Go No-go Task 
The way stimuli are presented to participants in cognitive tasks has been an important 
consideration in most (if not all) psychological studies. This has led to interesting findings, 
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for example, the effects of priming are very powerful and commonly underestimated (Bargh 
et al. 1996; Cesario, 2013; Wilson, 2013). Environmental cues and stimuli changes have been 
consistently shown to affect behaviour (Barker, 1968; Heft, 2011). For example, Reber and 
Schwartz (1999) have shown that that people are more likely to endorse a statement as true 
when the colour in which it is printed makes it easy rather than difficult to read. Schwartz 
(2010) also found evidence that this is true when the words rhymed (McGlone & 
Tofighbakhsh, 2000). This research illustrates that subjective experiences are an important 
part of understanding behaviour. What people conclude from their experiences often depends 
on their assumptions, which are also context-sensitive. In the above example, recall to assess 
truth was difficult because participants were distracted by an unrelated stimulus (the colour of 
text). As such, the effects that the contents had on the task-stimuli are an important 
consideration for understanding how subjectivity can be measured in controlled 
environments. However, exploring the particulars of the relationship between the subjective 
experience and the cognitive performance is made difficult by the fact that such experiences 
are typically not recorded in detail (they are assumed according to the conditions of the 
stimuli), nor are there obvious ways in which they might be analysed. Helping to show how 
meaning plays a role in cognitive tasks may allow for a more phenomenologically informed 
method, but we need a task in which meaning can be taken into account.  
The Go No-go Association Task (GNAT) is one such task that may offer us a means 
of exploring the relationship between meaning, task experience, and behaviour. The GNAT, 
developed by Nosek and Banaji (2001), is a highly controlled, face-paced task that is 
extensively cited in the study of executive functioning, a ‘higher cognitive’ function. It is a 
standardised experiment commonly used to explore executive functions and locus of control, 
with many variants and a substantial associated literature. For our purposes, the task provides 
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us a means of investigating stimulus-response behaviour with precision and reliability. As it 
has been used in the study of executive functioning, it has been used to investigate 
metacognitive systems such as lexical decision making, perceptual discrimination, priming 
and memory tasks (Gomez, Ratcliff & Perea, 2007).  There are two forms of the task, sharing 
the key characteristic of having to inhibit one response that is evoked much more frequently 
than a competing response (or non-response).  
A particular model of the GNAT presents one stimulus that requires an action, and 
one stimulus that requires a non-action. That is, participants are asked to perform an action 
when one stimulus is presented and withhold that action when the other stimulus is presented. 
This model is sometimes referred to as the Stop/Go task as the ‘stop’ response requires the 
withholding of a response. The other model of the task is a two-choice decision task, where 
one stimulus requires an action (go), and the other stimulus requires a similar but different 
(no go) action. This version of the task is created when the ‘go’ response is characterised at 
high-frequency, while the ‘no go’ is characterised at a low frequency. Typically, there are 5 
times as many ‘go’ stimuli than ‘no go’ (Goldstein et al 2007). This model is said to be a 
more efficient measure of response control as it is associated with less errors made from 
repetitious behaviour (errors from motor control).  Generally, literature on the Stop/Go 
version of the task reports less accuracy and much higher error rates as participants typically 
confuse the stop stimulus with an action. This is said to be due to the rapid nature of 
responses in the Stop/Go task (Gomez et al. 2007).  
For our use of the GNAT, we aim to explore the experiential components of response 
and response inhibition using manipulations to the task stimuli. This is carried out by varying 
the images representing the ‘go’ and ‘no go’ stimulus. We propose that actions may be 
supported by more meaningful stimuli in that they have a culturally supporting context. That 
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is, if the stimuli are meaningful to the participant, they may perform differently than if the 
stimuli are more abstract. If this is true, then there may be ways of exploring details of that 
experience using augmented qualitative techniques in later studies. For Experiment 1 
however, responses to meaningful and less meaningful stimuli are compared between three 
conditions, using simple manipulation to the GNAT stimuli.  
Using the two-choice model of the GNAT, different stimuli sets were developed. 
These consisted of a traffic light set, number set, and a coloured image set. The traffic light 
condition used green ‘go’ traffic light stimuli and red ‘no go’ traffic lights stimuli. The 
numerical condition used the figures 6 and 9, where the 6 was the go stimulus, 9 was the ‘no 
go’ stimulus. Finally the third condition used coloured circles as ‘go’ and ‘no go’ stimuli: a 
blue circle was the go stimulus and a yellow circle was the no go stimulus. The meanings 
associated with more meaningful stimuli are analogous to real-world behaviours in a clear 
manner, which was also why the two-choice GNAT was used instead of the stop/go version 
of the task. We hypothesise that different image stimuli will result in different task-
behaviour. If this hypothesis is supported, then there may be ways of adapting methods for 
attaining experiential reports based on the subjective experience of the stimuli.   
 
 
4.1.1 Method 
Design 
The study utilised a between groups design. The independent variable was condition. 
Three GNAT conditions were developed consisting of: a traffic light condition; a numerical 
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condition; and a coloured image condition. The dependent variable was performance in the 
task measured by total error rate scores and reaction times.  
 
Participants 
Seventy-five participants took part in this task, 45 female and 30 male. Ages of 
participants ranged from 18 to 56 (mean = 23.67yrs, SD = 6.32). Participants were recruited 
on a voluntary sampling basis at Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Ireland. 
All participants were from the undergraduate and postgraduate cohort of the college and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical approval for the conduct of the experiment was 
granted by the Mary Immaculate Research Ethics Committee (MIREC). Participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions.   
 
Materials and apparatus 
The experiment took place in designated Psychology laboratories on Mary 
Immaculate College campus. The experiment was carried out on a Dell desktop computer 
operating on Windows XP.  The experimental programmes were developed on Superlab 4.5 
consisting of 150 Go stimuli and 30 No go stimuli for each condition, programmed to be 
presented in a randomised order per participant.  
As outlined above, three sets of stimuli were used. In the first stimulus category, 
traffic light images were used (Figure 4.1), with the green traffic light representing a ‘go’ 
stimulus and the red traffic light representing the ‘no go’ stimulus. The second stimulus 
category used numerical images consisting of figures 6 or 9 (Figure 4.2). These images were 
altered so that their spatial placements on the screen corresponded with the traffic light 
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condition. That is, the figure 6 was placed such that its circular component occupied the same 
location as the green traffic light; likewise the figure 9 was placed such that the circular 
figure occupied the same space on screen as the red traffic light. The third stimulus category 
used blue and yellow circles (Figure 4.3). While the numerical stimuli allowed for a check 
against the spatial orientation of the traffic light images, circles of blue and yellow allow for a 
comparison against effects of colour contrast (as opposed to the culturally specific meaning 
associated with traffic lights, that would be familiar to the participants).   
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Figure 4.1: Traffic light condition: Red (no go stimulus) and green (go stimulus) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Numerical condition: Figure ‘9’ (no go stimulus) and ‘6’ (go stimulus) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Colour condition: Yellow circle (no go stimulus) and blue circle (go stimulus) 
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Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to a condition when they arrived at the lab. They 
were given instruction material and once they agreed to take part in the experiment, they 
signed a consent form (see Appendix A). Participants were reminded that they could leave 
the experiment at any stage without having to give an explanation or justification. Following 
this, participants were seated in front of a Dell laptop computer where further instructions 
were detailed (full material in Appendix A). Participants were instructed to press any key to 
prompt that they were ready to start the experimental trials. When they did this, the GNAT 
task was initiated. Participants were then presented with instructions of the task on the screen:  
 
When you see the [insert stimulus name], press the [\] button on the keyboard 
with your left hand. When you see the [insert image name] press the [/] key with 
your right hand. 
You will get some practice trials before the experiment begins. 
If you have any questions please ask the experimenter.  
Press any key to continue. 
 
Participants were instructed to place both hands on the keyboard so they could 
comfortably respond to the task. Following five practice trials composed of 4 ‘go’ trials and 1 
‘no go’ trial, participants initiated the experiment be tapping any key on the keyboard. The 
GNAT consisted of 180 images in total, presented sequentially for a maximum of 2000ms. 
There were 150 ‘go’ and 30 ‘no go’ trials over the duration of the task, presented in a 
randomised order per participant. A fixation point was presented for 500ms before the next 
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image appeared on screen after every trial. Trials progressed by a response (pressing a key) or 
after the allocated 2000ms had passed. The fixation point appeared on screen whether the 
response was correct or not. Incorrect responses and responses that took longer than 2000ms 
were recorded as errors. On completion of the task, participants were fully debriefed and the 
experimenter answered any questions they may have had.  
 
4.1.2 Results 
From investigation of the Go – No go performances mean scores for error rates and 
reaction times were calculated. These scores are outlined in the table below (Table 4.1).  
Error rates (ER) in the traffic light condition were 9.12 (SD = 4.157), showing greater ER 
than the other two groups. The numerical condition showed average ER of 6.56 (SD = 3.355) 
with the colour condition at 6.28 (SD = 3.021).  From investigation of the calculated mean 
scores for reaction times (RT), the numerical condition showed slower reaction times than the 
other two groups with average RT of 402.669ms (SD = 73.82); traffic light condition RT was 
269.438ms (SD = 29.824) with the colour condition RT of 281.548ms (SD = 50.834).  
 
Table 4.1: Mean scores for stimulus condition: Error rates and reaction times 
  
Error rates Reaction time 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Traffic light condition  9.12 (4.16) 269.438 (29.82) 
Numerical condition 6.56 (3.36) 402.669 (73.82) 
Colour condition 6.28 (3.02) 281.548 (50.83) 
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Separate between-groups analyses of variance were carried out for both Error Rates 
and Reaction Times. For Error Rates, there was a statistically significant difference at the p 
<.05 level in the three groups: F (2, 72) = 4.9, p = .01. The effect size, calculated using η2, 
was .119 indicating a large difference in ER between groups. Post-hoc comparisons using 
Tukey HSD indicated that the mean score for the traffic light condition (M = 9.12, SD = 
4.157) showed significantly higher error rates than the numerical condition (M = 6.56, SD = 
3.355) and colour condition (M = 6.28, SD = 3.021). There was no significant difference 
found between the numerical and colour conditions.  
 For Reaction Times, there was also a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 
level between the three groups: F (2. 72) = 45.6, p <.005. The effect size, calculated by using 
η2, was .56 indicating a large difference in RT and condition. Post-hoc comparisons using 
Tukey HSD indicated that the mean score for the traffic light condition (M = 269.438, SD = 
29.82) was significantly lower (responses were faster) than that of the numerical condition 
(M = 402.669, SD = 73.82), but not significantly different from the colour condition (M = 
281.548, SD = 50.843). The numerical condition was also significantly higher than the colour 
condition, indicating that RT was longest for the numerical condition. 
 
4.1.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
The results of this experiment suggest that participants may attend to the stimuli 
differently depending on their visual contents.  The images used in the traffic light condition 
were used in hopes of providing clear meaning cues. Findings show that participants’ reaction 
times were much faster for the traffic light condition compared to the other conditions. More 
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meaningful stimuli did affect behaviour from which we see a clear change in the patterns of 
behaviour between conditions. However error rates for the traffic light condition were 
significantly higher than both other conditions, which may simply represent a speed-accuracy 
trade-off. This would still suggest that the stimuli had an effect on the behavioural responses 
in the task, although research on the GNAT states that the meaning of the stimuli is said to 
have little bearing on performance and is not often explored (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). 
Additionally, during informal feedback after the experiment, participants reported that they 
didn’t feel engaged with the task. As it progressed, some participants reported that they were 
bored during the task. This is a real challenge for any attempt in exploring the relationship 
between experience and behaviour, as boredom may imply a different kind of relationship 
between the two over time.  
Examining the experiential components associated with this is challenging. The 
GNAT may not be a suitable means of investigating experiential differences in the task due to 
the rudimentary task demands. That is, in retrospect the experiment lacks qualitative features 
beyond those imposed explicitly by the experimenter in the form of particular stimuli. While 
the behaviours involved in the GNAT are analogous to real-world behaviours for the more 
meaningful stimuli, the GNAT may be too minimal a behavioural measure. Each response is, 
in principle, meaningful in its response to the given stimulus; but in practice, is isolated from 
one another in that earlier decisions do not affect later ones and the task itself provides no 
feedback to the participant on their performance. The GNAT is a test of more implicit 
behaviour, like perceptual judgments (Gomez et al. 2007). However, it appears that we need a 
more explicit task in the study of experience in the laboratory. Nonetheless, it is important to 
note that even in a commonly used paradigm such as the GNAT (Gomez et al. 2007); 
different behavioural patterns can be observed when we manipulate the contents of the 
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stimulus. To investigate qualitative components of task performance, it is clear that the task 
requires clearer experiential components where participants interact with task stimuli over 
longer periods of time, instead of specific trial outcomes. Additionally, to avoid people 
getting bored, we need a task that is more engaging, with the potential for a range of different 
outcomes that might differ for the participant – that is, where the participant might be able to 
become invested in their performance. For our next experiment, we considered the form of a 
game to keep participants engaged with the task and to consider their behaviour over the 
course of the task.  
 
4.2 Experiment 2: The Balloon Analogue Risk Task and task framing 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is a simple decision making task presented 
as a game to assess participant’s risk-taking tendencies. During the task, participants inflate a 
simulated balloon and are instructed to keep the volume of the balloon as full as possible to 
gain points. The more the balloon is expanded, the more points that are earned. Participants 
can save points earned per balloon trial at any stage. If the balloon is over-inflated before 
points are saved, they lose the points for that trial (and are met with an unpleasant popping 
noise). As such, the BART takes the form of a game where participants aim to minimise their 
losses. It is a standardised task for decision making that can be applied in controlled lab-
based settings, but also has real-world applicability in that it can be used to assess risk taking 
dispositions in everyday life. 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) has not yet been extensively used in 
decision making research. Instead, studies using the task have focused on its reliability to 
identify risky decision makers (Lejuez et al 2002) and in evaluating sequential decision 
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making theories (Pleskac, 2008). The BART, developed by Lejuez et al (2002) is said to be a 
rigorous decision making task as it involves “actual risky behaviour [...] similar to real-world 
situations” (p.76). In the literature, the BART is usually used as a means of differentiate 
people that may engage in real-life riskier behaviour, such as smoking and casual drug use 
(Lejuez et al. 2003), as well as impulsivity in daily life (Hopko et al. 2006).  
The BART is sometimes compared with the more complicated Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT) in that they are both a measure of sequential decision making (Pleskac, 2008). Both 
tasks involve risk and uncertainty and have been used to identify individuals with specific 
high risk behaviour in clinical and neurological experiments. Both tasks use reward and 
punishment schemes to identify decision making patterns over the course of the task. The 
IGT does this by using 4 decks of cards, from which the participants make a series of free 
choices, each with different gain and loss outcomes that the participant learns over time. The 
BART uses a balloon where inflations reward the participants in points, but it is more 
unpredictable. If the balloon is overinflated it will burst, causing the participant to lose any 
points attained during that trial. Participants can “bank” their points at any time in the BART, 
at which point the next trial begins with a new balloon. With 60 trials in a complete 
standardised BART paradigm, analysis of the task focuses on participants’ ability to save 
points by inflating the balloon as much as possible. It is inferred that participants who 
continue to overinflate the balloon trials losing points are riskier decision makers in real life. 
The task has shown consistent validity in experimental research including health correlates 
such as smoking and drug use (Lejuez et al. 2003). It has also been used to investigate 
planning during stressful situations (Lauriola, Panno, Levin & Lejuez, 2014; White, Lejuez & 
Wit, 2008). As such, the BART may be an appropriate task for keeping the participant 
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actively engaged with the task, have some real-world relevance, and yet provide a relatively 
simple lab-based paradigm.  
This experiment aims to investigate if framing the BART in a particular context can 
be used to affect performance in the task. This would give us a means of investigating a 
clearer link between the experience of the task and performance, where the way that the task 
is presented could provide a clear let of meaning cues for the task stimuli. Additionally, other 
decision making tasks have been shown to be very sensitive to environmental and social cues 
(Gray, 1999; Mesquita et al. 2010). However, there is little research on the BART and 
context or environmental indicators on performance. To develop a way of integrating context 
in the lab in a pragmatic way, we created a socially framed version of the BART by leading 
participants in this condition to believe that their performance in the task would affect the 
next participant, which was someone who they were acquainted with. This simple 
manipulation may change the dynamics of the task as their performance in the task has more 
real-world consequence, a finding that is said to affect performance in a lot of lab based tasks 
(Gray, 1999; Schwartz, 2010).  
To facilitate this, we recruited participants in a social condition in pairs of two, where 
participants were led to believe that they were taking part in a co-operative two person task. 
In reality, only one person would take took part in the BART and the other person acted as a 
social facilitator for the task framing. Through this, we hypothesise that participants in the 
socially framed condition may show different behavioural patterns over the course of the 
task, while maintaining a game-like task paradigm. If this finding is supported, it may suggest 
that the BART, as well as task framing, could be used to explore experience and behaviour 
using more widely used lab based tasks. We also investigate this to explore if controlled 
framing in the lab could provide clear behavioural patterns emerging over the course of the 
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task that might be associated with their experience of how they actually understand it. If clear 
links between context and behaviour were to be found, it may indicate that the task, or 
framing of the task, could be explored using more phenomenologically informed methods in 
future studies by exploring descriptive techniques.  
 
4.2.1 Method 
Design 
The experiment used a between groups design to investigate the differences between a 
socially framed and individually framed BART. The independent variable was task framing, 
consisting of two levels: social framing and individual framing conditions.  The dependent 
variable was BART performance, calculated by total number of successful inflations per trial. 
This is often called the corrected or adjusted BART score as it involves calculating average 
number of pumps on unexploded balloons (successfully banked trials), with higher scores 
indicative of greater risk-taking propensity (Lejuez et al. 2002). The corrected score is used 
as the frequency of pumps needed to inflate the balloon is randomised per trial, and higher 
pumps on successfully banks points indicates a greater propensity to risk taking (Lejeuz et al. 
2002).  
 
Social framing 
 Two framing groups were used in this study: a socially framed version of the task and 
the individual BART framing that is used in the typical Lejuez et al. (2002) task. Participants 
were recruited in pairs and asked to sign up to take part in the experiment with someone they 
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were acquainted with. They are briefed before taking part in the task that the aim of the task 
is to maximise points and to minimise losses. In addition to recruiting participants in pairs of 
two to facilitate the social framing of the BART, participants in this condition are also told 
that their winning total points would be the starting total for their friend sat in a waiting room 
area. This was used to encourage participants to experience the task in a way that had social 
implications.  
 
Participants 
Sixty participants completed the task, 35 female and 25 male, with an additional 30 
people acting as social facilitators in the social condition, from whom no data were collected. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 47 (M = 22.42, SD = 5.26) and were recruited from 
Mary Immaculate College, Limerick, from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations, 
all having normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical approval for the conduct of the 
experiment was granted by the Mary Immaculate Research Ethics Committee (MIREC). 30 
participants were assigned to each condition..  
 
Materials and apparatus 
Participants were tested in a designated Psychology lab space in Mary Immaculate 
College, Limerick consisting of an experimental room and a waiting area. The Balloon 
Analogue Risk task used in this study was developed by Pleskac and Wershbale (2008) on E-
Prime 2.0 stimulus presentation software. This software was run on a Dell XP computer and 
participants inputted their responses using a standard keyboard.  
 
 
~ 87 ~ 
 
The BART consisted of 60 balloon trials presented sequentially. Instructions for the 
task were presented on the screen at all times as well as participants’ net total of points and 
amount of inflations made per trial (see Appendix B). 
  
Procedure 
Participants were welcomed to the laboratory and in the social framing group, 
participants nominated between themselves which would be first in taking part in the 
experiment. Unbeknownst to this group, the participant who nominated themselves to take 
part second acted as social facilitator. These participants were seated in a waiting area and 
provided with some light reading material for the duration of the experiment. 
Participants completing the experiment were brought to the laboratory, seated in front 
of the Dell desktop computer and asked to read the information pack as well as sign a consent 
form (see Appendix B). Participants were reminded that their participation was voluntary and 
that they could leave the experiment at any time without providing reason for doing so. If 
they were happy to continue, participants were asked to read instruction material. Following 
this, they were asked to initiate practice trials consisting of 3 balloon trials that were not 
included in the analyses. Participants were then prompted to complete the standard version of 
BART consisting of 60 trials without interruption. At the end of the task, participants were 
fully debriefed and participants in the socially framed condition were told the true nature of 
the experiment in their pairs. Participants were thanked for their time and the experimenter 
answered any questions they may have had. BART responses were gathered through ePrime 
2.0 and analysed using SPSS software.  
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4.2.2 Results  
To investigate the relationship between framing condition and BART performance, 
we calculated performance scores over the course of the task, categorising scores into 6 
BART blocks, each consisting of total mean scores averaged over 10 balloon trials. A 
corrected score was calculated for each balloon trial to measure the total number of 
successful balloon pumps where points were banked before the trial ended. That is, the 
corrected score represents the total number of balloon inflations that did not result in 
overinflating the balloon and losing points for the trial. This is the standard analysis of BART 
performance outlined by Lejuez et al. (2002).  
A mixed-measures analysis of variance was conducted to investigate the differences 
between framing groups and Successful BART trials over the course of the task. There was 
no significant interaction effect between the framing groups and BART blocks, Wilks 
Lambda = .967, F (5, 54) = .368, p = .868, partial η2 = .033. There was a significant main 
effect for scores across the blocks, Wilks Lambda = .712, F (5, 54) = 4.36, p = .002, partial η2 
= .288, indicating an increase in Successful BART scores over the course of the task (see 
Figure 4.4). Using a Bonferroni correction demonstrated that this main effect still reached 
statistical significance. However, post hoc paired sample t-test between block (i.e. BART 
block 1 v BART block 2… etc) did not reveal any significant results. The main effect for 
framing group was not significant, F (1, 58) = .207, p = .651, partial η2 = .004, suggesting no 
difference in scores for the framing groups.  
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Figure 4.4: Successful BART choices between framing conditions 
 
4.2.3 Discussion for Experiment 3 
There were no differences found between social and individual framing conditions in 
scores on Balloon Analogue Risk Task. While this would support Pleskac’s (2008) assertion 
that the BART is a robust decision making, the limited influence of framing is a challenge for 
our current research aims. However, asking for informal feedback from participants seemed 
to indicate a certain level of boredom of the task. This would suggest that participants may 
not be too engaged with the task as it progressed and that any experiential differences in the 
task may not have been affected by the context of the experiment, particularly in the role it 
may have in behaviour over the course of the task. Though presented as a game and having 
certain amounts of complexity to it, there is really only a choice between two behaviours – 
pump or bank – at any given time. This limits the variety of possible experiences and 
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implications for the participant, and while late decisions can be affected by earlier ones, there 
is not much that the participant can do about it. That is, there are a limited number of 
strategies available to participants to complete the task due to its simplicity.  
Performance on the task did improve over its duration, indicating a change in 
behaviour and a possible dynamic to the experience involved. The comments regarding 
boredom from participants, however, would not seem to imply a rich set of experiences to be 
examined if complementary experiential explorations were to be included in the task. Before 
knowing what questions to ask using qualitative methods, we need to be clear of the 
experiential changes in the task. However, task framing did not have an effect on behaviour 
over the course of the task, so we don’t necessarily have a systematic way of comparing any 
potential experiential differences to strengthen a lab based phenomenology in the future. Both 
the social framing and individual framing conditions showed similar performance across the 
BART blocks. Participants seem to make riskier decisions as the task progresses overall and 
we may be able to that the BART is, in fact, a robust tool for measuring decision making 
patterns as it was not very sensitive to contextual manipulations. This has implications on 
other research that argues that there is a clear relationship between the task and 
environmental stressors. However, it seems to give strength to previous research that argues 
that the BART is a stringent measure of risk taking behaviour. Findings are often generalised 
to reveal behavioural patterns in in real life settings, such as health and individual differences 
(Lejuez et al. 2003) as well as strategic behaviour management (White, Lejeuz and Wit, 
2008). This robustness is a strength for its use in other research areas, but unfortunately 
makes it less suitable for the present research project. 
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4.3 Experiment 3: The Iowa Gambling Task and task framing 
The final experiment in this chapter investigates the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as a 
possible experimental paradigm for integrating phenomenologically informed methods in the 
laboratory. The IGT is an extensively used assessment tool for decision making that has been 
used to identify individuals who are high risk takers in real life situations (DeDonno & 
Demaree, 2008). Developed by Bechara et al. (1994) it is said to replicate real world decision 
making as it involves uncertainty, reward and punishment. The computerised task involves 
choosing between four decks of cards presented on a screen, typically labelled A, B, C and D. 
The aim of the task is to maximise their winnings and avoid losses. Unbeknownst to 
participants, however, some decks are more advantageous than others. With 2000 points in a 
simulated reservoir at the start of the task, participants are instructed to pick one card at a 
time. The task will involve 100 such draws, but participants are typically not informed about 
this limit. For each deck choice, participants either win or lose points that are added or 
subtracted to the points in the reservoir. Typical versions of the IGT (Bechara et al. 1994) 
characterise two of the decks (often referred to as B & D) as less advantageous (“bad decks”) 
in that they may yield overall net losses if chosen too often. One deck in particular (Deck B) 
is associated with high-frequency gains but results in catastrophic losses if chosen too often. 
The two other decks (A & C) have smaller immediate gains but the losses are also smaller, 
resulting in an overall net gain if chosen more frequently in the task (“good decks”).  
Typical analysis of the IGT usually involves dissecting task performance, commonly 
measuring performance after every 10 or 20 deck choices (Bechara et al 1994). Task 
performance is calculated by totalling good deck choice frequency against bad deck choice 
frequency. The task was made famous by Antonio Damasio’s (1994) Descartes Error, where 
he outlines evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. The IGT has been used to show that 
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people’s performance is biased by emotional ‘somatic markers’ whereby physiological 
arousal (measured by skin conductivity and heart rate) is said to guide decision making 
behaviour. The popularity of the IGT paradigm stems from the proposal of the SMH, which 
is arguably the most well-known theory of emotion-based reasoning (Colombetti, 2003). The 
IGT relies on normally functioning somatic markers for advantageous performance in the 
task (Preston et al. 2007).  
Damasio (1994) found that participants display greater physiological arousal before 
making disadvantageous deck choices, characterised by changes in skin conductivity 
responses and heart rate. The key feature of this is that the bodily changes are said to occur 
before the individual has conscious knowledge about the outcome of the deck (Bechara et al. 
2005). That is, the participant in the task shows a physiological response before making bad 
decisions, highlighting the body as playing an important role for emotion. Evidence for the 
SMH was illustrated from individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortices 
(VMPFC). These individuals are commonly shown to make high risk decision in their 
personal lives. In the IGT, VMPFC participants generally fail to generate anticipatory skin 
conductance responses (SCR) before selecting a bad deck (Bechara et al. 2005). It is thus 
concluded that these individuals do not share the same reasoning capabilities to non-injured 
participants.  
There are also questions as to exactly how the IGT paradigm replicates real life 
decision making and has been shown to be sensitive to context changes and environmental 
stressors. While some researchers have identified stressors that influence behaviour in the 
task (Gray, 1999; Lin et al. 2007; Preston et al. 2007) the specifics of these stressors are not 
fully understood in terms of how experience in the task changes (Bechara et al. 2005; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004). Maia and McClelland (2004) found that participants have more 
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knowledge about the IGT than initially thought by researchers and even report more 
knowledge of advantageous strategies than how those participants actually perform. There are 
very few empirical studies carried out on how conscious knowledge affects behaviour in 
cognitive tasks. However, Maia and McClelland developed a questionnaire to assess how 
participants understood the deck stimuli in the IGT. This was carried out at various points 
throughout the task and they claim that the questionnaire responses reflect conscious 
knowledge of the task. At the very least, it shows how people may be able to give 
experiential descriptions of certain facets of the IGT. The questionnaire measures this by 
asking participants to (1) rate how good or bad they thought each deck was and (2) asking 
them to elaborate on why they felt this way. As the task is typically 100 deck choices, Maia 
and McClelland (2004) were able to develop a systematic way of comparing task 
performance with how participants perceived the task stimuli over the course of the task.  
Their findings indicate that participants were able to successfully identify which 
decks were good and which were bad even though their performance in the task suggested 
otherwise. In Bechara et al.’s (1994) analysis of the IGT they found that participants 
increasingly make more advantageous decisions as the task progresses. However, Maia and 
McClelland (2004) argue that whether participants could correctly identify good decks over 
bad decks was not an indicator of better task performance. It highlights two strong points in 
the overestimation of what the IGT can achieve. First of all, people consistently have been 
shown to perform to optimise gain frequency rather than maximising gains (Maia & 
McClelland, 2004; Preston et al. 2007) – that is, operate on short-term rather than long-term 
goals. Secondly, there are phenomenologically implausible accounts of participants’ 
performance in the IGT. If they know which decks are good, it does not follow that they will 
follow along advantageous strategies. 
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This literature indicates that participants engage with the task, are capable of 
articulating experiences about the task, but clearly that the relationship between their 
experience and their behaviour in task performance is not well understood. This extensive 
research suggests that the IGT may be a more suitable candidate for the study of experience 
in relation to task behaviour, which could potentially be aided by the specific context of the 
task, similar to the previous experiment using the BART. Furthermore, instead of being seen 
as a widely-accepted task that measures emotion-based learning, the task should be seen as a 
lab-based task with an array of possible actions. The value of each available action can be 
learned over the course of the task, and a richer set of possible strategies can be followed as a 
result. With the aim of increasing the range of experiences of participants in performance of 
the task, and the implications associated with different actions (deck choices), we used the 
same social vs. individual framing of the task noted in Experiment 2, to help provide a little 
more socially relevant context with which the participants might engage.  
Research suggests that performance in the IGT is highly sensitive to environmental 
effects and context manipulations. However, there is conflicting research suggesting that 
environmental stresses tend to lead performance toward more advantageous or 
disadvantageous behavioural patterns (Colombetti, 2003; Gray, 1999).  Some say that 
environmental stressors facilitate advantageous behavioural patterns in the IGT (Ennis et al. 
2001) while others say that participants become more guided by immediate trial outcomes, 
resulting in disadvantageous behavioural patterns emerging over the course of the task 
(Colombetti, 2008). There is also some evidence for what is terms a ‘Prominent Deck B’ 
phenomenon (Lin et al. 2007) where participants are said to be guided by following short 
term, not long term, goals to maximise amount of winning IGT trials rather than final 
outcome (Li et al. 2010). 
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For this experiment, we used the social framing created in Experiment 2, where 
participants are lead to believe that their performance in the task would affect the next 
participant, which was someone who they were acquainted with.  We hypothesised that 
participants in the socially framed condition may show different behavioural patterns over the 
course of the task. We investigate this to explore if controlled framing in the IGT could show 
clear behavioural patterns emerging over the course of the task, which might be associated 
with their experience of how they understand the task. If clear links between context and 
behaviour can be found, it may indicate that the IGT could be explored using more 
phenomenologically informed methods in future studies. 
 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine participants took part in this study, 37 female and 22 male. Participants 
were aged between 18 and 39 (mean = 22.54yrs, SD = 4.68). A total of 29 participants took 
part in the (traditionally framed) individual IGT group. 30 participants took part in the 
socially framed group (and an additional 30 acted as facilitators for the social framing). 
Participants were recruited on a voluntary sampling basis at Mary Immaculate College, 
Limerick. When recruiting participants for the social framing group, participants were asked 
to take part in a study with an acquaintance and sign up to participate in the experiment in 
pairs of two. Ethical approval for the conduct of the experiment was granted by the Mary 
Immaculate Research Ethics Committee (MIREC). All participants were from undergraduate 
and postgraduate cohorts of the college and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
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Design 
A between groups design was carried out to investigate IGT performance and task 
framing. The independent variable was task framing which consisted of two conditions, a 
socially and individually framed condition. The dependent variable was performance 
measured by Overall Good Deck choices and total ‘Bad Deck B’ choices, similar to common 
analysis of IGT (Bechara et al. 1994; Lin et al. 2007).   
 
Social framing 
 Two framing groups were used in this study: a socially framed version of the task and 
the individual IGT framing commonly seen in the literature (Bechara et al. 1994; Gray, 1999; 
Maia & McClelland, 2004). Participants are told that the aim of the task is to maximise their 
gains and minimise their losses. In addition to recruiting participants in pairs of two to 
facilitate the social framing of the IGT, participants in this condition are also told that their 
winning total would be the starting total for their friend sat in a waiting room area. This was 
used to encourage a clearly defined context for this group of participants.  
 
Materials and apparatus  
The experiment took place in designated Psychology laboratories on Mary 
Immaculate College campus consisting of an experimental room and a waiting area. The 
experiment was carried out using a Dell desktop computer with Windows XP.   
The IGT programme was developed by Pleskac (2008) on E-Prime 2.0 stimulus 
presentation software. The IGT consisted of 100 IGT trials, presented sequentially over the 
course of the task. An IGT trial consists of 4 decks labelled 1, 2, 3 and 4 (instead of A, B, C 
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& D). Decks 1 and 3 represented the ‘good’ decks similar to Bechara et al.’s (1994) Decks A 
and C. Likewise, Decks 2 and 4 represented the ‘bad’ decks. The 4 decks and net total of 
points in participants’ reservoir were presented on screen for each trial. Each of the decks was 
randomised per participant. They were instructed that they can choose from any of the deck 
per trial, each having an initial 2000 points at the start of the task, which they must try to 
maximise. A copy of the instructions is provided in Appendix C.  
 
Procedure  
Participants were welcomed to the laboratory and in the social framing group, 
participants nominated between themselves which would take part in the experiment first. 
Unbeknownst to this group, the participant who nominated themselves to take part second 
acted as social facilitator. The facilitator were seated in a waiting area outside the 
experimental lab and provided with some light reading material for the duration of the 
experiment. 
Participants completing the experiment were brought to the laboratory, seated in front 
of the Dell desktop computer and asked to read the information pack (full material in 
Appendix C) as well as sign informed consent. Participants were reminded that their 
participation was voluntary and that they could leave the experiment at any time without 
providing reason for doing so. If they were happy to continue, participants completed a 
standard computerised version of IGT. Participants were instructed to select from among four 
decks of cards (labelled 1, 2, 3 & 4 but representing the traditional Decks A, B, C & D) 
varying in their frequencies of reward and punishment. The task consisted of 100 deck trials 
in total and participants completed the task without interruption. At the end of the task, 
participants were fully debriefed and participants in the social framing condition were told 
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the true nature of the experiment. Participants were thanked for their time and the 
experimenter answered any questions they may have had. IGT responses were gathered 
through ePrime and analysed using SPSS software.  
 
4.3.2 Results 
Overall Performance 
To investigate the relationship between framing condition and IGT performance, we 
calculated performance scores over the course of the task, categorising scores into IGT blocks 
representing 20 card choices, similar to the commonly used analysis in the literature (Bechara 
et al. 1994; Lin et al. 2007; Preston et al. 2007). Scores were calculated for Overall 
Performance representing total amount of good deck choices [Number of choices from 
(Decks A + C) – Deck (B + D)] and ‘Bad Deck B’ choices across the IGT blocks.  
A mixed-measures analysis of variance was conducted to investigate the differences 
between framing groups and Overall Performance across the IGT blocks. There was a 
statistically significant interaction effect between the framing groups and IGT blocks, Wilk’s 
Lambda = .799, F (4, 54) = 3.4, p = .015, partial η2 = .201.  
There was a substantial main effect for overall performance across the IGT blocks, 
Wilk’s Lambda = .635, F (2, 54) = 7.77, p <.005, partial η2 = .365. Post hoc paired sample t-
tests were carried out to explore this change across the IGT blocks, which can be seen in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Post hoc paired sample t-tests for overall performance across the IGT 
blocks 
  t df 
IGT block 1 
1.27 
(SD = 4.9) 
IGT block 2 
3.44 
(SD = 8.51) 
 
-2.092* 
 
58 
IGT block 2 
3.44 
(8.51) 
IGT block 3 
5.76 
(7.93) 
 
-2.22* 
 
58 
IGT block 3 
5.76 
(7.93) 
IGT block 4 
6.69 
(8.1) 
 
-1.067 
 
58 
IGT block 4 
6.69 
(8.1) 
IGT block 5 
5.47 
(10.1) 
 
1.302 
 
58 
Note * = p < .05. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
 
The main effect comparing the framing groups was not significant, F (1, 57) = 2.589, 
p = .113, partial η2 = .043. However, from the significant interaction effect, performance in 
the task appeared to differ between the framing groups as the task progresses, which can be 
seen clearly in Figure 4.5 below.  
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Figure 4.5: IGT Overall Performance between framing groups 
 
 Post-hoc analysis was carried out for the framing groups using independent-samples t-
tests. These were used to explore each IGT block and the framing conditions. There were no 
significant differences in IGT scores for the first three IGT blocks, but there were statistically 
significant differences found for blocks 4 and blocks 5, presented in Table 4.3. These are 
presented in the following table. Results show that there were differences in Overall 
Performance scores with the individually framed group making more advantageous choices, 
but only after IGT block 4. 
 
  
 
 
~ 101 ~ 
 
Table 4.3: Post-hoc Independent Sample t-test findings for IGT blocks 
 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT block 1 1.69 
(SD = 5.37) 
.87 
(SD = 4.64) 
 
-.630 57 
IGT block 2 3.72 
(8.3) 
3.17 
(8.76) 
 
-.249 57 
IGT block 3 4.59 
(6.64) 
6.9 
(8.97) 
 
1.122 57 
IGT block 4 4.03 
(7.86) 
9.27 
(7.57) 
 
2.606* 57 
IGT block 5 2.17 
(9.11) 
8.67 
(10.28) 
 
2.564* 57 
Note.*= p < .05, Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
‘Bad Deck B’ choices  
A mixed-measures analysis of variance was also carried out for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
between the framing groups and IGT blocks.  There was a statistically significant interaction 
effect between framing groups and IGT blocks, Wilk’s Lambda = .8.6, F (4, 54) = 3.25, p = 
.019, partial η2 = .194. There was no main effect for scores across the IGT blocks, Wilks 
Lambda = .814, F (2, 54) = 3.09, p = .186, partial η2 = .186. The main effect comparing the 
framing groups was not significant: F (1, 57) = 2.955, p = .091, partial η2 = .049, however the 
significant interaction effect shows that there is a relationship between framing and IGT 
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blocks, with participants in the social framing group making more draws from the “Bad Deck 
B” in the final two blocks of the task. This is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: ‘Bad Deck B’ choices between framing conditions 
 
 Post-hoc analysis was also carried out for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices between the framing 
groups using independent-samples t-tests, presented in Table 4.4. These were used to explore 
individual IGT blocks for the framing conditions. There were no significant differences in 
IGT scores for the first IGT blocks, but there were statistically significant differences found 
for blocks 4 and blocks 5. These are presented in the following table. Results show that there 
were differences in ‘Bad Deck B’ choices with the socially framed group making greater 
choices from this deck, but only after IGT block 4.  
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Table 4.4: Post-hoc Independent Sample t-test findings for IGT blocks 
 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT block 1 5.31 
(SD = 2.254) 
5.53 
(SD = 2.675) 
 
.346 57 
IGT block 2 5.34 
(3.82) 
5.00 
(4.12) 
 
-.333 57 
IGT block 3 4.17 
(2.69) 
3.93 
(4.12) 
 
-.260 57 
IGT block 4 5.66 
(3.67) 
3.11 
(3.13) 
 
-2.881* 57 
IGT block 5 6.79 
(4.135) 
3.83 
(4.79) 
 
-2.538* 57 
Note*= p < .05, Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
4.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 3 
The results of the experiment show that task framing had an effect on behavioural 
patterns over the course of the IGT.  Social framing was associated with riskier behaviour in 
the IGT, with greater ‘Bad Deck B’ choices observed over the course of the task (as seen in 
Figure 4.6). As a result of these choices, poorer Overall Good Deck choices were observed in 
the social group. This is similar to findings from Lin et al (2007) where greater Deck B 
behaviour is often observed. This behaviour is said to be associated with effects of immediate 
trial outcome where participants may be guided by gain frequency, rather than overall net 
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scores. However, this interpretation may not be the whole story. We can see that in the social 
framing group, overall good decisions increase for the first three blocks, but then drop, with 
Deck B choices rising substantially in Blocks 4 and 5. While this might indicate the trial-by-
trial thinking suggested by Lin et al (2007), it might also indicate an increasing pressure to 
produce a positive result by the end of the task. Participants were not aware of just how long 
the task would go on, and after 60 trials it may be a reasonable expectation that it was ending 
soon. 
The change in profile over the course of the task is a potentially important point – 
both framing groups begin performing in a very similar fashion, but diverge in Block 3. This 
would indicate the dynamic nature of the task which makes it appealing as an engaging and 
potentially rich experience. Participants’ engage with and perform differently as the task 
progresses. The use of task framing indicates clear behavioural patterns between conditions, 
and suggests that the IGT may have the necessary experiential components that warrant 
further research. In contrast to the GNAT, the stimuli of the task remain the same across 
conditions, but the context seems to affect the task differently. Finding methods that allow the 
collection of descriptive reports during the IGT may be challenging, but the multi-layered 
structure of the IGT suggest that there are ways of exploring the experiential aspects of the 
task that guide task behaviour. One of the interesting aspects of the IGT is that it requires the 
participants to learn strategies over the course of the task. The dynamics of the gain/loss 
frequencies can only be learned by interacting with the task over a number of trials. It is also 
worth noting that, when asked for informal feedback, participants did not mention that they 
were bored.  
While Maia and McClelland (2004) argue that participants attain knowledge of the 
gain/loss frequencies at a stage earlier than previous believed (Bechara et al. 1994), this 
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dynamic is an interesting paradigm for the lab. Earlier decisions affect the state of play for 
later decisions, thus creating an interdependency and complexity in the cognitive process of 
performing that task most similar to everyday life than isolated, inconsequential decisions in 
many experiments. The results of Experiment 3 show that the IGT is a promising task for 
future research. The task dynamics appear to be rich enough for people’s behaviour to vary, 
hold people’s attention over the course of the task, as well as have the kind of dynamism and 
inter-dependency of decisions to be relevant to real-world experience. It also appears to be 
sensitive to participants’ experience of the wider situation, indicating that there may be useful 
differences in experience to explore using this task. As outlined in Chapter One, the 
psychological situation and broader context is frequently overlooked in experimental tasks. 
Further research is certainly needed to explore contextual effects and the IGT, but results of 
the present experiment suggests there may be ways of exploring experience in the lab. This 
could be used to shed light on what aspects of the psychological situation is important for 
understanding the relationship between experience and behaviour, but in a more controlled 
way that previous research has proposed.  
 
4.4 General discussion  
From the results of the three experiments outlined in this chapter, the importance of 
context or the general meaningfulness of stimuli for behaviour seems variable and has a 
complex relationship with task behaviour. This may not be surprising as if the relationship 
was simple it would have been discussed much more in the literature since the inception of 
lab based experimentation. The variability of behaviour, and participants’ descriptions of 
boredom, emphasises the importance of using tasks that engage participants in dynamic ways.  
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Boredom may indicate a metacognitive disengagement with the task. Schwartz (2010) 
stated that metacognitive experiences facilitate our interactions with environmental stimuli. 
As our environment contains many affordances, we attend to what is meaningful in moment-
to-moment instances, which are hard to isolate in artificial and controlled settings like the lab. 
When we examine this behaviour in lab based paradigms, we aim to identify a particular 
aspect of experience to study. While we want to maintain as much control as possible, we 
also want to provide relevance for participants so that they can make some sense of the 
situation and be capable of discussing their experience and task in a coherent manner. 
Though it was not a key consideration in the design of the studies, nor has it seen much 
discussion in the literature on introspection, boredom in experimental tasks does seem 
important, and have some potential implications for experimental research in general. The 
fact that the more playful, game-like framing of the BART doesn’t alleviate the boredom 
element shows us that there needs to be some richness in the behavioural strategies that can 
be learned or improved over time on the basis of feedback on how the task is going, that 
keeps people engaged. While the aim of the present thesis is to investigate what kinds of 
minimal changes in laboratory practice might enable better examination of the experience-
behaviour relationship, it would seem that task design will be affected. The limited, difficult 
to interpret results of the GNAT and BART, and participants’ informal comments about 
boredom setting in, indicate that to avoid limiting our research to the experiences of people 
apathetic about what they are doing, our tasks will need to be at least a complex and dynamic 
as the IGT. 
 The purpose of this chapter was to identify an experimental paradigm that could be 
used to develop more integrative methods in controlled settings; something that would enable 
the effective inclusion of phenomenological or introspective methods of investigation in the 
lab, beginning with minimalist actions, such as including more meaningful stimuli. 
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Experiment 1 suggests that the contents of stimuli may affect participant behaviour, even in a 
fast paced task like the GNAT. This is an interesting, if unsurprising, finding as it is said that 
behaviour in this task is due to higher cognitive functions (for example, executive 
functioning, or in some version of the task lexical decision making). However, the finding of 
this experiment may also suggest that the contents of the stimuli are also important, in how 
participants attend to them. The meaningfulness of stimuli in the GNAT may have some 
effect on patterns of performance during the task. Interpreting those effects may prove 
difficult and the relatively fast-paced nature of the task would make interruption to elicit 
descriptive accounts of participants’ experiences problematic, as the aim of this project is to 
explore ways of gathering this qualitative data in meaningful and useful ways.  
In order to find methods for exploring experience in controlled settings, it was clear 
that we needed to find ways of including more meaningful and engaging stimuli in our task. 
This would give a richer context for participants as they behave in the lab, which can often be 
far removed from the naturalistic ways in which behaviour occurs. From our experiments, it 
appears that there is some impact of meaningfulness of stimuli, even in minimal, highly 
constrained tasks like the GNAT. Adapting methods for using such tasks to explore relevant 
experiences for the participants will be challenging, and interpreting the different patterns of 
behaviour between the conditions would be challenging even were we to have rich 
descriptions of participants’ experiences.   The multi-layered and dynamic IGT, on the other 
hand, seems to involve several components that could be used to explore interesting aspects 
of task behaviour.  
While a simple test of decision making in the lab, the BART lacks an interdependency 
of decisions. It is impossible to accurately guess when a BART trial will result in a loss, and 
as a result, the task does not afford opportunities to vary participant performance or interact 
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with the task in a dynamic way. Using a social framing of the BART, we failed to uncover 
behavioural differences in the task. Participant cannot rely on inflation frequencies, as these 
vary per trial. It seems to suggest that the task is not sensitive to context manipulations in 
straightforward ways. While a more controlled version of the IGT (in that it involves more 
unpredictable gain/loss frequencies), it results in fewer behavioural strategies so it is harder to 
explore how experience in the task is related to specific aspects of behaviour, other than risk-
taking propensities of the participants. These features may indicate the stark behavioural 
differences found in Experiment 3. From our findings, the IGT is sensitive to contextual 
manipulations. As the BART does not appear to be associated with the same effects, it 
suggests that the task may not be suitable for qualitative explorations. Performances in the 
BART may improve over the course of the task, but it brings with it certain monotony, with 
some participants noting that the task can be repetitive and boring, which is detrimental to 
developing ways of exploring experience in the task further. However, Experiment 3 suggests 
that there may be a way to explore experience in the task in more promising ways as 
performance seems to be specifically linked with how the task is framed. The IGT, being 
more dynamic and involving learning over the course of the task, was much more successful 
in illustrating a link between the task experience (in the form of social framing) and task 
behaviour. Environmental factors, other than personality differences or strategic capabilities, 
have not been extensively explored using the IGT. Uncovering how situational or framing 
factors affect IGT performance, using qualitative descriptions, could provide interesting 
insights to task experience and uncover tenets of the relationship between experience and 
behaviour more generally.  
What we have specifically learned over the course of these experiments is that careful 
consideration is needed when exploring experience in the lab. Contents of the stimuli and 
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situation are important when measuring specific aspects of task behaviour, with the latter 
being a key factor in showing a clear link between experience and behaviour. Situational 
factors seem to be able to influence task behaviour, which could be used to explore the 
qualitative aspects of experience. The social framing seemed to work particularly well for the 
IGT, with clear behavioural patterns emerging over the course of the task. This suggests that 
it is the experience of the meaning, or context, of the task, that has some bearing on how the 
participants understands and interacts with the task over time. Having identified an 
appropriate task in the study of experience in the lab, we turned our attention to finding 
appropriate qualitative methods that can be integrated to the lab. This may allow us to 
uncover details of experiences that help us to understand these data more comprehensively.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Experiment 4: Task-Specific Questioning and 
Introspective Training using the Iowa Gambling Task 
 
 
We cannot predict a person’s judgments or decisions by merely knowing what came to mind 
without taking the accompanying subjective experiences into account. Adding further 
complexity, the meaning of subjective experiences is itself malleable and the same experience 
can convey different information in different contexts (Schwartz, 2010; p. 105). 
 
 
Adopting a phenomenological approach is necessary when trying to investigate the 
experiential nature of consciousness (Gallagher, 2005). However, Smith, Flowers and Larkin 
(2009) claim that phenomenological data are often elusive, ambiguous, and difficult to 
analyse. This is supported by a number of researchers who suggest that, at present, there is no 
coherent method for the study of experience in Psychology (Dennett, 1991, 2012; 
Langdridge, 2007; Schwitzgebel, 2008; Weisberg, 2011). Collecting descriptive data using 
direct questioning, but focusing on richer descriptions of experience, may offer insights to 
task behaviour when used in a controlled way (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004; Traylen, 1989). As of yet, there is no consensus on methods for studying 
experience in this way, although many approaches are available to make sense of qualitative 
data (Langdridge, 2004). As discussed in previous chapters, these methods for studying 
experience tend to be either focused on naturalistic settings and offer no control over 
behavioural observations, or are very demanding in terms of research time (prolonged 
interview with the Elicitation Interview), participant time (phenomenological training), or 
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focused almost entirely on perceptual tasks (neurophenomenology). Standard experiments 
have not been readily used to explore experiences as they often lack meaningful, dynamic 
behaviour and are removed from their naturalistic expression. This may be due to task not 
engaging the participants in an embodied way, where their actions in the task are not based in 
any real context or meaningful situation. Additionally, the task used in common experiments 
may possibly bore participants, an issue not commonly considered in psychological research 
but potentially posing a significant challenge to any generalisation of behavioural 
observations. 
The findings from Experiment 3 presented in the previous chapter suggest that 
framing an experiment in a clear and meaningful situation, where their behaviour is 
embedded in some dynamic interaction, may offer more useful behavioural data for exploring 
experience further. Moreover, it may show that there are ways of using psychological 
methods to explore the relationship between the experience and the behaviour in controlled 
settings. The previous chapter suggests that the IGT might be both engaging, and rich enough 
in dynamics to provide a spread of experiences that can be used to help examine behavioural 
differences. As such, the experiment presented in this chapter investigates the use of directed 
questioning on participants’ experience during the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) when task 
framing is used for the experiment.  
As it happens, there is a questionnaire already associated with the IGT. Rather than 
marginalising experience, (that is, describe it in terms of characteristics of the behaviour), in 
the present study we attempt to use the descriptive data to interpret task behaviour using the 
questionnaire developed for the IGT by Maia and McClelland (2004). This questionnaire 
provides us with a simple, minimal start on exploring experience of the framed IGT, but we 
aim to do so with a greater emphasis on descriptive, qualitative questions, which have not 
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been directly examined in previous uses of the questionnaire. In addition, the structured 
probing of experience associated with an experimental task like the IGT, provides an 
opportunity to explore whether practice in description of experiences, or awareness of 
changes in responses, to questions about qualitative aspects of the task in which they are 
engaged. 
Are participants who receive a basic form of introspective training better at picking up 
on experiential or emotional facets of the experience, and might this have an effect their 
descriptions of the task? While there has been some discussion in the literature on 
introspection, regarding the impact of introspective or phenomenological training on the 
experience itself (e.g. Schwitzgebel, 2008), there is little to no discussion as to whether 
concomitant behaviour changes would also occur. As such, this type of training has not been 
carried out using the IGT or in much of the previous studies where emphasis is on the 
integration of qualitative descriptions and task behaviour. 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have argued that introspection has no place in scientific 
research. Overgaard (2004), and others (Gallagher, 2005; Langdridge, 2004; Smith et al. 
2009) refute this in that the very basis of empirical psychological investigations is somewhat 
introspective as it also involves the researcher reflecting on the processes behind thoughts 
and feelings. As discussed in Chapter Two, introspective or phenomenological training may 
be associated with biases from self- reflection. This has to be addressed and investigated 
further if mixed methods are to be used in controlled settings. Schultz (2012) states that all 
psychological research is introspective in some way as it involves the active reflection of 
metacognitive experiences; that is, when we aim to explore behaviour in Psychology, we do 
so by our understanding that the behaviour involves the participants reflecting on their 
actions in some way. Third- person science doesn’t tell us much of the qualitative 
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experiences associated with perceptual phenomena, however it is generally believed that the 
participant is actively making sense of the task demands and stimuli in some sort of 
meaningful way so as the behaviour is directly associated with a cognitive function.  
5.1 Task-specific questioning in the IGT 
The use of the Maia and McClelland questionnaire with the IGT constitutes a form of 
guided reflection on the task, and more particularly on the task materials, for participants. 
The questionnaire asks questions that are developed on a Likert rating scale (self-report 
ratings), but also includes questions where participants are asked to explain their responses, 
thus including qualitative aspects of description and uncovering qualitative features of their 
experiences with the task stimuli. In its previous use (Maia & McClelland, 2004), the 
questionnaire data were collected by interrupting the participants’ performance in the IGT 
several times over the course of the task. A similar, less extensive, procedure is also used in 
other IGT studies. For example, Bechara et al.’s (1994) original study used a questionnaire 
that was carried out several times over the course of the task. Their questionnaire was 
developed to investigate levels of task knowledge and decision making strategies based on 
participants’ perceptions of the task. On the basis of responses to their questionnaire, they 
claimed that participant knowledge relates to three types of ‘feeling’ states. These states 
consist of ‘pre-hunch’, ‘hunch’ and ‘conceptual’ periods. The conceptual period is when 
participants are said to attain explicit knowledge of the different outcomes of the task stimuli. 
Participants were shown to ‘feel’ certain ways during the experiment, as they interacted with 
the dynamics of the task, also discussed in Damasio (1994).  
Following from this, Maia and McClelland (2004) developed a questionnaire 
specifically designed for the IGT. In this questionnaire, however, more detailed aspects of the 
participants’ conscious or expressed knowledge were explored. This questionnaire included 
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items specifically related to the participants’ experience of the task and has been used to 
argue that participants have much more conscious knowledge of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ decks 
in the IGT than supposed by previous researchers (Colombetti, 2003). Maia and McClelland 
argue that participants’ behaviour in the IGT was more affected by immediate trial outcome 
rather than the long term decision strategies proposed by Bechara et al (1994) who claim that 
during ‘hunch’ periods  emotional feelings guide behaviour. Maia and McClelland’s (2004) 
questionnaire was administered after the first 20 deck choices, then following every 10 deck 
choices.  Colombetti (2008), however, suggests that their questionnaire may be too intrusive 
to the task.  
From the responses to the questionnaire, Maia and McClelland (2004) reduced the 
scope of data collected (9 interview stages over the task) to a narrow range of three levels of 
conscious knowledge that participants may have during the IGT. Level 0 referred to the 
participant not having any conscious knowledge specifying a preference for one of the two 
best decks. That is, participants in this category are unable to identify the ‘bad’ decks. Level 
1 referred to the participant having conscious knowledge about the outcomes of the decks that 
could provide a basis for that preference. That is, participants in this category can identify 
some, but not all ‘good’ and ‘bad’ decks consistently in their responses. They may be able to 
identify a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ deck, but are unable to provide justification for their choices. Level 
2, the highest level of conscious knowledge categorised by their questionnaire, refers to 
responses that show a preference for one of the two best decks as well as having knowledge 
of the decks that could provide the basis for that preference. These responses are based on 
rating each of the decks in the task, providing justification for those ratings, rating one’s own 
confidence levels in the task, and stating preferred decks. 
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In the present experiment, we included introspective training for some participants as 
research has suggested that training attunes participants to their experience and enables them 
to give more detailed responses to open questions about their activity. Maia and McClelland 
(2004) questionnaires did include responses to these descriptive questions that offered 
participants the opportunity to describe their experiences of the decks and justifications for 
their ratings. Responses to these questions were ignored from analysis by Maia and 
McClelland due to the difficulty in evaluating those responses. They state that qualitative 
responses were only considered for one participant in their experiment, in an instance where 
IGT behaviour was deemed erratic. Subsequently, this participant’s data were excluded 
entirely from their analysis as it was determined that the participant did not grasp what was 
required of them in the task. It seems probable, but is not discussed, that the qualitative 
responses attaining from other participants in their 2004 study were vague or insufficiently 
structured, and difficult to analyse. This would be consistent with literature on introspection 
that consistently states that open ended questioning needs careful consideration (Levine, 
1983; Petitmengin et al. 2013; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2008; Schwitzgebel, 2003; Traylen, 
1989). As such, some of the participants who took part in Experiment 4 outlined below 
received introspective training prior to taking part in the task. Training is often said to change 
how participants view their experiences and the ways in which they describe them 
(Petitmengin, 2006; Vermesch, 2004). However, the effects that this sort of training could 
have on behaviour are little understood and have not been properly explored using controlled 
experiments.  
There are additional problems associated with integrating introspective and 
phenomenologically informed methods in the lab. As presented in Chapter Two, many 
authors argue that introspective methods are best integrated with day-to-day activities in the 
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individual’s natural environment (Heron & Reason, 1997; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2008; 
Langdridge, 2007; Petitmengin et al. 2013; Reid et al. 2005). While Maia and McClelland’s 
questionnaire has been used with the IGT before, it does not appear to have been used to its 
fullest. The qualitative and open-ended questions were removed from the analysis and the 
useful of these data were not discussed. As the authors were concerned with knowledge of the 
task materials, not participants’ experience, participants were not given any practice in 
offering descriptions of experience. As such, the experiment outlined in this chapter may help 
determine whether training makes a difference in the kinds of replies in the questionnaire, or 
the participants’ awareness or understanding of their experience or the task. The chapter 
investigates two key issues: direct questioning relevant to the participants’ experiences of the 
task; and adopting introspective training methods.  
 
5.2 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-four participants took part in the experiment, twenty-four male and thirty female 
(mean age = 25.33, SD = 7.56). Twenty-seven participants were randomly assigned to each 
of the social framing and individual IGT conditions. In the social framing groups (10 male; 
17 female) fourteen participants received training. In the individual IGT condition (14 male; 
13 female), fifteen participants received training. All students assigned to the social condition 
(both trained and untrained) were asked to help the researcher by recruiting a friend who 
would come to the lab with them and also participate. Participants were recruited on a 
voluntary sampling basis on Mary Immaculate College, Limerick. All participants were from 
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the undergraduate and postgraduate cohort of the college and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Design 
The experiment utilised a between groups design. There were two independent 
variables. The first IV is framing group; similar to Experiment 3, we utilised a socially 
framed version of the task as well as the individual IGT condition.  The second IV is training 
group; this variable also consisted of two levels: trained and untrained. We provided 
introspective training for some of the participants to explore potential differences in 
questionnaire reports. The untrained group received no introspective training.  
The dependent variable for the experiment is IGT performance and questionnaire 
responses. For analysis, we calculated IGT Overall Performance (Decks [A + C] – Decks [B 
+ D]), as well as ‘Bad Deck B’ choices over the course of the task. Similar to previous 
studies, these scores were calculated for every 20 deck choices in the task, characterised as 
IGT blocks. 
We also collated responses from the amended questionnaire. Responses were 
measured for rating each IGT deck (referred to as Deck Ratings) and responses of task 
confidence (referred to as Confidence Reports). Deck Ratings were carried out on a 10 point 
scale were participants were asked to rate each of the decks sequentially, giving each deck a 
score between 0 and 10, stating how good (10) or bad (0) each deck was. Confidence Reports 
(ranging from 0 to 100) were collected after each of the questionnaire blocks, whereby 
participants rated how confident they felt in the task to maximise their gains and minimise 
their losses. The questionnaire was carried out in intervals of 20 deck choices in the task, 
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similar to typical IGT analysis (Bechara et al. 1994) but less intrusive than Maia and 
McClelland’s administration (after every 10 deck choices, following the initial 20 card choice 
block).  
 
Introspective Training 
Participants who were assigned to the introspective training group met with the 
experimenter for three training sessions before taking part in the IGT experiment. During 
these sessions, participants completed a simple decision making task called the Angling Risk 
Task, developed by Pleskac (2008) on ePrime 2.0. During these sessions, the experimenter 
conducted semi-structured interviews. The Angling Risk Task is an experiment used to 
investigate decision making, but the task takes the form of a fishing game where the 
experimenter can alter the weather conditions (sunny/cloudy) and how many chances 
participants have to be successful in catching a fish in a computerised fishing task. This was 
used to vary the task used for the training group, to avoid boredom, and to ensure that 
participants had different aspects of the task to describe. Participants were aware that these 
were training sessions for an experimental session that would take place in the future, but 
were not aware of the task that was going to be used. Participants were also instructed that 
their performances were not going to be measured in the Angling Risk Task. 
Each training session for participants took place on separate days, the first being 
seven to ten days prior to taking part in the IGT. Training sessions lasted between twenty and 
twenty-five minutes. During these sessions, the interview was administered twice at random 
times during the task, followed by a discussion at the end of the task. The questions used 
during these interviews focused specifically on the descriptive words they naturally used to 
describe their experience in the task. This followed similar guidelines of Hurlburt and 
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Akhtar’s (2006) training in their study whereby focus was placed on the naturalistic 
expression of experiences. That is, when the participants explained why they made particular 
decisions in the task, the experimenter asked them to describe what they meant by the 
descriptive words they used, rather than the contents of their descriptions. Participants were 
continually asked how they felt about the task and talking about the task. 
Participants were not asked to defend their behaviour in the task, but rather were 
instructed to focus on their experiences and to detail the descriptions of their experience as 
honestly as possible. This also included describing to the experimenter how they felt doing so 
in a lab, about a specific task, and if boredom had an effect on the task. Through this, 
participants reported that they were engaged with the training session. As the training 
sessions progressed, participants reported that they were comfortable talking about their 
experience of the task and the lab environment. Some participants felt that they had little to 
report in terms of new experiences after the first training session, but as the experimenter 
manipulated the conditions of the task (making it more and less difficult), they reported 
differences in their experiences with the descriptive words they used.    
Following completion of the 3 training sessions and practice introspection, 
participants were invited to take part in the experimental task where their performance in IGT 
would be measured.  
 
Materials and equipment 
The experiment was run on a Dell laptop using Windows XP with an 18 inch monitor 
and standardised European keyboard. The experiment used a standardised version of the IGT 
run on ePrime 2.0, developed by Pleskac (2008) consisting of 100 deck trials.  
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An amended version of Maia and McClelland (2004) questionnaire (Appendix D) was 
used in the experiment and presenting on the computer screen after every 20 deck trials (IGT 
Blocks). As the aim of the experiment is to gather descriptive data about the participant’s 
experience and knowledge of the task, the questionnaire was adapted to include the 
qualitative questions measuring deck ratings of the task stimuli. For example, question 1 
asked participants to rate on a scale of 0 to 10 how good or bad the particular deck was, and 
Confidence Rating in their judgement (between 0 and 100). This was followed by the 
qualitative question: 
 
Why did you give Deck [__} that particular rating and take a few moments to 
describe why 
 
This was repeated after each deck rating and participants were encouraged to detail as 
much of their experience of the task as possible. We also reduced the Likert scale ratings to a 
10 point scale (rate between 0 and 10) instead of Maia and McClelland’s 20 point scale (rate 
between -10 and +10). A Dictaphone was used to record participant responses to questions.  
 
Procedure 
Ethical approval for the conduct of the experiment was granted by the Mary 
Immaculate Research Ethics Committee (MIREC).  
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate and postgraduate cohorts at Mary 
Immaculate College, Limerick. The experimenter gave a brief explanation about the nature of 
the study and if they were willing to take part, participants were randomly assigned to either a 
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training or untrained group. They were advised that their participation in the experiment was 
voluntary and that there was no requirement for a justification on their part if they wished to 
withdraw participation at any time. A date and time was set for participants to take part in the 
study. Participants were randomly assigned to the social framing or individual IGT conditions 
before coming to the designated experimentation lab. Participants who received training and 
were assigned to the socially framed condition were asked to complete IGT experiment 
“first”.  
Once at the lab, all participants were asked to read briefing material and sign 
informed consent if they wished to continue. If participants were unable to recruit a friend to 
participate with them in the social framing groups, they were reassigned to the individual IGT 
condition.  
Participants taking part in the experiment were met by the experimenter in designated 
areas and brought to the experimentation lab. Following this participants were seated in front 
of computer and asked to read an information sheet (Appendix D). Once they were happy to 
continue, they were prompted to press a key on the keyboard in front of the computer to 
initiate the experiment. The IGT presented a practice period of 3 individual deck choices. 
This was used to introduce participants to the task. After these trials, the participant had the 
opportunity to ask the experimenter any questions. Following this, the participants were 
prompted to press any key on the keyboard to initiate the IGT experimental trials. After every 
20 card deck choices, the questionnaire was presented on the computer monitor. Participants 
were instructed to give their responses verbally and pressed the space key on the keyboard to 
initiate questions sequentially.  
When the experiment was completed, participants were given debriefing information. 
Participants in the social framing group were debriefed on the true nature of the study 
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together and explained that some participants were not asked to bring a friend. All 
participants were thanked for their cooperation and the experimenter answered any questions 
they had. 
 
5.3  Results 
The analysis that was carried out in this experiment is divided into 4 sections: IGT 
performance between groups; Deck Ratings between groups; Confidence Ratings and IGT 
performance between groups; and Examination of Qualitative Responses.   
This analysis investigates IGT behaviour and questionnaire responses over the task, 
divided into IGT blocks, parallel to analysis performed in Experiment 3. Each block is a 
summary of 20 deck choices. Groups are characterised by framing groups (social framing and 
individual group) and training groups (trained and untrained). IGT performance is 
characterised as Overall Performance (number of choices from Decks [A + C] – Decks [B + 
D]) and number of ‘Bad Deck B’ choices, in keeping with analysis carried out in Experiment 
3. Deck Ratings are analysed by the calculating the score from a question in the amended 
2004 questionnaire. Confidence Ratings refer to a self-reported score rating the confidence in 
their performance in the IGT.  
 
5.3.1 IGT performance between groups 
This section analyses behavioural differences in the IGT between groups (framing 
groups and training groups). A mixed-measures analysis of variance was performed on the 
data for each of the IGT behavioural variables.   
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Overall Performance 
Overall Performance was measured for framing groups (social framing and individual 
IGT) and training groups (training and untrained) per IGT blocks (IGT blocks = 20 card 
trials). There was no significant interaction effect between framing groups, training groups 
and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .860, F (4, 47) = 1.912, p = .124, partial η2 = .14. There 
was no interaction effect between training group and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .907, F (4, 
47) = 1.203, p = .322, partial η2 = .093, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1. There was also no 
interaction effect between framing group and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .923, F (4, 47) = 
982, p = .426, partial η2 = .077, illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Overall Performance scores in IGT for training groups 
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The main effect for framing group was not significant, F (1, 50) = .141, p = .709, 
partial η2 = .003. The main effect for training was also not significant, F (1, 50) = .091, p = 
.976, partial η2 = .002. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Overall Performance scores in IGT for framing groups 
 
However, there was a significant main effect for IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .374; F 
(4, 47) = 19.69; p < .005, partial η2 = .625, showing that there is a difference in Overall 
Performance over the course of task, but not due to either of the grouping variables, training 
(Figure 5.1) and framing (Figure 5.2). Post-hoc analysis was carried out for the Overall 
Performance scores and IGT blocks, as the analysis revealed that there were differences in 
the scores between blocks. Paired-samples t-tests found that there were significant changes in 
the scores between blocks, presented Table 5.1.  
 
 
~ 125 ~ 
 
Table 5.1: Paired sample t-tests for IGT blocks between framing groups 
 
  t df 
IGT block 1 
1.019 
(SD = 4.17) 
IGT block 2 
3.148 
(SD = 8.403) 
 
-1.967 
 
53 
IGT block 2 
3.148 
(8.403) 
IGT block 3 
5.94 
(7.14) 
 
-2.42* 
 
53 
IGT block 3 
5.94 
(7.14) 
IGT block 4 
8.61 
(5.26) 
 
-2.563* 
 
53 
IGT block 4 
8.61 
(5.26) 
IGT block 5 
8.2 
(8.12) 
 
.372 
 
53 
Note * = p<.05. Standard Deviations appear in parenthesis below the means 
 
‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
‘Bad Deck B’ choices were measured for framing groups and training groups per IGT 
block of 20 card trials. There was no significant interaction effect between framing groups, 
training groups and  IGT blocks for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices, Wilks Lambda = .971, F (4, 47) = 
.356, p = .839. There was also no interaction effect between framing group and IGT blocks: 
Wilks Lambda = .861, F (4, 47) = .796, p = .534; or training group and IGT blocks of Deck B 
choices: Wilks Lambda = .937, F (4, 47) = 1.89, p = .128. The main effect for framing group 
was not significant, F (1, 50) = 2.615, p = .112, partial η2 = .05. The main effect for training 
group was also not significant, F (1, 50) = 1.036, p = .314, partial η2 = .02.  
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There was a substantial main effect for IGT block, Wilks Lambda = .22, F (4, 49) = 
44.01, p < .0005, partial η2 = .61, with both grouping variables showing less choices of the 
‘Bad Deck B’ across the 5 IGT blocks, illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: ‘Bad Deck B’ choices across IGT Blocks 
  
 Post-hoc analysis was carried out for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices and IGT blocks using 
Paired-Samples t-tests for each IGT block. These results are presented in Table 5.2.   
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Table 5.2: Paired sample t-tests for IGT blocks and ‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
 
  t df 
IGT block 1 
7.037 
(SD = 2.16) 
IGT block 2 
5.389 
(SD = 3.75) 
 
2.77* 
 
53 
IGT block 2 
5.389 
(3.75) 
IGT block 3 
4.296 
(3.33) 
 
1.95 
 
53 
IGT block 3 
4.296 
(3.33) 
IGT block 4 
3.685 
(2.51) 
 
1.24 
 
53 
IGT block 4 
3.685 
(2.51) 
IGT block 5 
2.5 
(1.88) 
 
2.85* 
 
53 
Note * = p<.05. Standard Deviations appear in parenthesis below the means 
 
5.3.2 Deck Ratings 
Deck Ratings were measured with Question 1 of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) 
questionnaire:  
 
Rate on a scale of 0 to 10, how good or bad you think deck [insert deck here] is, 
where 0 means that it is terrible and 10 means that it is excellent. 
 
This was measured for Deck’s A, B, C and D across the five IGT blocks and 
presented below. Following preliminary analyses, no major violations of the assumptions of 
the ANOVA were found.  
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Deck A 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance found no significant interaction effects for 
framing groups, training groups and Deck Ratings for Deck A choices across the IGT Blocks: 
F (2, 52) = 1.547, p = .204. However, there were significant main effects for framing groups: 
F (2, 52) = 8.561, p <.001; but not for training groups, F (2, 52) = 1.619, p = .185. Post-hoc 
independent samples t-tests were carried out to find patterns amongst the deck ratings and 
framing group. These tests found that there were significant differences between framing 
groups during IGT Blocks 2, 4 and 5, which is presented in Table 5.2. This analysis shows 
that the individual IGT group rated Deck A as significantly more positive in blocks 2 and 4, 
but this was reversed in block 5 which was gathered once the IGT was completed (at which 
point the social group rated Deck A as more positive than the individual group).  
 
Table 5.2: Mean ratings and t-test results for Deck A 
 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT block 2 5.15 
(1.433) 
6.15 
(.989) 
-2.984* 52 
IGT block 4 5.41 
(1.217) 
6.22 
(1.476) 
-2.213* 52 
IGT block 5 6.98 
(1.217) 
5.15 
(1.350) 
4.986** 52 
Note.*= p < .05, ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
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Deck B 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance found no significant interaction effects for 
framing groups, training groups and Deck Ratings for Deck B choices across the IGT blocks: 
F (2, 52) = .995, p = .42. However, there were significant main effects between framing 
groups: F (2, 52) = 16.668, p <.001; but not for training groups, F (2, 52) = 1.749, p = .155. 
Post-hoc independent samples t-tests found that the differences between framing groups 
occurred during IGT blocks 3 and 5. Table 5.3 shows the t-test analysis for these differences. 
The social group rated Deck B more positive than the individual group.  
 
Table 5.3: Mean ratings and t-test results for Deck B 
 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT block 3 5.33 
(.620) 
2.44 
(1.188) 
11.205** 52 
IGT block 5 3.41 
(2.241) 
2.07 
(1.107) 
2.772* 52 
Note. *= p < .05, ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
Deck C 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance found no significant interaction effects for 
framing groups, training groups and Deck Ratings for Deck C choices across the IGT Blocks: 
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F (2, 52) = .328, p = .805. There were no main effects for framing groups, F (2, 52) = 1.537, 
p = .217; or for training groups, F (2, 52) = .137, p = .925 in Deck C ratings.  
 
Deck D 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance found no significant interaction effects for 
framing groups, training groups and Deck Ratings for Deck D choices across the IGT Blocks: 
F (2, 52) = .528, p = .716. However, there were significant main effects for framing groups: F 
(2, 52) = 8.729, p <.001; but not for training groups, F (2, 52) = .819, p = .520. Post-hoc 
independent samples t-tests found that the differences between framing groups occurred 
during IGT Block 4. Table 5.4 shows the t-test analysis for these differences, where the 
individual IGT group rated Deck D more positively than the social group.  
 
Table 5.4: Mean ratings and t-test results for Deck D 
 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT Block 4 3.04 
(.649) 
5.11 
(.847) 
-10.0960** 52 
Note.  ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
5.3.3 Confidence Ratings and IGT performance between groups 
This section analyses Confidence Reports gathered through the questionnaire with 
IGT performance across the IGT blocks for framing groups and training groups. IGT 
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performance was analysis for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices only as there were no trends in behaviour 
noted for Overall Performance in the task (Decks [A + C] – Decks [B + D]). A mixed-
measure multivariate analysis of variance was performed to investigate Confidence Reports, 
IGT performance, framing groups and training groups. 
 
‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
Confidence Reports and ‘Bad Deck B’ choices were measured for framing and 
training groups across the IGT blocks. The mixed-measures multivariate analysis of variance 
found no significant multivariate effects for Confidence Reports and ‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
for framing groups or training groups across the IGT Blocks, F (2, 52) = .580, p = .679.  
There were no interaction effects for Confidence Reports, ‘Bad Deck B’ choices and 
framing groups, F (2, 52) = 2.502, p = .055. Additionally there were no significant interaction 
effects for Confidence Reports, ‘Bad Deck B’ choices and training groups: F (2, 52) = .611, p 
= .567. However, we did find a significant difference between framing groups for Confidence 
Reports across the IGT Blocks, F (2, 52) = 3.341, p = .017, which is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Confidence Reports across IGT Blocks for framing groups 
 
Post-hoc t-tests were carried out to investigate the differences between the confidence 
reports and framing groups across the IGT blocks. This is done using independent samples t-
tests and presented in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5: Post-hoc independent samples t-tests for Confidence Ratings and framing 
groups 
 Framing groups   
 Social framing Individual IGT t df 
IGT Block 1 30.37 
(SD = 18.55) 
29.19 
(SD = 15.83) 
.253 52 
IGT Block 2 54.67 
(11.75) 
42.78 
(13.107) 
3.509** 52 
IGT Block 3 58.52 
(10.64) 
47.7 
(11.05) 
3.665** 52 
IGT Block 4 65.3 
(9.75) 
57.41 
(9.44) 
3.02** 52 
IGT Block 5 75.37 
(10.74) 
75.74 
(10.53) 
-.128 52 
Note.  ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
We also carried out the mixed-measures multivariate analysis of variance to 
investigate differences in training groups for Confidence Reports with training groups across 
the IGT Blocks. Figure 5.5 illustrates the Confidence Reports across the IGT Blocks for 
training groups. No significant interaction effects were found: F (2, 52) = .940, p = .449.  
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Figure 5.5: Confidence Reports across IGT Blocks for training groups. 
 
 The main effect for IGT block was significant: F (4, 49) = .169, p < .005, indicating 
that the confidence reports increased over the course of the IGT blocks. Post-hoc paired-
samples t-tests were carried out for overall Confidence Reports across the IGT blocks. The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Paired sample t-tests for IGT blocks for Confidence Reports 
  t Df 
IGT block 1 
29.78 
(SD = 17.09) 
IGT block 2 
48.72 
(SD = 13.712) 
 
-7.109** 
 
53 
IGT block 2 
48.72 
(13.712) 
IGT block 3 
53.11 
(12.047) 
 
-2.58* 
 
53 
 
IGT block 3 
53.11 
(12.047) 
 
IGT block 4 
61.35 
(10.307) 
 
-4.45** 
 
53 
IGT block 4 
61.35 
(10.307) 
IGT block 5 
75.56 
(10.54) 
 
-8.696** 
 
53 
Note.   * = p < .01; ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means. 
 
 
5.3.4 Examination of Qualitative Responses 
Qualitative Responses were gathered through question 2 of the questionnaire: “Why 
did you give Deck [__] that particular rating and take a few moments to describe why”. The 
responses for these questions were coded using Template Analysis. Template Analysis is a 
commonly used approach used with qualitative or descriptive data (Langdridge, 2007). It 
characterises textual data according to themes. These themes only emerge from the responses 
once data are collated and are defined to include the relevant material and organised into an 
initial template, which is was undertaken after initial coding of a sub-set of the data, not pre-
established by the researcher. In our data, responses were brief and neither trained nor 
untrained groups produced detailed descriptions of their experience with the deck stimuli or 
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their beliefs about the task. Responses were attained after each IGT block, and analysis of the 
data produced two emerging themes. These themes were characterised as (1) Estimations of 
Deck Outcomes and (2) Task Evaluation.  
The first theme, Estimation of Deck Outcomes, related to responses directly 
associated with the characteristics of the deck, or deck outcomes. This enabled us to define 3 
categories of response: definite estimation of the advantages/disadvantages of the deck; 
ambiguous estimation of the deck; or no reportable knowledge/unable to explain deck rating. 
These responses characterised estimations of the deck or task performance in relation to the 
deck and was an attempt to explore the experiences of the participant with the task stimuli.  
 
Participant 4:  “I can’t actually remember that deck too much, that’s one I didn’t like. I 
avoided that one, I think so anyway…” 
 
Participant 22: “I really didn’t like that one, that one crucified me… yeah it was that one. 
Didn’t like it...” 
 
Participant 40: “Oh was it that one or, actually I’m mixing those two up. I liked those two 
you see… Those one’s were am… […] I think it was that one that was okay. I always won 
some points on that one. I think. Can’t remember the losses, I need to choose it a bit more.” 
 
For the category, ‘definite estimation of the advantages/disadvantages of the deck’, a 
table was developed to analyse the differences in frequencies between the framing of the IGT 
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groups, and the training groups. Table 5.7 shows the percentage frequencies in responses for 
this category across the groups for each of the IGT blocks. 
 
 
Table 5.7: Percentage frequencies of ‘Definite estimations of advantages/disadvantages of decks’ 
 
 Social Individual Trained Untrained 
Block 1 49.1% 50% 49.1% 50% 
Block 2 51.85% 49.1% 50.1% 50% 
Block 3 52.8% 49.1% 50.85% 51% 
Block 4 43.5% 48.15% 42.2% 50.1% 
Block 5 59.27% 62.1% 61.2% 60% 
 
 
There were no noticeable differences in responses between the groups, with ‘definite 
estimation of the advantages/disadvantages of the deck’ gradually increasing across the IGT 
blocks. From block 1 to block 5, each grouping variable showed an increase in definite 
estimations of approximately 10%. For the next category, ‘ambiguous estimation of the 
deck’, a table was also developed, shown below in table 5.8. 
 These responses were distinguished from definitive estimations of the decks with 
participants’ descriptions being more ambiguous, or participants becoming hesitant to 
describe their particular deck rating.  
Participant 8: Oh I don’t know, it’s just the rating I want to give it. It seems to be alright. I 
guess that it’s one of the one’s I choose a lot, but I’m just randomly picking them at the 
moment. 
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Participant 16: Have to give it a 5 because I think it’s neutral. I don’t really have a specific 
reason. There are losses and gains to be… with deck 2. It’s one of the one’s like, but like…  
yeah. I feel neutral about it to be sure. 
 
Table 5.8: Percentage frequencies of ‘Ambiguous estimations of decks’ 
 
 Social Individual Trained Untrained 
Block 1 41.6% 37.91% 43.1% 36% 
Block 2 37% 38.85% 38.8% 37% 
Block 3 34.2% 40.7% 37.9% 37% 
Block 4 47.2% 44.4% 47.4% 44.2% 
Block 5 35.15% 36.1% 35.35% 36% 
  
 The final category consisted of responses with no reportable knowledge of the deck. 
These were the least frequent responses, shown in table 5.9 below. There were no reportable 
differences between the framing and training groups. These responses became less frequent 
over the course of the IGT blocks with low levels of no reported knowledge in the final IGT 
block.  
Participant 1: “Oh god I don’t know…” 
 
Participant 50: “I really wouldn’t be able to say.” 
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Table 5.9: Percentage frequencies of ‘No reportable knowledge’ 
 
 Social Individual Trained Untrained 
Block 1 9.3% 12.1% 7.8% 14% 
Block 2 11.15% 12.05% 11.1% 13% 
Block 3 13% 10.2% 11.25% 12% 
Block 4 9.3% 7.45% 10.4% 5.7% 
Block 5 5.58% 1.8% 3.45% 4% 
 
The second theme for the qualitative responses was Task Evaluation. These responses 
were compiled from qualitative descriptions that went beyond estimation of deck outcome or 
responses relating to the deck, calling for a separate characterisation. These descriptions are 
defined by evaluations or descriptive responses that relate to the task, but are not direct 
comments on the deck outcome.  
 
Participant 2: “I’m doing really good when I choose that deck. I think I know what I’m 
going to get, to win more points that one is helping me. I think they’re all a bit random but I 
know I can do well. Watch now, I’ll probably lose all my points like last time!” 
 
Participant 48: “I have no idea; it’s all a bit random. I can’t tell which is which. Can’t 
really figure it out from the previous one” 
 
Responses for this were coded using Template Analysis as either ‘emerging’ or ‘not 
emerging’. That is, participants whose responses went beyond the characterisation of the 
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‘estimation of deck outcome’ theme were coded as having ‘emerging’ task evaluation 
content. In most cases, this was used to identify participants who did not specify a reason for 
choosing a particular deck or was unable to provide justifications for their responses. 
However, there were no discernible differences in these descriptions between framing and 
training groups. Responses from trained participants were no more detailed than untrained 
participants, with both groups showing difficulty detailing extensive descriptions. The 
following table 5.10 was produced to analyse the ‘emerging’ Task Evaluation responses, or 
responses that included descriptions of the task in an evaluative way that went beyond direct 
estimation of the decks, across the IGT blocks.  
 
Table 5.10: Emerging Task Evaluation responses across IGT blocks 
 Social Individual Trained Untrained 
Block 1 14.8% 19.4% 20.7% 13.8% 
Block 2 12.1% 17.6% 19.8% 10.2% 
Block 3 22.2% 26.8% 27.6% 19.8% 
Block 4 12.95% 13.88% 16.1% 11.9% 
Block 5 24.98% 22.1% 22.4% 18.4% 
Average % 17.41% 19.96% 21.32% 14.8% 
 
From the frequencies of ‘emerging’ task evaluation responses, there were no 
distinguishing differences between the groups. However, untrained participants show the 
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lowest frequency of responses compared to the other groups. However, this difference is 
marginal, with a difference of 6.52% compared to trained counterparts.  
The ‘not emerging’ descriptive data consisted of content that were characterised 
solely through the ‘Estimation of Deck Outcomes’ theme. That is, task evaluation 
descriptions did not emerge over the course of the participants answer to question 2 of the 
Maia and McClelland questionnaire. 
 
Participant 51: “That’s a good deck. I’m rating that deck a nine out of 10” 
 
Participant 11: “I’m not really sure about how I scored that last time, maybe a 6 
because it’s good, but not giving me a big, a lot of points like…” 
 
These descriptions primarily encompassed details on the task decks, their outcomes 
(or lack of details), and did not reference the task in an evaluative way, referring to 
experiences of task as a whole, or the social context in which some participants were placed. 
 
 
5.4 Discussion  
The findings in this experiment suggest that using directed questioning during the IGT 
does not necessarily uncover detailed experiential differences in the task. Riskier decision 
making amongst the socially framed group seems to have been suppressed with the inclusion 
of the amended 2004 questionnaire, and training did not appear to change participants’ 
behaviour, nor did it make much of a difference in the richness of their descriptions of 
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experience. This is hard to analyse using mixed methods as our experiment did not yield 
extensive or richly detailed qualitative data. However, our aim was not to explore a 
phenomenological understanding of the experience in depth, but to find a method that brings 
together experience and behaviour in more meaningful ways. Directed questioning was used 
in an attempt to find parallels between the description of experiences in the task, and 
subsequent behaviours. Results show that task framing did not produce behavioural 
differences in the task like Experiment 3. There were no significant differences between the 
social and individual framing groups on IGT performance.  
Over the course of the task, participants made more choices from the advantageous 
decks over the IGT blocks, which is a reliable finding in the literature (Bechara et al. 1994). 
Similarly, participants made fewer choices from the risky Deck B over the course of the task. 
Interestingly, there were consistent differences found between framing groups on Deck 
Ratings, but no differences between the training groups. These differences are arguably most 
notable for advantageous Deck A and disadvantageous Deck B. Deck A offered the most 
advantageous outcome if consistently relied on, however gains were not as large as Deck B, 
which offered the highest immediate gain but catastrophic losses if consistently chosen. 
From the results of the questionnaire we see that the directed questioning used in this 
experiment did not uncover clear links between the experience of the task (using social or 
individual framing) and behavioural patterns between experimental conditions in 
performance on the IGT.  
The lack of clarifying descriptive data produced using the questionnaire, including the 
more open-ended question inviting justification of ratings, may be due to a number of factors. 
A number of researchers (e.g. Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006; Langdridge, 2004) warn against the 
use of experimental tasks in the collection of experiential data, because of the constrained and 
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artificial nature of the experience. We were aware of this challenge going into the 
experiment, but maintain, on the basis of the reviewed literature in previous chapters, that the 
possible benefits of a broadly application integrative approach are worth the risk to 
investigate. 
However, in acknowledging the shortcomings of exploring experience in lab based 
tasks, we used the IGT in clearly defined framing contexts to help facilitate distinct 
experience of the task. Results from Experiment 3 indicated that there were clear behavioural 
patterns that emerged over the course of the IGT using social framing; these were not 
replicated in the present experiment. While results from the present experiment are therefore 
somewhat challenging, there may still be promising insights to be gained about participants’ 
responses.  
Results show a significant, though inconsistent, relationship between the framing 
groups in the Confidence Reports and ‘Bad Deck B’ choices. Participants in the social 
framing groups showed higher Confidence Reports during the task (after 40 card choices) but 
both groups have the same ratings at the end of the task. This suggests that there may be 
differences in the experience of the task, or more specifically, in the dynamic of the 
participants’ experience of the task over the course of its duration. While suggestive, 
however, the lack of clear behavioural differences between groups in task performance (that 
were more strongly apparent in Experiment 3) makes interpreting this difference challenging.  
The framing of the task may have a more implicit effect on the task experience. 
However, this may be at a higher or more abstract level than immediate behavioural control, 
as performance in the task was not affected by framing (unlike findings in Experiment 3). 
This may be consistent with Damasio (1994) whereby experience of the task over time 
predicts emotional markers of the task, and only later impacts directly on behaviour in the 
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IGT. Physiological arousal occurs in anticipation for gains and losses as the task unfolds for 
participants, but it also may have an effect from immediate trial outcome in the IGT. 
However Colombetti (2008) sees this as a presupposition that the IGT provides a clear picture 
of the very complex relationship emotion has with behaviour. This also highlights the 
limitations of methodological measures of experience and behaviour in the lab, and the type 
of problems that still need addressing. If behaviour in the IGT is influenced by learning over 
the course of the task (and anticipatory markers seem to indicate so), but is also influenced by 
immediate trial outcomes (as Maia and McClelland propose), then the methods that are 
currently available to investigate this are not adequate enough to explain experience.  
How experience guides the behaviour is not altogether clear due to an issue that arose 
in this experiment: there were no clear behaviour patterns between groups to analyse the 
experiential data with, providing no clear way of statistically measuring associations between 
group, framing and IGT behaviour. Without a means to clearly distinguish behavioural 
patterns, seeking parallel patterns in experience becomes unfeasible. This may be due to the 
questionnaire having an effect on how the participants perceive the task when asked about 
specific aspects of their experiences. It also means that using this methodological approach in 
the lab provides additional limitations as it removes the task experience away from any sort 
of naturalistic expression that may have been facilitated by the framing of the task in a 
meaningful way. That is, while the framing initially suggested that experience mattered for 
the task behaviour, which is more akin to naturalistic behaviour, the use of a questionnaire to 
gather data on this experience alters the participants’ attitude toward, or perception of, the 
task in such a way that it removes whatever effect framing initially had on the task. As such, 
it may be the case that, while training does not appear to have had a substantial effect either 
on behaviour or participants’ insight into the task, the act of probing experience may have 
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affected both. This change would seem to simultaneously reinforce that experience of the task 
impacts on behaviour, and that studying the mechanism of that impact remains extremely 
difficult. 
The ratings participants gave to the task stimuli also changed over the course of the 
task. Deck Ratings for Deck A differed between framing groups after 40 and 60 deck trials, 
IGT Blocks 2 and 4 showing statistically significant differences. Participants in the individual 
IGT condition rated these Deck A as more preferable than their socially framed counterparts. 
Conversely, Deck B was rated higher for the social framing groups after 60 and 100 deck 
trials, IGT Blocks 3 and 5. This suggests that participants in the social framing groups did not 
view ‘Bad Deck B’ as negatively as the individual IGT condition, who consistently rated 
Deck B lower over the course of the task. It is difficult to interpret effects on behaviour in the 
task as the only difference observed in task performance was observed during IGT Block 4 
(after 80 deck trials). It may be interesting in and of itself, as there are no clear links between 
how the participants rated the decks and how they performed in the task at specific IGT 
Blocks.  
As seen from the differences between the socially framed and individual IGT in 
Confidence Ratings, there may be experiential differences between the conditions. However 
the results of the behaviour responses are still ambiguous and we have not found a clear 
experiential component to interpret the deck choices. Rather, we have illustrated that are 
tentative links between them, and task framing may be an interesting way of exploring 
experiential differences further, but we may simply have been asking the wrong questions. 
The Maia and McClelland questionnaire was specifically developed to examine participants’ 
knowledge and experience of the Iowa Gambling Task over the course of the task. It is an 
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attempt to directly evince people’s experience of key aspects of the task itself. It may be, 
however, that a more open-ended introspective method will provide more useful data. 
The Maia and McClelland (2004) questionnaire afforded a means of exploring 
specific and defined experiences during the IGT. This, while useful for our study, may not 
adequately evoke descriptions of these experiences to explore how participants may be 
meaningfully engaging with the task. Bechara et al (2005) criticised some of the 
generalisations from Maia and McClelland’s original study, particularly the claim that 
participants may be guided by the outcome of the preceding trial, instead of learning the 
constraints of the deck outcome over the course of the entire task. While this criticism may 
overlook the effects of immediate trial outcome on subsequent behaviour, it should not be 
proposed that Maia and McClelland’s (2004) offer a means to show behaviour is guided by 
immediate outcomes. Their questionnaire may illustrate instead that participants use 
immediate outcomes to navigate their actions more than Bechara et al (1994) initially 
proposed.  
As results from the qualitative questions did not indicate differences between framing 
and training groups, either in the form of the response or the detail of participants’ 
justifications or observations, it raises a number of questions for this type of exploration of 
experience and how data were gathered through the Maia and McClelland questionnaire, as 
well as the practicalities of gathering experiential data in lab based, that is, non-natural 
environments. Certainly, it would seem that some practice in introspection does not change 
participants’ reports of their own cognition or perception of a task generally. Trained 
participants produced no more detailed description on the open questions available to them, 
nor significantly different deck or confidence ratings. There were no indications in trends to 
suggest any effect of training on responses to the kinds of questions used here. 
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While the use of the questionnaire provided a means of exploring specific 
experiences, and potentially assessing the effect of practice in attending to and describing the 
experience of completing an experimental task, it shows that there are problems when trying 
to understand these data from experiences of controlled lab based, non-natural environments.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined an experiment using the IGT that attempted to explore how 
experience in the task guides behaviour. This was investigated by carrying out the IGT with 
use of a medium to explore specific experiences in the task: the Maia and McClelland (2004) 
questionnaire. The experiential differences in the task were facilitated by exploring framing 
effects aiming to create a clearly defined situation for the IGT performance to be interpreted. 
Additionally, some participants received introspective training to explore differences of 
responses for qualitative questions and discuss some of the issues with task based responses 
discussed by Lutz and Thompson (2003) and Hurlburt and Akhtar (2006) in Chapter Three of 
this thesis. Our findings and outcomes are limited by minimal behavioural differences 
between social framed and individual IGT conditions.  
 
While the Maia and McClelland (2004) questionnaire was a disciplined means of 
exploring specific experiences in the IGT, it raises many questions about measuring how 
participants meaningfully behave over the course of the task. Without a better understanding 
of the relationship between consciousness and behaviour it becomes pretty difficult to ask the 
right questions. It might be that the questionnaire, which is designed around the task, was still 
getting at the wrong kinds of things to capture the relationship between experience and 
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action. The following chapter develops a sampling method to gather less constrained 
descriptive data during the IGT using minimal changes to research practices. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Experiment 5: Controlled Experience Sampling in the 
Iowa Gambling Task 
 
 
The previous chapter indicates that basic introspective training of participants does not 
substantially change their awareness of the task or its components, even when that awareness 
was assessed using a series of directed questions. This is consistent with previous literature, 
discussed in Chapter Three, which shows that attaining useful descriptive data in controlled 
settings often requires extensive training for both the participant and the experimenter. 
Questions in Experiment 4 largely concerned the task components, but in a fairly conceptual 
manner, and the more qualitative questions were in fact meta-cognitive (that is, they 
concerned the participants’ reasons for giving a particular deck ratings in the IGT). This 
resulted in findings that maintain the longstanding disconnection between what a person is 
aware of and what they do. That is, the behaviour is not linked with the subjective responses 
in clear ways, making it difficult to interpret the findings when considered together. 
Phenomenological and experiential research more generally would suggest that the questions 
used by Maia & McClelland (2004) constrain the kind of information we can get about the 
person’s experience of the task – they are effectively pre-conceptualised. This is, perhaps, a 
necessity of attaining focused descriptive data in controlled settings. However, researchers in 
qualitative and phenomenological research have maintained that there are ways of attaining 
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more open subjective data. The hope remains to find a way to gather this type of data in 
controlled settings where it can be used to understand the behaviour in more comprehensive 
ways.  
Training participants does not seem to reliably improve the participants’ awareness of 
either the decks or their own experience of the IGT, regardless of how the task was framed. It 
may be more appropriate that we take a step back, and collect experiential data in a less 
constrained fashion. In this chapter we explore an Experience Sampling method to investigate 
experiences during the IGT, and their relationship with the task behaviour. While research 
has shown that many situational factors affect performance in the IGT (Ennis et al. 2001; 
Preston et al. 2007), there have been few attempts to explore qualitative aspects of 
engagement with the task. As findings in Experiment 3 show that the IGT is susceptible to 
contextual changes, the intention is to see whether patterns in the descriptions of experiences 
by participants parallel with patterns of behavioural responses in the task.  
For the following experiment, we required an experience sampling method that could 
be adapted to lab based experiments. There are, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, a 
number of methodological approaches that offer detailed experiential data. We considered 
semi-structured interviews and other approaches that involve the participant in natural and 
practical ways. Exploratory methods are often associated with a number of limitations, such 
as intensive training (Petitmengin et al. 2013; Schwitzgebel, 2008) and questionable 
generalisability to new domains (e.g. neurophenomenology).   
As the findings of Experiment 4 suggest that a task-specific questionnaire has 
limitations, a broader, less structured approach to experience sampling might offer some 
helpful insights. Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is a tool for gathering experiential 
descriptions in natural behaviour settings, one that has gained attention in the literature 
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(Weisberg, 2011). For our purposes, however, we attempt to adapt the DES technique so that 
it can be used in the lab. DES uses verbal descriptions attained at specific moments and is 
concerned with the descriptive words participants naturally use when detailing experiences 
(Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2008). This neutral focus on participants’ descriptions, we 
suggest, leaves DES flexible enough to be adapted for use in controlled settings, such as the 
laboratory. Reviewing the key elements of the approach, we suggest that many of its core 
features and philosophy can be maintained, while the procedure is revised for laboratory 
situations. 
 
6.1 Reconciling Descriptive Experience Sampling with the Laboratory 
The use of a beeper: Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006) notes the importance of 
identifying a particular moment of experience for participants to describe. They use a beeper 
for this purpose. In a similar vein, according to Lutz and Thompson (2003) participants need 
a specific moment to describe in order for reports to be used to inform the behaviour being 
studied. Schwitzgebel (2003) also discusses the use of a method to define temporal 
experiences. He states that DES attempts to minimise effects of reflective reporting that could 
potentially bias data and likens the method to Titchener’s aural task where participants would 
focus on specific tones and use their natural vocabulary to describe their experience. We 
decided that the use of a beep would allow for a controlled use of DES when applied at 
specific moments in the IGT. From the findings of the previous experiments using the IGT, 
the general pattern that emerges over the course of the task is that participants generally make 
more advantageous decisions as the task progresses. As such, applying our use of DES in the 
IGT at specific points (after 20 or 80 deck decisions) may uncover experiential data 
associated with the emerging task behaviours. Experiment 5 described in this chapter 
 
 
~ 152 ~ 
 
attempts to use DES at specific moments in the IGT and investigates the differences in 
experiential reports when applied at early or late stages in the task.  
 
Randomisation of data collection: Randomisation of the beeps is standard in DES 
methods. Experience Sampling methods rely on collecting data at random times during a 
person’s day-to-day activities. However, non-randomness is a requirement of the controlled 
way we use it in Experiment 5. It is necessary to avoid interrupting the participant’s 
performance in the IGT in order to collect data that are representative of un-reflective states, 
as well as to maintain as far as possible the validity of those behavioural data within the 
framework of the IGT itself. This is a key difference between the standard DES method and 
the version applied here.  
In Hurlburt and Akhtar’s (2006) DES study, participants wore a beeper over the 
course of the sampling period. When the beeper is activated, participants are encouraged to 
immediately detail honest accounts of experience at that moment. These may be gathered 
through the use of notebooks/diaries or recorded verbal descriptions, later explicated in post-
hoc interviews. However, our amended or controlled use of DES is applied at specific 
moments in the task. It is important that participants are not aware that DES data will be 
collected at specific moments and therefore participants will be instructed that the beep 
would be randomised. That is, participants believe, to all intents and purposes, that the beep 
was random. As participants believe that the beeper is random, it is hoped to minimise 
anticipatory effects and associated biases highlighted by Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2008). 
Vermersch (2011) also discusses this randomness in great detail. He warns that the beeper 
inevitably creates anticipatory effects which could potentially bias descriptive data. However, 
our controlled use of the method only lasts the duration of the task, a relatively short 
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sampling period. The laboratory setting also enables a swifter recording of experiential data 
than the standard method, which, while keyed to notes and comments recorded immediately 
after the beep, are necessarily somewhat retrospective in nature. 
 
Training: Training has been used in most, if not all introspective studies. It is said to 
help participants become more familiar with what is expected of them in qualitative 
approaches (Langdridge, 2007). However, in Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007), 
Schwitzgebel warns that this may affect the experience being explored. That is, training may 
be a form of bias where participants are guided by experimenter expectations or priming. In 
their book, Schwitzgebel and Hurlburt argue over the questioning used in the post-experiment 
interview after the DES data were collected. Though training is often used in 
phenomenological or introspective studies, we decided that we would apply a minimal 
approach and use only a pre-task to familiarise participants with DES. By avoiding laborious 
training, we attempt to minimise biases and priming effects, and gain more naturalistic 
descriptions of participants’ experience. There may be additional strengths to taking a 
minimal approach. The period of gathering the experiential data in this experiment is brief, 
and we wanted as natural an expression of experience as possible. This sort of minimal 
sampling is not readily accepted amongst qualitative and phenomenological investigators, but 
there may be merit in doing so for this exploratory work in controlled settings. Additionally, 
how training could improve descriptive reports in controlled settings is underexplored (and 
not often reported). The findings of Experiment 4 would seem to suggest that training in 
describing experience does not produce substantial differences in evoked responses to open-
ended questions, and so we decided to explore this less intensive technique in the present 
experiment. While this may result in the reports lacking phenomenological detail, participants 
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are encouraged to use their natural vocabulary which may provide clearer and naturalised 
descriptions.  
 
 Controlled – Descriptive Experience Sampling: Taking these above points into 
consideration, we developed a more controlled version of DES, which we term Controlled – 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (C-DES). The aim is to develop a method that could be 
adapted to a number of behavioural paradigms, but the experiment outlined below builds on 
the previous experiments using the IGT. C-DES aims to use a beeper to define a particular 
moment of experience for the participant to describe. The use of a beeper aims to define a 
specific moment for the task, but instead of its original administration using randomised 
beeps, we administered at pre-determined points during the task. As we are aware that 
participant behaviour varies over the course of the IGT, we were able to define our own 
moments to administer the sampling method. However, this could be easily adapted to suit a 
wide range of studies, the key feature only being that the participant believes that the moment 
is randomised and does not coincide with a specific point where behaviour is hoped to be 
understood using the experiential descriptions. We also did not follow Hurlburt & Akhtar’s 
(2006) classic training method for DES. During their training, which is quite extensive, 
sampling data are gathered over longer periods (often over days). Instead, we used a pre-task 
to help participants to become comfortable with qualitative methods and focus on their 
descriptions of experience. While participants are encouraged to use their natural expressions 
when describing what they experience, C-DES also utilises a rudimentary pre-trial period 
(which could be seen as basic training). Through this, semi-structured interviews are used to 
familiarise participants with talking about experience of lab-based tasks.  
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Early sampling will occur after 20 deck choices were made (at the end of block 1) in 
the task. At this stage in Experiment 3 participants in both groups were performing at a 
similar level. Late sampling occurred after 80 deck choices (at the end of block 4), which is 
still during the task as a whole, but after a period of time where participants are expected to 
have made more sense of the task and have a greater understanding of the different decks. In 
Experiment 3 the social and individual groups were widely divergent at end of block 4, 
perhaps indicating the more substantial difference in experience of the task, if such a 
difference exists. 
 
6.1  Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty-nine participants took part in this study, 36 female and 23 male. Participants 
were aged between 18 and 56 (mean age = 24.45yrs, SD = 7.14). A total of 30 participants 
took part in the socially framed IGT (along with an additional 30 people who acted only as 
social facilitators); 29 participants took part in the individual IGT.  
Participants were recruited on a voluntary sampling basis at Mary Immaculate 
College, Limerick. When recruiting participants for the social framing group, they were 
asked to take part in a study with an acquaintance and sign up to participate in the experiment 
in pairs of two. All participants were from undergraduate and postgraduate cohorts of the 
college and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Experience Sampling (ES) data were collected after either 20 (early) or 80 (late) trials 
in the IGT (outlined below), the groups of which were randomly assigned by the 
experimenter. 
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 For the socially framed condition, 19 completed ES early in the IGT, with 11 
completing ES late in the IGT. In the individually framed condition 17 completed ES early, 
12 completed ES late. 
 
Design 
A between groups design was carried out to explore differences between IGT framing 
and C-DES descriptions. The study used qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative 
analysis in this study consisted of the controlled use of sampling techniques based on DES 
(Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006) and responses were analysed through Template Analysis 
(Langdridge, 2007). Verbal descriptions were attained during the IGT at specific points, 
either early or late stages of the task as mentioned above. Quantitative analysis in this study 
consisted of calculating behavioural responses over the course of the task using standard IGT 
scoring procedures. Independent variables are the framing of the task (social vs. individual) 
and early vs. late conduct of C-DES. Change in performance over five blocks of the task was 
also examined, in line with previous experiments. 
Controlled- Descriptive Experience Sampling (C-DES) was carried out through the 
use of a beeper that was initiated by the experimenter at either early or late stages of the IGT. 
Early C-DES was carried out after 20 IGT trials. Late C-DES was carried out after 80 IGT 
trials. 
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Materials and apparatus 
The experiment took place in designated Psychology laboratories on Mary 
Immaculate College campus consisting of an experimental room and a waiting area. The 
experiment was carried out using a Dell desktop computer operating on Windows XP.   
 The experimental programmes used E-Prime 2.0 stimulus presentation software which 
measured behavioural responses. A pre-task used the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; 
Lejuez et al. 2002), consisting of 30 BART trials. For the experimental task, Pleskac’s (2008) 
IGT ePrime script was used consisting of 100 IGT trials 
A beeper developed by Maelz Sport (2014) was used to initiate beeping sequences for 
the C-DES. The beeper was pre-set to deliver a 440.0Hz tone for 3 seconds and was 
controlled by the experimenter. Along with this, a Dictaphone was used to record participant 
responses.  
 
Procedure 
Each participant was given briefing information and instructions on what the 
experimental session would involve (see Appendix E for Experiment 5 materials). After 
reading this information, the experimenter answered any questions that they may have had 
and they were asked to sign a consent form. Participants in the social framing group 
nominated between themselves which would take part in the experiment first. Unbeknownst 
to this group, the participant who nominated themselves to take part second acted as social 
facilitator for the framing condition. These participants were seated in a separate waiting area 
and provided with some light reading material for the duration of the experiment. Participants 
completing the experimental trials were brought to the experiment room and seated in front of 
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the computer desk. They were reminded that they could withdraw from the experiment at any 
time and their participation was voluntary. The experiment procedure is divided into the Pre-
task and IGT trials.   
 
Pre-task 
Before the main IGT, a pre-task was carried out to familiarise participants with DES 
methods. This consisted of running a short decision making task (BART; Lejeuz et al. 2002). 
The experimenter used the beeper to initiate C-DES during the task. Participants were 
instructed to stop the task at the moment they heard the beep and describe their experience, 
and give clear and honest responses. This involved asking participants to elaborate on the 
descriptive words they used to describe their experience. If participants had trouble 
answering, they were asked to elaborate on what they felt at the precise moment of the beep. 
The experimenter did not ask specific questions, but only asked participants to elaborate on 
the language they used. If participants went on tangential descriptions, they were asked to 
focus just on the moment they heard the beep. Following this a brief interview was carried 
out to further encourage participants to focus on the descriptive words they used when 
describing their experiences and to focus on the specified experiences at the moment of the 
beeping sound. They were also instructed not to fabricate responses. Any questions they had 
were answered and they continued to complete the Iowa Gambling Task.  
 
IGT trials 
After the pre-task, participants completed the main IGT consisting of 100 deck 
choices. As in Experiment 3, the Iowa Gambling Task was presented as a series of free 
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choices from a set of four simulated decks of cards (labelled 1, 2, 3, and 4). Participants 
began the task with a reservoir of 2000 points and each card choice imposed a net loss or 
gain, with the instruction that participants should attempt to maximise their score by the end 
of the game. They were not informed in advance of the number of choices that they would be 
making, nor when the beep to indicate the moment of experience for experience sampling 
would occur. 
DES was carried out after either 20 or 80 trials, randomly assigned by experimenter. 
Following the same methods as the pre-task, participants were instructed to detail their 
experience at the moment they heard the beep. DES responses were recorded on the 
Dictaphone, transcribed, and analysed through Template Analysis (Langdridge, 2007). IGT 
responses were gathered through ePrime and analysed using SPSS statistical software. After 
the experimental tasks were completed participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Participants in the social framing group were debriefed as to the true nature of the study 
together with the participants acting as social facilitator. Any questions that the participants 
had were answered by the experimenter.   
 
6.2  Results 
6.2.1 Iowa Gambling Task Performance 
To investigate the relationship between framing condition and IGT performance, we 
calculated performance scores over the course of the task, categorising scores into 5 IGT 
blocks representing 20 card choices, similar to methods used in previous experiments. Similar 
to Experiment 3, scores were calculated for Overall Performance representing total amount of 
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good deck choices [Number of choices from (Decks A + C) – Deck (B + D)] and ‘Bad Deck 
B’ choices across the IGT blocks.  
 
Overall Performance 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance was conducted to investigate the differences 
between framing groups (social and individual), experience sampling (ES) intervention stages 
(early ES and late ES), and Overall Performance across the IGT blocks. There was no 
significant interaction effect between framing groups, ES stages and IGT blocks, Wilks 
Lambda = .913, F (4, 52) = 1.238, p = .306, partial η2 = .087. There was no interaction effect 
between ES stages and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .852, F (4, 52) = 2.253, p = .076, partial 
η2 = .148, which is illustrated in Figure 6.1. There was no interaction effect between framing 
group and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .951, F (4, 52) = .669, p = .616, partial η2 = .049. 
The main effect between framing groups and ES stages was also not significant, F (1, 55) = 
.741, p = .393, partial η2 = .013.  
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Figure 6.1: Overall Performance scores for Experience Sampling (ES) intervention 
stages 
 
The main effect for framing group was not significant, F (1, 55) = .694, p = .408, 
partial η2 = .012. The main effect for Experience Sampling stage (early vs. late) was also not 
significant, F (1, 55) = .2.347, p = .131, partial η2 = .041. 
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Figure 6.2: Overall Performance scores in IGT for framing groups 
 
However, there was a significant main effect for IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .471; F 
(4, 52) = 14.599; p < .005, partial η2 = .529, suggesting that there is a difference in Overall 
Performance over the task, but not due to either of the grouping variables, Experience 
Sampling stages (Figure 6.1) and task framing (Figure 6.2).  
 
‘Bad Deck B’ choices 
A mixed-measures analysis of variance was also conducted to investigate the 
differences between framing groups, Experience Sampling (ES) intervention stages, and ‘Bad 
Deck B’ choices across the IGT blocks. There was no significant interaction effect between 
framing groups, ES stages and  IGT blocks for ‘Bad Deck B’ choices, Wilks Lambda = .895, 
F (4, 52) = 1.526, p = .208, partial η2 = .105. There was also no interaction effect between 
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framing group and IGT blocks, Wilks Lambda = .943, F (4, 52) = .78, p = .543; or ES stages 
and IGT blocks of Deck B choices, Wilks Lambda = .850, F (4, 52) = 2.29, p = .072. The 
main effect for framing group was not significant, F (1, 55) = 1.605, p = .210, partial η2 = 
.028. Similarly, the main effect for ES stages (early vs. late) was not significant, F (1, 55) = 
.708, p = .404, partial η2 = .013. The main effect between framing group and ES stages was 
also not significant, F (1, 55) = .354, p = .554, partial η2 = .006. 
However, there was a substantial main effect for IGT block, Wilks Lambda = .721, F 
(4, 52) = 5.039, p = .002, partial η2 = .279, with both the social and individual framing groups 
showing changes in ‘Bad Deck B’ scores across the 5 IGT blocks, illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: ‘Bad Deck B’ choices in IGT for framing groups 
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Post hoc tests were carried out to investigate the differences between the ‘Bad Deck 
B’ choices over the course of the task, measured the IGT blocks. Paired sample t-tests were 
used to investigate this for each set of IGT blocks, and are presented in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Paired sample t-tests for IGT blocks between framing groups 
IGT Blocks t df 
IGT block 1 
5.372 
(SD = 2.45) 
IGT block 2 
5.44 
(SD = 3.87) 
 
-.17 
 
58 
IGT block 2 
5.44 
(3.87) 
IGT block 3 
6.05 
(3.52) 
 
-.892 
 
58 
IGT block 3 
6.05 
(3.52) 
IGT block 4 
4.033 
(3.36) 
 
3.73** 
 
58 
IGT block 4 
4.033 
(3.36) 
IGT block 5 
4.289 
(3.96) 
 
-.507 
 
58 
Note ** = p < .001. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means.  
 
 
6.2.2 Experience Sampling 
Template Analysis 
The initial coding templates of the qualitative data were developed through Template 
Analysis. For this, the researcher was not aware which of the framing conditions or ES stages 
that the data belonged. Template Analysis categorised participant’s responses and two 
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distinct themes emerged: descriptions based on the environment and descriptions based on 
the task. Blind coding was done to ensure that the main coding framework was consistent 
with the template framework and that the themes contained consistent subcategories. Once 
the coding framework was developed, 52% of the data (31 participants) were coded by an 
independent researcher who was asked to categorise responses using the template framework. 
Over 90% of the data were consistent with the template framework. Any disparities were 
discussed. Descriptions attained during the DES are described in the common themes 
outlined in the subsequent sections. Template Analysis allows responses be categorised in a 
relatively straightforward fashion. That is, the emergent themes are used to categorise 
responses from each participant so that the data (each response) had elements of both themes.  
 
Overview of qualitative responses  
In reviewing the descriptions collected for the qualitative analysis, a number of 
subcategories emerged which are summarized in the following section. It was found that 
thematic content was shared between the socially framed and individual IGT groups. The two 
primary themes of environment-based and task-based descriptions were then categorised into 
subcategories, detailed in Table 6.2 below. 
Environmental Descriptions of Experience (EDE) were categorised through responses 
that specifically referred to the environment or environmental stimuli. These include 
descriptions of experiences in the lab as well as details of peripheral aspects of environmental 
experiences that may have been expressed. Task Descriptive Responses (TDR) refers to 
descriptions of IGT and their experience of taking part in the task. These include personal 
feelings of the task, estimations of their performance and descriptions of behaviour strategies 
in the task. As mentioned above, Template Analysis allowed the categorisation of responses 
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from each participant so that each response had elements of both themes. That is, each 
response may consist of a particular EDE and TDR and for our analysis, descriptions that 
were characterised as in one of the EDE themes could also appear in subcategories of the 
TDR theme. This was a feature of the descriptions attained through our use of C-DES, which 
often contained descriptions in the participants’ natural patterns of expression.  
These descriptions frequently contained features of several themes, but the overall 
meanings of their experiences were characterised from the most prevalent and dominant 
expression. This includes most frequently expressed descriptions, and overall meanings of 
their contents. An independent coder assisted in the coding of approximately 50% of the data, 
with fewer than 5% discrepancies apparent from the initial framework. Any discrepancies 
were discussed with the independent coder and were found to be due to the data involving 
both of the framework themes, often found to be interdependent in these participants’ 
descriptive responses.   
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Table 6.2: Summary of thematic content of participant C-DES responses during the Iowa 
Gambling Task 
 
Environmental Descriptions 
of Experience (EDE) 
Task Descriptive Responses 
(TDR) 
 Immediate environment: descriptions 
of the lab environment including 
feelings of comfort and posture 
 
 Personal feelings of the task where 
participants may have used emotive 
words in describing the task  
 Peripheral environment: descriptions 
of environment outside immediate 
feelings including descriptions of the 
room, layers of surrounding 
experiences like temperature, smell 
and sounds 
 Responses of task performance: these 
descriptions were separate from 
personal feelings of the task and 
included responses on hypothetical 
performance and estimation, 
comparing their performance to 
others 
 
 Uncategorised experiences consisting 
of feelings not related to task (TDR’s) 
or the lab environment.  
 
 
 General task discussion: these 
descriptions consisted of responses on  
task strategies where participants did 
not estimate their own performance or 
discuss their personal feelings of the 
task 
 
 
The data tended to vary widely in their lengths, but not in their contents. That is, some 
responses were brief, while others were much more detailed, with the groups defined by the 
two independent variables (framing condition, and early vs. late experience sampling group) 
not producing substantially different descriptions of experience. The length of sampling 
periods seemed to vary from a few tens of seconds to several minutes depending on the 
comfort level of the participant, as well as their willingness to contribute. Again, this had no 
bearing on ES group or framing conditions. Some participants reported a relative ease in 
talking about their experiences of the task in the lab, while others were not as forthcoming 
with information. As minimal interaction and interruption is a key facet for DES procedures, 
there was little to no prompting from the experimenter. Instead, gentle reminders were used 
that participants should focus on their experience at the moment of the beep were used.   
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For responses that lacked one theme, a subcategory of ‘Other’ was used. That is, 
responses that contained descriptions of only EDE or TDR, a subcategory of ‘Other’ was 
used for that participant in the theme where the response could not be characterised under 
that theme. This is due to the nature of Template Analysis where each participant response is 
assigned a grouping subcategory. No response was characterised as ‘Other’ for both themes, 
and these responses were minimal (2 participants in total). As such, these responses were 
removed from statistical analysis, focusing instead on the differences between the 
subcategories of the themes for the grouping variables.  
 
Participant 22: “…I don’t really feel anything at the moment…” 
 
Participant 42: “I’m only aware of the lab, the chair… my fingers pressing the keys” 
 
Template Analysis allowed the categorisation of responses through examination of 
descriptive words used by the participant. As participants’ descriptions contained both 
environmental responses and task specific responses, single utterances might belong in more 
than one category. This was facilitated Template Analysis to identify subcategories for the 
participants’ descriptions and the independent researcher who assisted in coding the data 
from the framework.  
 
Descriptions of Environmental Experience  
 Environmental Descriptions of Experience (EDE) responses were broken into three 
subcategories. Table 6.3 outlines the coding framework developed through Template 
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Analysis with specific reference to the responses. Subcategory ‘immediate environment’ 
characterises descriptions at the individual and personal level: 
 
Participant 3: “I suppose I’m aware of the chair. I’m comfortable like… (…) 
 comfortably physically….” 
 
Participant 47: “The brightness of the room, the sounds coming from the hall. The smell of 
the computer lab. All these things are what I'm experiencing right now...” 
 
 This is distinguishable from subcategory ‘peripheral environment’ which 
characterises experiences of the environment not relating to specific individual level 
descriptions. Due to the frequent richness of descriptions, the final subcategory 
“uncategorised experiences” was used to characterise datum that were not related to 
immediate experiences or peripheral lab based responses.  
 
Participant 40: “I guess my mind is wandering through the college…” 
 
Participant 22: “I don’t really feel anything at the moment, I mean, erm […] yeah I 
 don’t really have a feeling at the moment, like my mind is blank, I can’t say 
 anything.” 
 
 Participants readily described aspects of the environment, which was uninterrupted by 
the experimenter to allow for the participant to use their own way of expressing meaningful 
experiences.  
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Table 6.3: Coding Framework of Environmental Responses 
Code  
1 Immediate environment  
 
Participant 20: “I’m thinking of hitting these keys, I’m feeling my fingers hitting the 
keys […] I feel very aware of that…”  
 
2 Peripheral environment  
 
Participant 42: “it’s a controlled room. I know that I’m in a lab, I’m part of the room 
…(…)...and um… the smell of damp from my umbrella (laughs)…” 
 
3 Uncategorised experiences  
 
Participant 2:“I’m feeling like I’m at a doctors office actually, I’m really aware of 
my presence in the room, and yours. I guess I feel like I’m here, in the lab. Does that 
make sense?” 
 
Participant 3: “…that, yeah, and I feel hung-over to be honest. Mainly the room I’m 
in. That’s what I’m feeling” 
 
 
 
Following the coding of the data through Template Analysis we investigated the 
differences between responses and the grouping variables in the IGT. Initial analysis 
indicates that there were no differences in responses for early vs. late sampling of experience 
data.  A Chi-square test for independence was carried out to explore the number of responses 
within the EDE subcategories and ES (early vs. late) groups of IGT.  Results indicated no 
statistically significant association between ES groups and frequency of EDE’s: The relation 
between these variables was not significant, χ² (1 n = 59) = .575, p = .75, phi = .099.  The 
frequencies of responses are presented in figure 6.4. As more participants completed the early 
ES stage, there were greater frequencies of responses for this category. For examination of 
the themes across framing conditions, the early and late experience sampling grouping 
variable was collapsed. 
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Figure 6.4: Frequencies of Environmental Descriptions of Experience responses for ES 
stages 
 
 
Preliminary analysis shows that the most frequent responses for the socially framed 
were that of the ‘immediate environment’, followed closely by ‘uncategorised experiences’ 
and finally ‘peripheral environment’. For the individually framed IGT, the most frequent 
response was ‘uncategorised experiences’, followed by ‘immediate environment’ and finally 
‘peripheral environment. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.5: Frequencies of Environmental Descriptions of Experience responses for 
framing groups. 
 
We focused on differences between the socially framed and individual IGT groups 
and carried out additional analysis using the Chi-Square test for independence. This was 
carried out to investigate the number of responses in the DES theme and framing groups 
(social and individual).  Results indicated no statistically significant association between IGT 
condition and frequency of environmental responses: The relation between these variables 
was not significant, χ² (1, n = 59) = .575, p > .75, phi = .09.  
 
Task Descriptive Responses 
TDR’s were categorised into three subcategories. Template Analysis facilitated the 
framework of these responses, detailed in Table 6.4 below. These categories outline 
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descriptions that are differentiated from environmental responses and specifically refer to 
descriptions of the task and task experience. The first subcategory is ‘personal feelings’ of the 
task, relating to specific descriptions of their feelings of the IGT. 
 
Participant 7: “It’s a little harder than I thought… I’m frustrated…” 
 
Participant 8: “I feel good at the moment…” 
 
The second subcategory was ‘responses of task performance’ and included 
descriptions where participants estimated their personal performance in the task. These 
responses were often brief, but were distinguishable from the other two subcategories as 
participants predominantly and consistently describe how they think they are performing in 
the task. 
 
Participant 17: “I’m really not sure how I’m doing at this… I’m not good at things 
like this… I bet I’m doing really badly…” 
 
 This is differentiated from the third subcategory, ‘general task discussion’, which 
refers to descriptions of the strategies of the task. This was a less common theme that 
emerged but was distinguishable from the other two categories as participants refrained from 
using descriptive words associated with their feelings or estimations of their performance. As 
such, it largely refers to responses based on task strategies without explication of how they 
thought they were performing.  
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Participant 18: “I think I figured out the pattern, you see I’m into games and I think 
 there’s a pattern to it…” 
 
It is worth noting that no participant made reference to the other person in the 
laboratory in the social framing group, or made reference to feeling that their performance 
was affected by their presence.   
 
Table 6.4: Task Descriptive Responses 
Code  
1 Personal feelings  
 
Participant 27: “I feel screwed over. I lost my points there. It’s annoying… (…)…  
 
2 Responses on task performance  
 
Participant 34: “I’m wondering how I’m doing” 
 
Participant 35: “I want to do the best in this thing. I’m not normally a betting man 
now, but I feel like I’m going to be compared to others” 
 
3 General task discussion 
 
Participant 51: “I think they are changing on me every time I pick a card, there’s a 
pattern I think that I’m aware of. I’m very focused on the decks to see which ones are 
switching on me…” 
 
 
There were no notable differences in task descriptive responses between early vs. late 
sampling of experience data. A Chi-square test for independence was also carried out to 
investigate the number of responses within the TDR subcategories and ES groups of IGT.  
Results indicated no statistically significant association between ES groups and frequency of 
TSR: The relation between these variables was not significant, χ² (1 n = 52) = 3.052, p = 
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.271, phi = .23. The frequencies of responses are presented in figure 6.6. As more participants 
completed the early ES stage, there were greater frequencies of responses for this category.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Differences in TDR responses for ES stages 
 
Analysis of the data shows that the most frequent responses for the socially framed 
were of ‘personal feelings’ of the task, followed by ‘general task discussion’ and ‘responses 
on task performance’, which were quite similar in frequency. For the individually framed 
IGT, most frequent response was ‘responses on task performance’, followed by ‘personal 
feelings’ and ‘general task discussion’. This can be seen in Figure 6.7.  
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Figure 6.7: Differences in TDR responses for framing groups 
 
A Chi-square test for independence was carried out to investigate the number of 
responses within the TDR subcategories and framing conditions of IGT.  Results indicated no 
statistically significant association between IGT condition and frequency of TSR: The 
relation between these variables was not significant, χ² (1 n = 52) = 4.46, p = .108, phi = .29  
   
6.3  Discussion 
The general findings of the experiment show that there were no statistically 
significant differences in the pattern of IGT behaviour between the framing conditions. 
Riskier decision making amongst the socially framed group appears to have been somewhat 
suppressed, as happened in Experiment 4. The IGT was chosen for use with experience 
sampling methods as Experiment 3 suggested that there was a relationship between task 
framing and behavioural performance. As this finding was not replicated (similar to 
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Experiment 4), it makes interpreting the results more challenging. With C-DES included in 
the task methodology, differences in IGT performance were not affected by task framing. 
Additionally, descriptive responses attained through our use of C-DES do not offer direct 
insight into patterns of behaviour during the IGT. However, not finding significant 
differences between the framing groups in the qualitative or quantitative measures, this is an 
interesting observation in itself. Schwitzgebel (2003) and others (Vermesch, 2004) have 
argued that introspection affects the experience being explored. However, there is not a lot of 
research into the specific link between the two. The predominant issue for secondary 
approaches is how to integrate qualitative and quantitative measures, so the effects of 
introspection on experience are often overlooked. If the methods used exploring qualitative 
aspects of experience affect behaviour, then we need to plan carefully when carrying out this 
type of research. 
Integration of C-DES with the IGT may have altered participant experience of the 
task. Results show that task behaviour was similar in both the social framing and individual 
IGT groups. This challenges findings from Experiment 3 that indicated greater ‘Bad Deck B’ 
choices in the socially framed condition. The findings from Experiment 3 suggest that 
behaviour over the course of the task was similar to the ‘prominent Deck B phenomenon’ 
found in other IGT studies where context was considered (Gray, 1999; Li et al. 2010). 
Participants are said to make choices based on immediate trial outcome, rather than overall 
performance in the task. In fact, the findings from the present experiment support more 
general conclusions drawn from Bechara et al (1994) where participants are said to learn to 
make more appropriate decisions to maximise final outcome over the course of the task. 
Using repeated measures t-tests we can see that participants consistently make fewer choices 
from the ‘Bad Deck B’, occurring after the 60 card choice point in the task.  
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  Interestingly, IGT performances in this experiment show that all participants made 
advantageous decisions, increasing over the course of the task. The use of DES may be 
associated with the performance in the task, suggesting that introspective methods facilitated 
advantageous performance in the IGT in some way, or inhibited risk taking in some 
participants in the socially framed group. However, this is inconsistent with some of the 
introspective research. For example, Petitmengin et al (2013) found that participants were 
quite unaware of the choices that they were making in a choice blindness study and 
consistently made incorrect judgements. This has implications for embodiment theory which 
purports that the relationship between experience and behaviour is one that is close, the two 
phenomena tightly intertwined. Efforts are underway to understand what this relationship 
might be. The findings from this study show that current methods may not be sophisticated 
enough to separate aspects of descriptive experience and readily incorporate such data with 
behaviour in controlled settings. This is a long withstanding tradition in much of 
psychological research (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
However, there was a richness and variety of descriptions attained through our use of 
C-DES. While this lacked depth in detail, and could hardly be called phenomenological in the 
disciplined sense of resisting conceptualisation and a strict focus on raw experience, there 
were lots of descriptive contents produced which could be useful for some interpretation of 
the task performance, where behavioural differences in evidence that would enable a contrast, 
some figure-ground structure in the data. While Petitmengin and colleagues (2013) developed 
a method to probe responses from participants in a controlled task (choice blindness and 
describing preferred choices), how this method could be used in other situations is a 
challenge and requires extensive knowledge of qualitative interview methods. From the 
descriptive data produced in a novel use of DES, data suggests that people are aware of much 
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more than just the task or the stimuli, with responses including their estimated performance 
on the task, performance in comparison to other imagined participants, and descriptions of 
the environment. However, this may simply be due to the nature of introspection when 
applied in controlled settings – when participants are asked to describe their experiences, they 
readily account aspects of the environment, even though it may not directly be linked to the 
behaviour of the task, or have been part of their experience during the moments of the task 
itself. This is more of a limitation of DES methods as participants are left uninterrupted or 
guided during sampling periods. The interviews that Hurlburt carried out after the sampling 
periods were used to explicate the descriptions attained during the sampling periods, but this 
may be where some of the serious methodological concerns of DES arise. The experience of 
the interviewer and leading questions change seem to readily change the interpretation of 
responses (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2008). Our aim to overcome this was to use experience 
sampling methods that minimised this interaction. A controlled sampling method shows some 
promise, but may need to be used to interrupt behaviour in more targeted ways or involve 
training participants in particular kinds of introspection, both of which come with serious 
drawbacks and difficult limitations.  
In a sense, we had hoped to show that the descriptions of experience might provide 
some kind of indicators or themes that could be used as “phenomenological markers”, aspects 
of a person’s experiences that might provide a hint as to the relationship between how they 
experienced the task environment and their behaviour in that environment. As the groups did 
not behave in distinct ways, finding such thematic differences becomes extremely difficult. 
However, the use of C-DES was able to attain descriptive data that at least partially pertained 
to the task and the situation. Participants readily described their personal feelings of the task; 
made descriptions of their behaviour in the task; described what they were physically aware 
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of in the lab. That the performances in the IGT do not provide any clear way of analysing the 
qualitative data makes it difficult for participants’ descriptions to help us refine our analysis 
of behavioural performance. Our use of C-DES was deliberately unstructured, aiming to 
examine the minimal possible change in practice that might provide some phenomenological 
angle to laboratory experimental research, but it seems that something more than minimal 
change in laboratory practice will be needed to enable an adequate examination of experience 
and behaviour. 
The qualitative findings suggest that C-DES may be a tool that attains descriptive data 
in a novel way, but much more research is needed to flesh out its various possible strengths 
and limitations for use in the lab. Hurlburt proposed that DES methods are an effective tool 
for gathering qualitative data that are deeply concerned with phenomenological traditions. 
These traditions are not replicated in the lab. The data produced in this study were not 
phenomenological in the sense that they were not obtained through disciplined and practised 
bracketing of experience, and careful suppression of tendencies toward conceptualisation. 
Rather, we adopted an introspective approach and tried to integrate it with standard lab 
practices to find ways of informing the behavioural data of the IGT. However, the effect that 
this type of self-reflection has on experience, as well as on behaviour is still little understood 
and warrants further investigation.  
While linking experience and behaviour with the results observed is challenging, the 
possibility still exists that experience, and people’s reflections on it, may matter for 
behaviour. The apparent effect of social task framing that appeared in Experiment 3 
disappeared in both Experiment 4 and in the present study. It may simply be that Experiment 
3 was an anomaly, but in the case that it was not, the change in behaviour following change 
in participant’s reflective engagement with the task would suggest that while the link between 
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behaviour and experience is not simple or strong, it is nevertheless present, and in need of 
investigation. 
From analysis of Experiment 5, DES methods provided a tool for generating 
straightforward descriptions of experience during the IGT. The data that were collected in 
this instance – undirected, variable, and dependent entirely on the diverse endogenous 
attentional quirks of the participants – appears to lack the specific content needed to capture 
the relationship between experience and behaviour, if there is one to be found and tracked. 
This may because, as previous literature suggests, people have difficulty in describing their 
experience (Petitmengin, 2006; Smith et al, 2009), or it may simply be that the particular 
aspects of experience that are important to track are not naturally focused upon or described 
by participants given little to no direction. 
As outlined in Chapter Two, DES is said to be used as a tool in real life day-to-day 
situations. More detailed methods including introspective training and targeted questions may 
uncover interesting descriptions, using controlled environments so that the data can be 
studied with particular behaviours. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined an experiment using a novel approach to gathering 
experiential data. While the results of the experiment do not clarify the relationship between 
experience and behaviour in the controlled use of the IGT, it does suggest that DES may be a 
useful tool in gathering more rudimentary or basic descriptive data when applied in lab based 
situations, but the specifics of method need to be addressed. Any extraneous effects that the 
method would have on task-experience needs careful situation. That is, reflecting on 
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experience, even with DES, affects the overall context of the procedure. The use of DES is 
challenging, but it does offer a novel means of attaining the data in the lab. Moreover, it is a 
simple matter to use it in other experimental domains beyond the IGT (unlike 
neurophenomenological methods, for instance), an exciting prospect in itself for introspective 
studies and embodied cognitive science. A use of DES may be adapted to suit a variety of 
situations including the lab; it just faces the same challenges as all other introspective 
methods. While our use of C-DES with the IGT suggests that open introspective reports offer 
little immediate insight into patterns of behaviour, this finding may not generalise to other 
uses of the DES, especially if the effects of training are considered. Olivares et al. (2015) 
have suggestions on how to overcome some of the limitations of qualitative methods in the 
lab. It may be that we need to explore the measurements of other expressive behaviour, such 
as body and kinaesthetic movements, facial expressions and patterns of speech fluctuations 
(as opposed to just the contents of descriptions). This may go beyond the aims of this thesis 
and need to include more sophisticated tools to measure other behavioural responses, such as 
subtle bodily movements during particular activities. The experiment described in this 
chapter shows that qualitative methods can be used in adaptive and interesting ways to 
produce potentially useful data, but need to be used with caution. More research is also 
needed to explore how these methods actually affect the overall experience.  
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
7.1  Overview of research project and findings 
People’s experiences, and their meaning for them, have come to play an increasing 
role in recent psychological science (Kagan, 2012; Mesquita et al. 2012; Olivares et al. 2015). 
In particular, researchers are becoming more concerned with how to authentically explore 
experience, which usually involves contrasts between first and third person modes of 
analysis. The aim of the present research project was to investigate whether 
phenomenologically inspired methods might usefully augment or complement standard 
laboratory practices so that we may develop a better understanding of the relationship 
between experience and behaviour. The methods we currently use are heavily informed by 
longstanding traditions in experimental practice (Allen & Williams, 2011; Kagan, 2012); 
however there have been arguments over the last few decades about understanding the 
importance of subjective experiences in relation to observable behaviour (Dennett, 1991; 
Froese et al, 2011; Lutz & Thompson, 2006). As Psychology calls for methods that are 
“accessible to any competent external observer” (Piccinini, 2010, p. 85), our focus was on 
augmenting or complementing current research practices, so that lab-based methods could 
become more phenomenologically informed without some form of revolutionary, total 
overhaul of common practice.  
In the current literature, there are few attempts to bring phenomenological methods 
into the laboratory. The kind of rigour and standards of reliable practice that come with 
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typical experimental tasks are important strengths in psychological research, and the aim of 
our experiments was to find ways of building on or augmenting this strength, rather than to 
try to replace normal practice. This allows us to refine standard lab based tasks to explore 
both experience and behaviour in ways that could be easily replicated, with hopes of finding a 
method that might allow us to observe the coupling of experience with behaviour in 
pragmatic ways.  Our aim with the experiments carried out in this project was to identify 
tasks where participants’ experience of the situation affected their engagement with the 
experiment, and through that, their pattern of behaviour. That is to say, these experiments did 
not aim to explore specific processes of executive functioning or decision making, but were 
used as tools for exploring methodological practices in the lab.  
This investigation started with the Go No – Go Association Task (GNAT) in an 
attempt to explore behaviour responding to stimuli with varying associated meanings. We 
found that more abstract stimuli were associated with longer reaction times and fewer errors. 
More meaningful, or culturally loaded visual stimuli, were associated with faster reaction 
times and greater error rates. We infer from the findings that the more ambiguous 
experimental stimuli resulted in longer reaction times, which is consistent with current 
research on locus of control and priming where the participants attend more slowly to stimuli 
that are not instantly recognisable to them (Gomez et al. 2007). However, given that in our 
experiment this was associated with fewer errors in the task, this is somewhat contradictory 
to other research using the GNAT which proposes that error rates increase as the task stimuli 
becomes less familiar or recognisable to participants (Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  
The use of the traffic light stimuli may have been more readily recognisable to the 
participants, but the faster times seemed to result in a speed-accuracy trade-off. While this 
trade-off is sometimes found in other metacognitive studies (Schwartz, 2010), the findings 
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from our use of the GNAT raise questions concerning how meaning plays a role in response 
cues. The aim for the thesis was to find a task that was sufficiently rich in meaning or 
complexity so that it could be integrated with more qualitative methods to explore this 
experience. Unfortunately, the GNAT does not afford us the opportunity of exploring the 
qualitative measurements of experience in the task. As discussed in the opening chapters, 
describing one’s own subjective experience is often difficult for participants. Though it might 
be possible to interview participants about their understanding and interpretation of stimuli 
with various levels of meaningfulness (e.g. action-relevant implications of traffic light 
images), doing so in a fast-paced executive functioning task seems unlikely to uncover how 
experience guides their actions, particularly given the effect the more meaningful stimuli 
seemed to produce.  The findings of this experiment perhaps suggest that not just structural 
aspects of the stimuli, but their meaning or familiarity at least, might be important, even in 
these types of fast-paced executive functioning tasks. However, it was decided that they offer 
little potential to further this research project as the task was ultimately unsuitable for 
qualitative exploration, and other experimental tasks were considered.  
We decided to explore how the contexts of experiences were important for particular 
behaviours, particularly in controlled settings such as the lab. Barrett et al (2010) show that 
situational instances are important for interpreting and understanding the behaviour. 
Individuals in social settings tend to behave in ways that are linked to the situation. For 
example, Schwartz (2010) found that people are heavily influenced by the social settings in 
which we measure their behaviour. As we intended to explore experiences in relation to the 
behaviour that emerged over the course of tasks, we developed the social framing for the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). This was to 
facilitate a clear but simple context within which the task was embedded, and also to use a 
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manipulation of the lab setting that could easily be adapted with other tasks, or altered for 
different settings. It was used to manipulate how participants may perceive the task by 
leading participants to believe that their behaviour in the lab would have ramifications for 
another person completing the task directly after them. The findings in Experiment 2 show 
that framing the BART in a specific context did not have an effect on participant behaviour. 
However, this may be due to the unpredictable dynamics of the BART’s gain/loss 
frequencies. Research suggests that it is a robust decision making paradigm, and while there 
might be reason to believe that people’s risk-taking tendencies might change under different 
contexts of accountability, this was not the case with Experiment 2. Literature on BART 
usually discusses how it is an adapted version of the IGT, which seems to afford a somewhat 
greater range of decision strategies as it uses less predictable task contingencies and involves 
four possible actions a given point, rather than a simple binary decision, as in the case of the 
BART. For Experiment 3 we used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to explore the framing 
effects.  
From literature on the task, the IGT seems to contain the task elements needed to 
explore aspects of experience and the experience-behaviour relationship, as participants 
engage with the task in a different way than with the GNAT or the BART. The key features 
of the task are that it is dynamic, has interdependency of decisions (the consequences from 
early decisions impact on the value of later ones because of the participant’s running total), 
and has been shown to be sensitive to environmental cues (performance is variable given 
different constraints external to the task itself). In its typical administration, researchers seem 
to have clear ideas of the experiential aspects of the task. That is, it is understood that healthy 
participants learn the good decks over the bad decks (in contrast, for instance, with VMPFC 
patients), and that their experience of task changes with their adapting behaviour. What is less 
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understood, however, is how participants seem to be quite sensitive to environmental cues 
and extraneous influences on task dynamics (Tomb et al., 2002). The results of Experiment 3 
indicated that participants completing the socially framed IGT made riskier decisions, with 
clear patterns of behaviour that were associated with the framing of the task.  
As the IGT seemed to be a more promising task for our methodological enquiry, we 
decided to use the framing effect from Experiment 3 and introduce qualitative methods in the 
lab. Maia and McClelland’s (2004) work has shown that participants in the IGT are more 
consciously aware of the dynamic of the task at earlier stages in the task that previously 
proposed by Bechara and colleagues (1994). As such, their standardised questionnaire was 
used, but with more emphasis on the qualitative questions to understand the dynamics of the 
framing of the task, and the behavioural differences that were observed in the previous 
experiment. However, Experiment 4 did not show such behavioural changes over the course 
of the task between the framing conditions, making it very difficult to derive clear outcomes, 
but posing some interesting questions on the nature of qualitative questioning in controlled 
situations. In particular, the kinds of effects that directed questioning would have on observed 
behaviour.  
As targeted questioning in the IGT seemed to have an overriding effect on the framing 
of the task, we decided to use a less intrusive, but more novel approach to gathering 
qualitative data in the lab. Work from Hurlburt and Akhtar (2006) has shown promise in the 
literature for gathering authentic experiential data in a number of situations (Froese et al., 
2011; Vermesch, 2010). As such, we used the method to develop a sampling technique for 
the lab, derived directly from Hurlburt's DES, as an appropriate tool to help explore 
experiential data in controlled settings with its randomised triggering of introspective 
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episodes. This experience sampling approach offered a means of gathering data without much 
interaction or questioning from the experimenter, a possible confound in the previous study.  
As DES aims to access “pristine” (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006) experience (relying less 
on retrospective accounts of an experience but notes and recorded comments made in the 
moments immediately following an instant of experience, prompted by a beeper device), the 
nature of the experience is collected within the flow of the person’s natural descriptive 
patterns. Random sampling (or sampling where the participants believes it is random) was 
used to gather the data in the IGT. However, we failed to show clear behavioural differences 
between the framing groups, similar to the previous experiment. This may point to limitations 
of the IGT and similarly controlled tasks, rather than the qualitative method and their use of 
exploring experiential descriptions. Experiment 5 shows that C-DES could integrate sampling 
techniques in the lab, making it a potentially useful tool amongst a number of methods that 
could be used to further understand the nature of experience and its relation with observed 
behaviour. However, our use of the IGT brings with it a number of limitations that need 
careful consideration. While the task is dynamic and allows the participants to choose from 
an array of stimuli over the course of the task, the IGT is also associated with a few 
methodological concerns. Indeed, some researchers find the use of the task contentious 
(Colombetti, 2008; Lin et al 2007).  
 
Limitation of the Iowa Gambling Task   
Since its inception, the IGT has been widely used to identify real-life risky decision 
makers and is said to highlight the role of the body during this process. The findings of the 
task are well replicated, with participants consistently showing bodily arousal before high 
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risk decisions in the task (Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Bishara et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2007). 
However, some empirical studies have found that participant behaviour during the IGT is 
sensitive to environmental changes, such as time pressure, anticipatory fear  and other 
stresses (Preston et al. 2007), gender differences in competition (Ennis, Kelly & Lambert, 
2001), as well as exam pressure and general stress (Gray, 1999). Neuropsychological studies 
have illustrated different brain regions associated with stresses during the task as a predictor 
of task performance (Bolla et al. 2004). Other research indicates that people behave 
differently due to characteristics of personality (Suhr, 2007). In our use of the IGT, we 
created a social framing context to facilitate clear experiential boundaries between the 
groups. Doing so was not just to illustrate clear behavioural differences in the IGT, but to 
show that experience is important for the interactions participants have with the task stimuli. 
The results from Experiment 3 show that framing the task in this way resulted in participants 
making riskier decisions. These performances are very similar to the ‘Prominent Deck B’ 
phenomena noted in some of the IGT literature (Lin et al. 2007).  
Colombetti (2008) and Tomb et al (2002) also criticise the role that skin conductance 
responses (SCR) have in their relation to emotional experiences in the IGT. SCR’s are said to 
affect or ‘bias’ decisions in the task, stemming from how Damasio (1994) proposed the IGT 
as the experimental evidence for somatic markers in decision making. Colombetti (2008), 
along with Tomb and colleagues (2002) criticise the interpretation of findings that specific 
physiological correlates are associated with bad deck choices. The most common 
interpretation is that increased SCR indicates a form of tracking of general risk in the card 
selections. Instead, Colombetti (2008) and Tomb et al. (2002) propose that a participant’s 
higher SCR before the selection of a bad deck may be due to the participant’s expectation of 
a higher-magnitude outcome, and not because a SCR mediates the considerations of long-
 
 
~ 190 ~ 
 
term outcomes.  This is a question for which first-person report would seem the appropriate 
means of checking, and the results of Experiment 4 seem to indicate that participants gather 
knowledge of the decks in the task at an early stage, consistent with Maia and McClelland’s 
findings.  
Participants in our socially framed IGT reported greater confidence levels at early 
stages in the task, which is consistent with the ‘prominent Deck B’ phenomena reported in 
the literature whereby participants are guided by gain-frequency of the deck, rather than 
focusing on long-term outcomes of the task. Interpreting this finding is a challenge as 
behavioural differences were not observed between the framing groups, but it seems that the 
gradual advantageous choices that participants made over the course of the task in both 
groups is consistent with the typical findings of the IGT. That is, participants gradually 
improve as the task progresses, although probing qualitatively on this experience overrode 
any effect that the framing context had during the task.  
Tomb et al (2002) illustrated gain-frequency behaviour in the IGT by altering the task 
paradigm. In lowering the amounts of losses of the disadvantageous decks they found that 
normal subjects (participants who did not suffer damage to the VMPRC) generated higher 
SCR’s to the advantageous decks, which appears to support the hypothesis that a SCR only 
reflects the expectation of the immediate outcome of the decks. This is a concern also 
highlighted by Colombetti (2008) in that the IGT only illustrates short-sighted somatic 
markers, that is, immediate decisions and outcomes. With the results of our experiments 
using the IGT, this seems to be true for the socially framed context of Experiment 3. 
However, findings from the questionnaire administered in Experiment 4 show that 
participants had different perceptions of the decks between the framing groups, with more 
favourable ratings of disadvantageous Deck B in the socially framed condition. Moreover, 
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this is only seen after 40 deck decisions and, crucially, does not appear to have a parallel in 
differences in the performance on the task. Participants’ reported experiences seem to diverge 
from their behaviour. 
In relation to the advantage deck ratings, participants in the social framing condition 
rated Deck A as less favourable when compared to the individual group’s ratings. 
Conversely, this reversed in the final ratings of Deck A, with participants rating it as more 
preferable having completed 100 trials. Again, this was not associated with differences in 
performance, so the question remains how to adequately integrate first-person descriptions 
with performance in the task, or if, indeed, such integration is a valid ambition. 
Colombetti (2008) suggests that further investigation of the physiology of emotion 
could attempt to establish if somatic markers are indeed necessary for emotional decision 
making. This has implications for whether or not participants are seeking to maximise gain-
frequency or maximise earnings at the end of the IGT. As researchers have traditionally 
proposed that Deck B is the disadvantageous deck in the IGT, Lin et al.’s (2007) research 
casts doubt over the strategies of participants in their proposal of the ‘prominent Deck B’ 
phenomenon. Participants seemed to choose decks with higher gains frequency rather than 
better long-term outcome when under social stress. That is, their performance may be guided 
by the high frequency of gains over losses with the risky Deck B, indicating poorer task 
performance. When qualitative methods were introduced to the task, there were no clear ways 
of understanding how the framing changed the experience of the task. Some of the deck 
ratings differed between the  groups, but the directed questioning used in Experiment 4 with 
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) questionnaire did not provide a clear indicators of experiential 
differences between groups.  
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With our use of the C-DES in Experiment 5, participant descriptions of their 
experiences did not differ between framing groups, so either the coupling of experience and 
behaviour is not as robust in this task, other means are necessary to explore the relationship 
further, or the IGT is not suitable for qualitative probing. The process of introspection just by 
itself seems to have suppressed the effect shown in the first IGT experiment. While a curious 
phenomenon, this is a perfect illustration of the deep methodological problems associated 
with experiential research. In principle, a next action to take would be to try to explore how 
the experiences of the participants are differing in the task when they are asked about their 
experience, versus when they are not, but there is, of course, no way to conduct such research 
directly. The behavioural phenomenon that promised to enable an interrogation of different 
forms of experience on a controlled experimental task disappeared when that experience was 
examined. This was not due to a failure to engage with the task generally. We found that 
participants in our individually framed group in Experiment 3, and across all groups in 
Experiments 4 and 5, performed very similar to the typical findings of the IGT. Participants 
consistently chose fewer cards from the riskier decks as the task progresses. Our findings 
show that participants generally made fewer risky decisions as the task progressed, just as 
Damasio (1994) originally stated. 
Other aspects such as motivation, level of engagement and apathy could explain the 
nature of emotional decision making in further detail. Colombetti (2008) argues that the IGT 
cannot truthfully show whether participants make their choices by considering long-term 
outcomes. As a result, the IGT may need further investigation to understand the physiology 
and phenomenology of decision making. To do this kind of research, we need to explore 
other aspects of behavioural responses to the situation, such as bodily and kinaesthetic 
movements. Other researchers are arguing for actions (Olivares et al, 2015), but how exactly 
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to methodologically capture these data and usefully explore them to understand the 
experiential differences in behaviour is going to call for a more radical overhaul of the 
methods. Rather than associated experience and behaviour, we should be associating 
experience and the behaviour as well as bodily changes or physiological responses.  
With regard to qualitatively probing during the IGT, the existing literature tends 
toward the claim that some form of training is needed, as participants are generally inept at 
discussing their experiences in sufficient detail. Experiment 4 attempted to directly build on 
this, and we developed a rudimentary training programme that attempted to give participants 
familiarity with talking about their experience in a controlled setting. However, as noted, our 
findings show that training had no bearing on the contents of descriptions, participants’ 
awareness of their own thinking, or specific details about decks or actions that might have led 
to the evaluations they were nevertheless happy to make. However, some participants in both 
the trained and untrained groups had difficulties in elaborating on their experiences, and it 
seems possible that the narrow focus of questions worked against us in gathering more open-
ended descriptive data. Our findings suggest that qualitative methods in the lab have a long 
way to go, but there may be promising ways of exploring experience in meaningful and 
controlled ways. The kinds of ‘minimal’ changes proposed at the beginning of this thesis 
seem unlikely to be enough to answer the research question. There is likely going to be some 
substantial innovation in the future, either in data gathering techniques, training of 
participants in the acquisition of meaningful data, or different kinds of experimental tasks 
needed. 
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7.2  Implications for the study of experience in Psychology 
Research on experience tends to focus on perception, or elaborating on individual 
level aspects of particular experiences in a person’s life. As has been shown in the earlier 
chapters, the scientific study of behaviour and cognition commonly use experimental 
observations carried out by objective observers who are outside the context and the content of 
the object of experience. To get valid outcomes, it is often argued that measurement tools 
should involve tight control and narrow behavioural options in experimental protocols in the 
specific conditions of a laboratory, which are far from the ecological state of natural 
experience (Kagan, 2012). These methods enable scientists to acquire data that are precise, 
reliable and available for public review, the kinds of third-person data most commonly 
associated with the core principles of science. This allows for practical and replicable 
research methods, however they tend to be associated with limiting options for behaviour in 
the lab, as well as highly contrived situations somewhat removed from natural situations 
(Doan, 2009). This removal from natural situations has been criticised by phenomenologists. 
The main focus for Husserl was the study of phenomena as they appeared through 
consciousness, with the study of experience attempting to unfold meanings as they are lived 
in everyday existence. Some researchers argue that in order to understand behavioural data 
fully, we need to interpret the behaviour with the help of the subject, whereby we allow 
participants to describe their subjective experiences during the experiment (Froese et al. 
2011; Lutz, 2002; Varela, 1999). Where this is done at all, it generally occurs after the 
experiment, by means of verbal reports or questionnaires (Langdridge, 2004; Smith et al. 
2009; Vermersch, 2004). This subjective information is then used as some extra data which 
might nuance the interpretation of the empirical data in positive or negative ways, but in any 
case are not themselves considered as scientific inputs (Dennett, 1991).  
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From the earlier chapters in this dissertation we see that there are new theories of 
mind and cognition that claim that experience and phenomenology are important and 
intertwined with behaviour. For example, Barrett (2011) and Froese et al. (2011) claim that 
cognition spans the brain, body and environment that cannot be adequately understood in 
terms of disembodied states. Embodied states are generally seen as necessarily involving 
experience, phenomenology, where these various aspects of the phenomena become 
intertwined. While the theoretical (and indeed, intuitive) rationales for such thinking might be 
compelling, findings from the experiments carried out in this research suggest that, much in 
line with the prevailing common sense in scientific psychological research, whatever the role 
of experience might be, it is subtle, unobvious. Attempts for attaining useful descriptive data 
that relates to task behaviour is not going to be straightforward.  
Introspection and experience have a mixed history in Psychology. The overall 
findings from the current project broadly support the long-existing trend that experience and 
behaviour have a weak relationship, if any. However, there remain good reasons to 
investigate the relationship in more depth and the findings of our experiments show that there 
is much more work to be done. There are growing parts of the scientific community that 
accepts subjective experience as necessary to fully understand cognitive functioning and 
behaviour (Colombetti, 2008; Froese et al. 2011; Olivares et al. 2015; Stuart, 2012; Wilson & 
Golonka, 2013). These researchers, especially in cognitive science, take subjective 
experience into consideration, not only as an extra source of data, but as something that 
should be studied on a par with typical behavioural data. The results of our latter experiments 
show that there is no simple path to an integration of experimental measures and participants’ 
experience in controlled settings. While it was hoped that there may be ways of using 
experimental measures with minimal changes in practices, the outcome of the study suggests 
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that this is not, in fact, likely to be the case. If experience is to be integrated into behavioural 
work more deeply, some substantial alterations to methods are required. I would argue, 
however, that the potential pay-offs remain promising. 
Even without prolonged training, direct descriptions given by the subject are often 
rich in experiential detail, supported by the findings of Experiment 5, which sometimes have 
details that are difficult to attain through third-person methods. As mentioned above, it is 
generally believed that people have great difficulty articulating their experiences. This could 
be due to the nature of the experience being examined by the researcher. The experience 
needs to be rich in detail and at least somewhat meaningful for the participant. This shift in 
focus opens the qualitative methods to be examined in a more critical way. For example, 
questioning the methods used to gather data on the experience and how these data are being 
used to understand the cognitive processes involved.  If first-person approaches are to be 
taken seriously, the methods may need to be more accessible to researchers and used in more 
practicable settings, that is, in the lab.  
Despite a great deal of research suggesting that meaning and experience matter, it is 
still unclear just how they matter, what the mechanism might be for experience to shape 
behaviour. More importantly, how this data can be collected and used in meaningful ways. 
The recent theories of embodied subjectivity that have been reviewed here argue strongly for 
the first conclusion – that experience matters. In controlled settings, there may be no strong 
link between consciousness and observed behaviour, so whatever links that can be shown will 
be looser than proposed in the literature, perhaps occurring over minutes of time rather than 
moment to moment. 
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Lutz and Thompson (2003) argue that momentary experiences are important for 
understanding the link between experience and behaviour. Their use of 
neurophenomenological methods in the exploration of experience defined specific moments 
in the lab whereby experiential data were gathered. This was also used in experience 
sampling methods (Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006), as well as other qualitative approaches (Heron, 
1996) where it is believed that attaining descriptions of a particular moment is a sufficient 
means of understanding the experience in a more general sense. The results of our use of C-
DES, however, suggest that the details of momentary experiences are too vague or unreliable. 
The open-ended questions used in Experiment 5 show that participants are likely to include 
descriptions of their surrounding environment and other justification for their behaviour. This 
may be the result of using the lab as a means of exploring specific momentary experiences 
which removes the behaviour from a naturalistic environment. However, it also raises issues 
of the precise relationship between experience and behaviour, which is not actually stated 
clearly in most theories, and so we are still at the exploratory stage in this research. It is not 
easy to make predictions or test specific hypotheses; so the theories that say that experience 
matters for behaviour need to become more specific in detailing what their relationship might 
be, and how consciousness affects actions. The implications of this is far reaching, as it may 
show that the relationship between experience and behaviour is not as closely intertwined as 
believed, or there needs to be much more work done to clarify the type of relationship 
between them.  
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7.3  Implications for qualitative methods to study experience in the lab 
Qualitative findings in our experiments shed little light on framing effects in the lab, 
showing that there are methodological challenges when studying experience in particular 
settings. The first problem that we face is just how difficult it is to facilitative descriptive 
experiences. While our use of qualitative probing in a specific task was naturally inclined to 
produce narrowly-focused data, our findings are consistent with previous research, which 
argues that people generally have trouble in elaborating on their experiences (Hurlburt & 
Schwitzgebel, 2008; Langdridge, 2004; Petitmengin, 2006; Vermesch, 2004). However, we 
face additional challenges when using sampling techniques in settings such as the lab as these 
methodological tools are not designed for such a controlled environment. Adapting these 
methods for the lab seems to compromise some of the validity of the descriptions, as the 
experience is being removed from naturalistic environments. As such, any descriptions 
attained in the lab may only be partly analogous to the real-world experience, and lose some 
of the details needed to understand the associated behaviours. The challenge facing us is that 
we are unsure exactly how descriptions in the lab differ from naturalistic expressions of 
experience and how these methods may be affecting them. The GNAT task and BART, for 
instance, both had elements that seemed to provide the possibility of meaningful experience 
in the laboratory (at least in a very minimal, controlled fashion), but reports of boredom and 
the lack of clear behavioural correlates suggests they did not capture the value of experience 
that is of interest here. Tasks will need to be dynamic, engaging, and carry some structural or 
process parallels with some form of real world experience, to be usable.  
While the IGT had some aspects of this, a task is needed that measures aspects of 
experience that go beyond risk-taking behaviour. Instead, experimental task are needed 
whereby participants can meaningfully attend to stimuli so that their behaviour may indicate 
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clear behavioural patterns as the task progresses. However, these patterns of behaviour need 
to be controlled enough so that the participants’ qualitative responses can be calibrated with 
both the task, and other participants who may take part in the task. The IGT, while certainly 
dynamic, is still too narrowly focused on a particular way of behaving. That is, the aim of the 
task is solely to make advantageous decisions over the course of the task.  
It seems that moving out of the laboratory may be necessary to make methodological 
advancements, measuring not just the naturalistic environment of potential participants, but 
specific aspects of their environment, so that their behaviour and descriptions may be 
authentic and tied to the phenomena explored. Alternatively, aspects of the person’s 
behaviour may not be adequately captured from their mere descriptions. If we could include 
analysis of the kinaesthetic awareness associated with the experience being described, we 
may be able to facilitate more comprehensive explorations of the associated behaviour.  
 
Using qualitative methods in the lab for future studies 
 It is clear from our final two experiments that more comprehensive training and 
directed (though carefully focused) questioning would have to be considered for future 
studies. Not just in the way we train participants in the lab, but in the experiences we hope to 
gather data on. Given the limitations of both the task-specific questions of Experiment 4 and 
the unguided descriptions of Experiment 5, there seems a need to focus on more specific 
aspects, or particular kinds, of experience. That is, we will need to explore specific aspects of 
experience (for example, somatic, emotional, environmental, object-oriented, task oriented), 
and systematically examine whether a clear relationship exists with the behaviour. While it 
may move away from minimal changes in the methods, it may be necessary in order to attain 
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more detailed and useful responses. Different theories suggest different facets of experience 
are likely to be more relevant. For example, Lutz and Thompson (2003) and Hurlburt and 
Schwitzgebel (2008) highlight pre-reflective states of consciousness from which we attain 
descriptive data. At present, however, we tend not to collect any such data in a qualitative 
fashion. Instead, we always boil off the experience to look at just the behavioural aspects. We 
therefore have very few data relevant to this question, and are in a very exploratory phase of 
research. 
 We will also have to examine the various effects that introspection tends to have on 
cognition and behaviour during a typical task, as our findings seem to show that people were 
less risky in the IGT when introspection was involved at some point during the task. Instead 
of comparing descriptions between experiential or context groups, it may be more appropriate 
to focus on a more direct link of experiential data with behaviour. This may take the guise of 
methods and questioning more akin to the Petitmengin (2006) use of the Elicitation 
Interview, although this method also comes with a series of limitations in trying to find robust 
effects between experience and behaviour.  While proponents of the elicitation interview 
approach argue strongly that a properly skilled interviewer neither foists particular 
descriptions nor prompts invented reports from their interviewees (Petitmengin, 2006), we 
must yet proceed with care. This means that the approach, while both demanding of 
extraordinary discipline on the part of the interviewer and substantial time for its conduct 
(often between half an hour to an hour per interview), must still be used with caution. Such 
pragmatic considerations must not stop us from doing good science, but they do, 
nevertheless, motivate us to be very aware of the range of choices we have available. 
Olivares et al. (2015) suggest that instead of relying on purely first-person 
descriptions we should also pay attention to nonverbal indicators that are relevant during the 
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sampling of experience. They conclude that the interpretation of gestures, the location of eyes 
in the space, or the movements that follow the verbal accounts, could bring non-explicit 
information about specific aspects of the interviewee’s experience. In addition, the 
interviewer could calibrate the non-verbal indicators performed by the interviewee by 
interpreting them, and thus improve both the introspective skills of the participant as well as 
their own interview skills. Their suggestion of using observations to augment first-person 
data is somewhat complementary to our proposal of collecting first-person data to help 
interpret behavioural measures.  
The qualitative descriptions attained during our IGT experiments could not be used to 
explain the behavioural patterns in a clear way, largely because there were no performance 
differences observed in the framing groups of the task. The behavioural differences that were 
found using the initial framed IGT experiment disappeared with the introduction of 
qualitative methods to the task. It has been argued in an earlier chapter that theory does not 
yet make clear the particular impact of the use of qualitative methods on the experience being 
explored or associated behaviour and the findings suggest that it is not to be overlooked or 
underestimated. Performance differences in the IGT are consistently found in the research 
when the task is applied with some social stress (Gray, 1999). Even with a minimal method 
that claims to have very limited impact on experience, such as the DES method (and using no 
leading questions) framing was not associated with performance differences. This shows that 
there are no reliable behavioural markers that could indicate differences between the framing 
groups. We do not yet understand the ramifications that qualitative methods may have on the 
experience being explored. As such, there may be a training/naiveté trade-off given the 
difficulty in attaining descriptions of experience that are not subject to major criticisms. As 
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mentioned above, we may need to consider using sampling techniques on more non-
momentary aspects of experiences (e.g. mood), or the use of more physiological measures.  
Neurophenomenology attempted to integrate experiential data with neurological 
correlates to understand the phenomena in comprehensive ways. As outlined in Chapter 
Three, neurophenomenology is associated with a number of limitations, including 
practicalities associated with integrating empirical neural data with qualitative descriptions 
from trained participants. There is little consensus amongst researchers of how to integrate 
these types of data, which means that looking for neural correlates of descriptive experiences 
may have been premature as the methods used to integrate these kinds of data have not faced 
the same level of scrutiny as traditional psychological practices. Much more work is needed 
to develop our understanding of integrating these types of data, especially as experience data 
is open to interpretation and sensitive to manipulations or bias.  
A soma-phenomenology, or a more behaviour-focused phenomenology may be 
possible with the current methodological tools that are available in experiential research. This 
research could develop on bodily and kinaesthetic movements in co-ordination of 
descriptions from different kinds of experiences, which could be adaptable and more 
generalised than EEG studies. For example, Stuart (2013) suggests the possibility of 
incorporating qualitative methods, such as an elicitation interview technique, with neural data 
measured in controlled settings as it could afford us the opportunity of examining a clearly 
defined behaviour in a contextualised temporal experience (specifically the idea of using a 
sample of participants that are finely attuned to the behaviour being measured in the 
controlled setting).  
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This is also suggested in Olivares et al (2015), who argue that there are other forms of 
data that may elaborate on participants’ experiences. The type of qualitative data that are 
gathered through open-ended questioning is insufficient and does not improve our 
understanding of behaviour in meaningful ways. This line of questioning tends to generate 
experience reports of external things. If it is a person's internal, emotional or affective, or 
bodily experiences that play a bigger role in shaping behaviour over time, people will need 
training and practice. This means compromising their naiveté, but that may just be necessary. 
Perhaps we need an extension of neurophenomenological methods into the standard 
laboratory. Evidence from Damasio (1994), Barrett (2011) and others suggests physiological 
responses, not just neurological ones, seem to fit behaviours.  
Leone et al (2012) show individuals have strong emotional fluctuations in decision 
making. They found that there were strong fluctuations in bodily arousal during a game of 
chess where (1) emotionality varied from decision to decision and (2) the bodily arousal may 
be strong enough to help shed light on the inner thought of the person making the decision. 
Bodily correlates measured by heart rate were found to predict specific performance 
characteristics in the chess game. With a sample of expert chess players, the authors found 
heart fluctuations that correlated with specific moments in the game where the players were 
performing high stake moves or overtaking an opponent. It illustrates clearly that we can 
measure and examine momentary experience where there are bodily correlates that show 
emotionality in clearly defined instances. Placing participants in these meaningful 
environments may be an advantageous way of investigating experience in the lab. However, 
as mentioned previously, narrowly focused tasks bring with them the limiting scope of 
generalising behavioural data, a concern that is often raised from standardised lab based tasks 
(Schwitzgebel, 2003).   
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As momentary experiences are not easily captured in lab based settings, it is clear that 
we need more robust effects before making clearer observations on the relationship between 
experience and behaviour. Future research could possibly explore more immersive games 
when gathering behavioural data, or using the participants where behaviours are controlled 
and limited, but fully meaningful for the participant. That is, the participant is more immersed 
in the experience of the task, and their behaviour has more links with fully realised 
meaningful descriptions. While it is not clear how we could sample such data, the loose 
relationship between experience and behaviour found in our use of C-DES is still 
problematic, and work in identifying the most appropriate data to gather, and the most 
appropriate analyses, should continue.  
Additionally, if people can be trained to report their emotional or physiological state, 
it might be possible to find the kinds of “phenomenological markers” that Lutz and 
colleagues do with neurological data. This would be a substantial change in practice and may 
be possible with the use of naive participants but use more directed questions, maybe 
something closer to the elicitation interview as mentioned previously. Additionally, new 
technologies to study behaviour in naturalistic settings with methods similar to C-DES or 
adapted versions of it could prove useful. For example, mobile technologies, fitness trackers 
and smartwatches all seem promising. In Hurlburt’s DES, participants recorded experience 
when prompted by wearing a beeper for several days. New technologies could also record 
much more data during these situations (and possibly trigger introspective episodes at 
specific moments during a specific activity). Data such as physiological arousal, heart rate, 
sleep information and more is already being collected by these technologies. Given the 
increasing awareness researchers have of the methodological limitations in experience 
research, using the aforementioned technologies to produce more meaningful data seems 
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promising, and potentially well under way. However, this would mean a move away from the 
minimal change in practice hoped for in the present work, but that may just be necessary to 
get the data we need.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Over the last few decades there is a growing trend in adapting first person accounts of 
experience in the study of cognition (Ruitenberg, 2012). Understanding experience and 
behaviour is crucial, but we’re still in at the beginning of developing adequate methods for its 
controlled study. Although embodiment research stresses the importance of experience for 
our cognitive theories, how to characterise or study it effectively has remained a challenge. 
However, there is reason to believe that experience can yet be studied in a controlled manner. 
Many researchers have put forward models attempting to explain ways of using more 
integrative methodologies in the study of experience, although these practices are often 
carried out in ways that are strikingly different to the methods used in Psychology at present. 
Some have claimed that there are ways of using qualitative accounts of experience to 
interpret behaviour (Varela, 1996), while others have argued that third-person methods are 
sufficient to understand experience and its relation to consciousness (although research needs 
to be carried out in slightly different ways) (Dennett, 1991, 2007; Piccinini 2003). Further 
still, some researchers are proposing a variety of tools and techniques that explores 
experience by way of second-person methods (Froese et al. 2011; Hurlburt & Akhtar, 2006; 
Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Petitmengin, 1996).  
When we analyse first person data, we do so in a way to create symbolic 
representations of it, through projections of what the experimenter understands by the 
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responses or through linguistic characterisation of experiences (Langdridge, 2004). Up to 
now, there are few attempts to find ways of using these data to inform the interpretation of 
experimental methods. If we are to test and refine our data collection techniques, we will 
need to be able to find some way of examining variation in measured performance that might 
fit or diverge from variation in observed experiences. This is a big challenge and changes in 
practice will have to be equally big. This research project shows that the answers are neither 
obvious nor straightforward. The kind of practices of psychologists and cognitive scientists 
doing this new kind of science will have to be very different from the practices we currently 
see in contemporary research.  Qualitative methods are continually improving. Tools, such as 
a controlled use of DES, show that we can study experience and behaviour in controlled ways 
that still produce usable and interesting experiential data. How we use these approaches to 
inform and refine methodological practices is entirely undeveloped from a cognitive 
psychology point of view. As such the current thesis hopes to have opened avenues for new 
research to occur, particularly in how we can use our methods to further explore the 
relationship between experience and behaviour in meaningful ways.  
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Appendices 
 
 Appendix A:   Go No go Association Task 
 
 
 
Instruction sheet: 
 
On the computer monitor in front of you, you will be presented with the Go No-go task.  
 
A ‘Go’ symbol on the computer monitor requires you to press the [\] button.  
 
The ‘Stop’ symbol on the monitor requires you to press the [/] key on the keyboard.  
 
Take a moment to familiarise yourself with the layout of the keyboard.   
 
If you press the incorrect button, the next stimulus appears on the screen automatically.  
 
You are not being timed and it is not important that you complete the task quickly.  
 
It is expected that the experiment should not take longer than ten minutes in total.  
 
When you are ready to begin, click on the [Space bar] to begin.  
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Information sheet: 
 
 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
Thank you for your interest in the study. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to 
complete the Go No-Go Association task. The task is not a test of your intelligence but a 
simple cognitive task where you are asked to press an appropriate button for what you see on 
the computer monitor in front of you.   
 
You can decide to stop and leave this experiment at any time, without giving any reason or 
explanation, should you wish to. 
 
All of the information collected in this study will be kept in strictest confidence.  
 
If you have any questions at any time, please do not hesitate to ask the researcher. If you have 
questions later on, please email Alan McAuliffe at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie. Alternatively 
you can contact my research supervisor at marek.mcgann@mic.ul.ie  
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you may 
contact: 
 
Emma Barry 
MIREC Administrator 
Mary Immaculate College 
South Circular Road 
Limerick 
061-204515 
emma.barry@mic.ul.ie  
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Consent form: 
 
 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about this research project and on the Stop-Go Task, and 
any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give 
any reason or justification. 
 
 
I am aware that my results will be kept confidential. 
 
 
I am aware that research findings may be published; however my anonymity will be 
preserved at all times. 
 
 
I am willing to take part in the study, and I am over 18 years of age. 
 
 
 
Name (please print):_____________________ 
 
Signature: _____________________ 
 
Date: _____________________ 
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Debriefing: 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Research suggests that meaningful cues provide 
a different understanding for individuals. In this experiment, a group of participants 
completed the Go No-go task with ‘Go’ or ‘No-go’ symbols appearing on screen, thus 
providing a clear meaningful instruction. In the other group of participants however, 
individuals were presented with numbers, with the number ‘6’ representing the ‘Stop’ 
stimulus. Other individuals completed the task with Yellow and Blue images. It is expected 
that individuals who completed the task with the Stop/Go stimulus have greater reactions 
times and fewer inaccurate responses. This may give us an insight the role meaning has in lab 
based cognitive tasks.   
If you have any further questions about your own data, the research itself, feel free to contact 
the researcher at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie 
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 Appendix B:   Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
 
Information sheet 
 
To whom it may concern, 
Thank you for your interest in the study. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to complete a 
decision making task called the Balloon Analogue Risk Task.  
The task involves inflating a balloon by clicking a button on the keyboard.  
Each time you click the balloon, you earn 5 points. If you overinflate the balloon it will explode and 
you will lose any money you earned associated with that balloon.  
You may ‘bank’ any points earned for pumping a particular balloon at any time in the task. This will 
add to a pot of earned points seen on the right hand side if the screen.  
Once you hit the ‘bank’ button or if the balloon explodes, a new balloon will appear on your screen. 
Please try to earn as much money as possible. There are 30 balloons you can earn money inflating.  
The task in this experiment is not a test of your intelligence but is a decision-making task. You can 
decide to stop and leave this experiment at any time, without giving any reason or explanation, 
should you wish to. 
All of the information collected in this study will be kept in strictest confidence.  
If you have any questions at any time, please do not hesitate to ask the researcher. If you have 
questions later on, please email Alan McAuliffe at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie. Alternatively you can 
contact my research supervisor at marek.mcgann@mic.ul.ie  
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you may contact: 
 
Emma Barry 
MIREC Administrator 
Mary Immaculate College 
South Circular Road 
Limerick 
061-204515 
emma.barry@mic.ul.ie  
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Consent Form 
 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about this research project and any questions I have about the 
project and the BART have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give any 
reason or justification. 
 
I understand that all of the information collected in this study will be stored in accordance with all 
application data protection legislation including the Data Protection Act and (where applicable) the 
Freedom of Information Act. 
 
I am willing to take part in the study, and I am over 18 years of age. 
 
Name (please print):_____________________ 
Signature: _____________________ 
Date: _____________________ 
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 Appendix C: Iowa Gambling Task 
 
Information sheet 
 
To whom it may concern, 
You are invited to participate in a study currently being undertaken by Alan McAuliffe, PhD 
candidate in the Psychology Department; Mary Immaculate College, Limerick. This research 
investigates your experience in a decision making task called the Iowa Gambling Task. Should you 
consent to participation, you will be asked to complete the Iowa Gambling Task and answer a 
qualitative experience questionnaire.  
The aim of the task is to maximise your points by making decisions on cards that will appear on a 
computer screen. The experiment is not a test of your intelligence but a simple decision making task 
where you are asked to choose from 4 decks of cards presented on the computer monitor in front you.  
[This information will appear in the information sheet given to experimental condition only:] 
[Your performance in the task will affect the next participant in the game. If you perform poorly then 
the next participant will have a more difficult time winning points. Your performances will be judged 
together as this is a cooperative task. It is important that you win the most amounts of points possible 
in order to do well! ] 
All information gathered in this study will be anonymous and confidential. Data will only be viewed 
by the researcher and examiner. Should you consent to participation, data gathered will be 
anonymised and there contain no identifying factors. 
You are free to decline participation in this study or to withdraw participation at any time without 
being obliged to give justification for your action. If you chose to withdraw your participation during 
completion of the study, the data that you have provided will be removed. 
If you have any queries, please contact the researcher at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie. Alternatively you 
can contact my research supervisor at marek.mcgann@mic.ul.ie 
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you may 
contact:  
MIREC Administrator  
Mary Immaculate College  
South Circular Road  
Limerick  
061-204515  
mirec@mic.ul.ie  
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Consent form 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about this research project involving the Iowa Gambling Task. Any 
questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give any 
reason or justification. 
 
I am aware that my results will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
I am aware that research findings may be published; however my anonymity will be preserved at all 
times. 
I am willing to take part in the study, and I am over 18 years of age. 
 
Name (please print):_____________________ 
Signature: _____________________ 
Date: _____________________ 
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Debriefing form: 
Dear participant, 
Thank you for taking part in the study. The purpose of this experiment is to help us 
understand decision making during the Iowa Gambling Task. Some participants were told 
that their performance was going to affect the next participant in the waiting room however 
this is not the case. Research suggests that how people perceive a given situation affects how 
people perform in the Iowa Gambling Task. Your participation is greatly appreciated in this 
study.  
Please keep the information sheet given to you at the beginning of the study for your personal 
records. If you have any further questions about your own data, the research itself, feel free to 
contact the researcher at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie 
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 Appendix D: Iowa Gambling Task and Experience Questionnaire 
 (Maia and McClelland questionnaire) 
 
Information sheet 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
You are invited to participate in a study currently being undertaken by Alan McAuliffe, PhD 
candidate in the Psychology Department; Mary Immaculate College, Limerick. This research 
investigates your experience in a decision making task called the Iowa Gambling Task. 
Should you consent to participation, you will be asked to complete the Iowa Gambling Task 
and answer a qualitative experience questionnaire.  
The aim of the task is to maximise your points by making decisions on cards that will appear 
on a computer screen. The experiment is not a test of your intelligence but a simple decision 
making task where you are asked to choose from 4 decks of cards presented on the computer 
monitor in front you.  
At specific times in the game you will be presented with a number of questions about the task 
that will appear on screen. When this happens, the experimenter will be recording your 
responses. Please read the question aloud and answer honestly. This procedure is used to 
understand decision making, however we want you to focus on your honest experience about 
the task. There is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer. Don’t try to anticipate responses; just try to 
honestly answer the question about the task and your experience of it. 
[This information will appear in the information sheet given to experimental condition only:] 
[Your performance in the task will affect the next participant in the game. If you perform 
poorly then the next participant will have a more difficult time winning points. Your 
performances will be judged together as this is a cooperative task. It is important that you 
win the most amounts of points possible in order to do well! ] 
All information gathered in this study will be anonymous and confidential. Data will only be 
viewed by the researcher and examiner. Should you consent to participation, data gathered 
will be anonymised and there contain no identifying factors. 
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You are free to decline participation in this study or to withdraw participation at any time 
without being obliged to give justification for your action. If you chose to withdraw your 
participation during completion of the study, the data that you have provided will be 
removed. 
If you have any queries, please contact the researcher at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie. 
Alternatively you can contact my research supervisor at marek.mcgann@mic.ul.ie 
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you 
may contact:  
MIREC Administrator  
Mary Immaculate College  
South Circular Road  
Limerick  
061-204515  
mirec@mic.ul.ie  
 
 
 
Amended Maia and McClelland questionnaire 
Q1.  Rate on a scale of 0 to 10, how good or bad you think deck 1 is, where 0 means that it 
 is terrible and 10 means that it is excellent. 
Q2.  Why did you give Deck [__] that particular rating and take a few moments to describe 
 why 
[Repeat Q1 and Q2 for decks 2 through 4] 
Q3.  On a scale of 0 to 100 how much you think that you know what you should do in this 
 game in order to win as many points as possible (or if you can’t in, to avoid losing 
 points as much as possible). 0 means that you have no idea of what you should do and 
 feel that you still need to explore the game more, and 100 means that you know 
 exactly what you should do and have no doubts that that would be the best strategy.  
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Consent form 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about this research project involving the Iowa Gambling Task and 
Qualitative Experience Interview. Any questions I have about the project have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give any 
reason or justification. 
 
I am aware that my results will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
I am aware that research findings may be published; however my anonymity will be preserved at all 
times. 
 
I am willing to take part in the study, and I am over 18 years of age. 
 
Name (please print):_____________________ 
Signature: _____________________ 
Date: _____________________ 
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Debriefing form: 
 
Dear participant, 
Thank you for taking part in the study. The purpose of this experiment is to help us 
understand decision making during the Iowa Gambling Task. Some participants were told 
that their performance was going to affect the next participant in the waiting room however 
this is not the case. Research suggests that how people perceive a given situation affects how 
people perform in the Iowa Gambling Task.  
You were asked to answer questions about the task at specific moments during it. This was 
based on a standardised questionnaire developed for the task and some participants received 
training sessions to become more familiar with the procedure. This involved training in 
giving accounts of descriptive experience in a more disciplined way. We hope to compare 
responses from trained and untrained participants and explore the effects it has on response 
detail; and whether the training affected the experience of the task.   
Your participation is greatly appreciated in this study. Please keep the information sheet 
given to you at the beginning of the study for your personal records. If you have any further 
questions about your own data, the research itself, feel free to contact the researcher at 
alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie 
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 Appendix E: Iowa Gambling Task and Experience Sampling Method 
 
 
 
Information sheet: 
 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
Thank you for your interest in the study. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to 
complete a computerised task called the Iowa Gambling Task and tell the experimenter about 
how you find the task at various intervals. The task is not a test of your intelligence but a 
simple decision making task where you are asked to choose from 4 decks of cards presented 
on the computer monitor in front you.  
 
Iowa Gambling Task: This is a decision making task where you will see 4 decks of cards in 
front of you. You can choose a card from one of these decks by pressing keys [1] [2] [3] or 
[4]. Each card will show you if you won or lost some points. You have 2000 points at the 
beginning of the task. The aim of the game is to win the most amounts of points possible!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
At various times in the game you will hear a ’beeping’ sound. You need to stop playing the 
Iowa Gambling Task as soon as you hear this beep and tell me exactly how you feel. This 
may be a little tricky at first so you’re going to get a chance to practise this before the 
experiment begins. This is a method commonly used to understand decision making, however 
we want you to focus on how you feel as soon as you hear the beep. What is your bodily 
experience as that particular moment in the task? Don’t try to anticipate responses. The 
beeping will occur at completely random times. There are no ‘right’ answers, just try to 
describe how you feel at the particular moment of the beep. At the end of the task I am going 
to ask you a few overall questions on how you found the Iowa Gambling Task.  
You can decide to stop and leave this experiment at any time, without giving any reason 
or explanation, should you wish to. 
[This information will appear in the information sheet given to experimental condition only:] 
Your performance in the task will affect the next participant in the game. If you perform poorly then the next 
participant will have a more difficult time winning points. Your performances will be judged together as this is a 
cooperative task. It is important that you win the most amount of points possible in order to do well!  
 
 
~ 232 ~ 
 
 
All of the information collected in this study will be kept in strictest confidence.  
 
If you have any questions at any time, please do not hesitate to ask the researcher. If you have 
questions later on, please email Alan McAuliffe at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie. Alternatively 
you can contact my research supervisor at marek.mcgann@mic.ul.ie 
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you may 
contact: 
 
Emma Barry 
MIREC Administrator 
Mary Immaculate College 
South Circular Road 
Limerick 
061-204515 
emma.barry@mic.ul.ie 
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Consent form: 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about this research project involving the Iowa Gambling Task and 
Descriptive Experience Sampling method. Any questions I have about the project have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give any 
reason or justification. 
I am aware that my results will be kept strictly confidential. 
I am aware that research findings may be published; however my anonymity will be preserved at all 
times. 
I am willing to take part in the study, and I am over 18 years of age. 
 
Name (please print):_____________________ 
Signature: _____________________ 
Date: _____________________ 
 
 
Debriefing form: 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in the study. The purpose of this experiment is to help us understand 
decision making during the Iowa Gambling Task. Some participants were told that their performance 
was going to affect the next participant in the waiting room however this is not the case. Research 
suggests that how people perceive a given situation affects how people perform in the Iowa 
Gambling Task.  
You were asked to explain exactly how you felt at the moment of a beeping sound. This helps us 
understand exactly how you felt at a specific time in the game. You were lead to believe that the 
beeper went off at random intervals however it did in fact go off after 40 and 80 card choices in the 
Iowa Gambling Task.   
Your participation is greatly appreciated in this study. Please keep the information sheet given to 
you at the beginning of the study for your personal records. If you have any further questions about 
your own data, the research itself, feel free to contact the researcher at alan.mcauliffe@mic.ul.ie 
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 Appendix F: Experience Sampling Interviews 
 
 
Summary of experience sampling transcriptions 
P1 
Okay so I guess that I'm feeling that I'm doing pretty well. Like 
I'm feeling like I'm doing it correct enough. Am… [pause] I'm 
very aware of performing, like I'm being tested. I know that my 
results will go into a computer and be analysed. I'm experiencing 
that feeling, which is hard to describe, like I feel like I'm doing 
well all things considered [laughs] I'm trying to focus on the 
moment of the beep, I wasn't expecting it. I was just getting into 
things [laughs] It's alright like...  
P2 
I’m feeling like I’m at a doctors office actually, I’m really aware 
of my presence in the room, and yours. I guess I feel like I’m here, 
in the lab. Does that make sense? 
P3 
I suppose I’m aware of the chair. I’m comfortable like... [pause]...  
comfortably physically. I'm also experiencing the floor. I 
deliberately put my feet flat on the floor at the start. That's what 
I'm experiencing at the moment. My chest and breathing too for 
some reason. And that I don't think I've figured out the task yet. 
I'm not sure what I'm doing yet, everytime I feel like I do know I 
lose it again. It's not hard or anything but I'm am... [pause] I 
dunno. I'm just concentrating I guess is what I mean, that's what I 
mean. 
P4 
I was going to say that I'm hearing a buzzing. It's what I'm most 
aware of at the moment. I think it's the computer overheating. I'm 
really aware of the sound of it anyway. It's the first thing I noticed, 
because the beep interrupted it, my thinking of it. I'm also feeling 
anxious, I think that's why I'm focusing on the buzzing or 
humming or whatever the noise is coming from the computer. I'm 
anxious for sure, I can feel my palm sweating on the keyboard, 
which is kind of gross. I'm aware of the keys in front of my, and I 
want to do well, but I'm still figuring out the best way to go about 
it. I mean I wouldn't normally be like this, so it's clear to me 
enough at the moment I'd say. I'm.. yeah. That's what I'm aware of 
at the moment.  
P5 
I feel like I’m doing okay but the beep startled me. I’m trying to 
keep on top of the task but I’m not really sure if I’m doing well or 
not. There’s a lot of chance involved I suppose. I’m just getting 
used to it now. 
P6 
Yea it’s going really well I think. I suppose its just chance too but 
I feel like it’s going well anyway. The room is comfortable and 
it’s a fairly straight forward task so I’m feeling good about it at the 
moment anyway- feeling confident. 
P7 It’s a little harder than I thought… I’m frustrated…” 
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P8 
Oh jeez. It that it? I'm supposed to say exactly what I'm 
experiencing right now? I guess pressure, in case I say the wrong 
thing. I feel good at the moment 
P9 
I’m feeling a bit anxious about it at the moment. I’m probably 
overthinking it a bit I’d say. The general experience is good; I’m 
comfortable and all that but I’m putting pressure on myself. I get 
very competitive when it comes to things like this [laughs] and I 
think there’s probably a bit more pressure because I know I’m 
being observed.  
P10 
Yea I think it’s going grand so far.  I feel like I’m doing as well as 
anyone would do really. It’s starting to make more sense now as I 
play so yea, feeling fine. I’m finding it fairly easy to concentrate 
too. 
P11 
So I just explain how it’s going is it? Yea I’m not doing too bad 
I’d say! It’s hard to tell but I feel like I’m doing alright anyway. I 
feel like I’m rushing a bit though and I don’t know why. I’m not 
thinking my moves through very much. I’d probably do better if I 
relaxed a bit and thought it through more. 
P12 
To be honest I’m finding it a bit hard. Like it’s going okay but I 
feel like I’m just choosing things at random. I feel a bit stressed 
and overwhelmed by it. I don’t know.. if I was doing it by myself 
at home I’d probably do better, you know? The room’s a bit warm 
too so I don’t know if that’s affecting me. 
P13 
I feel pressure at the moment. I'm just getting into the swing of 
things. Got burned a couple of times there so won't be doing that 
again [laughs]. I'm feeling like I'm being judged as well like, so I 
have to do good. Yeah like that actually. I feel like I'm doing good 
but like, being measured at the same time. There's no way I can 
slip up. I'm very aware of the one's I'm choosing  
P14 
It was so silent I could only hear my watch ticking and I was 
letting it distract me I think. I got mixed up a few times I’d say. It 
could be going a lot worse though. I’m doing alright!   
P15 
Content. I feel really confident and content at the moment. I'm 
happy enough, well even though I know I don't have reference 
point. I got a rake of points there. So I'm feeling well chuffed. Ah 
yeah… I don't think there's anything else really 
P16 
I was getting into it there, the beep kind of startled me [laughs].. 
I’m getting the hang of it now. At the start I was getting a bit 
confused, it took me a while but I’m on a roll now. The room’s a 
small bit stuffy but it’s grand. I’m trying to concentrate on the task 
and there aren’t any distractions really. 
P17 
I’m really not sure how I’m doing at this… I’m not good at things 
like this… I bet I’m doing really badly. 
P18 
I think I figured out the pattern, you see I’m into games and I 
think there’s a pattern to it 
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P19 
Oh god, I don’t know. Am I doing it right? I’m a bit all over the 
place. I keep picking the wrong one and it’s stressing me out a bit. 
I don’t think it’s going too well at the moment 
P20 
I don't know actually. To be honest I don’t really think I feel 
anything at the moment. I feel my tummy is making a lot of 
sounds. I guess I'm hungry. I’m thinking of hitting these keys, I’m 
feeling my fingers hitting the keys […] I feel very aware of that… 
P21 
I’m feeling good. I’m doing better than I thought I would actually. 
I’m kinda taking my time a bit to think it through and it’s going 
alright. So far so good! I’m probably after jinxing myself now 
though [laughs].  
P22 
I don’t really feel anything at the moment. I don't know… [pause]. 
I'm genuinely feeling a little absent minded. Like if I were to say 
what I'm feeling at the moment I wouldn't have an answer. Sorry 
P23 
Am, I'm very aware of my surroundings. I feel like I'm very aware 
of my skin for some reason, I'm feeling like I'm aware of my 
body. I don't know if that's because I'm here or what like I'm just 
really trying to focus on what I'm experiencing right now. I have a 
gut feeling like I messed up too I suppose, like I know I just lost a 
load of points before the thing went off. Now I'm just sort of here, 
in the chair, very aware of things all of a sudden. Like my mind is 
starting to wander now, to like, I dunno... yeah 
P24 
I’m feeling okay about how it’s going… I think. I find it hard to 
tell actually. It’s a bit stressful knowing that I’m kinda being 
judged on it though. I know you’re not staring over my shoulder 
or anything but I feel very aware that I’m doing it as a task for 
someone and I’m probably making a few mistakes because of that.  
P25 
I feel like I'm experiencing time pressure. Yeah, like I'm being 
timed. I'm trying to figure out how to do the best the fastest, which 
is probably because I'm used to playing games. I like the game. It's 
easy. That's how I'm feeling. It's grand like, I'm just trying to focus 
on the moment right now like I know you said. Am... [pause] I'd 
have to say I'm feeling engaged a bit, like the novelty of the game 
hasn't worn off yet anyway 
P26 
Am.. [pause] I don't know. My mind's gone blank. I can't actually 
think, I was focusing on the screen. I was thinking I figured out a 
way to get more points, but I don't know, it's being unpredictable 
at the moment  
P27 
I feel screwed over. I lost my points there. It’s annoying… 
[pause]. That's the only thing that really stands out if I am to say 
exactly what I felt at the alarm going off 
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P28 
I feel cool calm and collected. As usual, like I wanted to think 
about this level-headedly. I knew that I wasn't going to be doing 
something very hard. And I feel like I'm your average participant. 
Like not average, but like, I'll do no better or worse than the grand 
scheme of things, or in the scheme of things. My mind is 
wandering now. But that's what I felt at the beep. That's exactly 
how I felt. Other than that I guess I'd have to say my nexk is sore 
but that has nothing to do with this. I had an injury before, and I 
find sitting upright isn't the best for it 
P29 
I’m feeling a bit panicked about it. One minute I’m doing okay 
and the next I’m losing. I’d say it’s going alright over all though. 
I’m not taking enough time to think before I choose maybe. When 
people passed the room I got distracted a bit so I’ll have to get 
back into it now. 
P30 
I have no idea what I'm doing to be honest. My experience right 
now. Am… confusion [laughs]. No not really, I mean I get it now, 
but I keep losing so I don't know what's up with that. If I were a 
betting man I wouldn't bet on me. Probably doing shite to be 
honest, but sure. My experience, just then.. [pause] I guess it's just 
that of focus.. no not focusing that's not the right word. I guess 
attention. Or am.. attentitive. And the smell of rain too, I think it's 
an umbrella or something. I noticed that a few times. Yeah the 
room like, I feel like it's just a really bad day out. Experience 
P31 
Oh I wasn't expected to lose so much points at the end there. I'm 
feeling sad, like I really wiped out all of my points right there in 
an instant. I thought it was easy but I don't know, maybe the decks 
switched on me. It's impossible to tell. So right now I'm feeling a 
little deflated I guess. It got really tough there I wasn't sure which 
one's I liked, like I was relying on them before but then it all went 
belly up 
P32 
Am… happy. And am… the chair [laughs]. I don't know I guess. 
I'm fine. Feeling my usual self, not noticing anything strange. 
Happy out. Am, I'm experiencing the computer screen. The green 
colous of the decks. The dell monitor. The sound of the 
fluorescent light, and remembering the sound that fluorescents 
make when they turn on 
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P33 
Feeling alright I guess, not sure I have it figured out yet. I'm really 
aware of my fingers hitting the number though, for some strange 
reason. I mean, I'm [laughs] I'm really aware that when I hit a key 
there's a change I'll lose everything. Like everytime I hit a key I 
get a nervous kind of feeling. Like it isn’t bad nerves or anything 
like that, I'm not like, emotionally invested in the thing like. But 
Everytime I hit a key I'm not sure what's going to happen. An 
uneasy feeling, no not uneasy, yeah just a little nervy I think. I feel 
less nervy with these one's, but I'm hardy doing well with those 
one's, it's everytime I go for the other one's that I get nervy, but I 
can't help it, I want to see in case I suddenly get a load of points. I 
should probably just stick with what I know 
P34 
I’m wondering how I’m doing. I'm just wondering like, how good 
I did or am doing. Like what am I doing wrong. Just curious about 
that, and if I can do better. 
P35 
I want to do the best in this thing. I’m not normally a betting man 
now, but I feel like I’m going to be compared to others 
P36 
At the moment I'm grand. Not at all panicking yet. I don't have as 
many points as I thought I would, I guess that's why I got 2000 
points or whatever at the beginning. Right so, I guess the room is 
the immediate thing I feel, like this is a small lab, if I was 
claustrophobic I might be more anxious. That's it. 
P37 
How am I doing? Oh I have to just win the points like, it's grand. 
I'm feeling good. I feel like I know the task even though I’ve only 
been playing a few minutes. It's grand. Yeah. I don't know 
anything else right now 
P38 
I feel like shouting. I didn't mean to hit that key, and I just did 
again. I didn't lose anything. I was feeling very apprehensive 
about talking about the task actually. Like I knew that the alarm 
was going to go off. I could almost predict it. Like I knew if I 
made a certain move it was going to go off and I have nothing to 
say. Nothing to really report at the moment. Maybe that I'm a little 
frustrated with myself for hitting that key. I don't like that one. Or 
that one actually. I love the first one though. Is that alright? I don't 
think there's anything else I can really say  
P39 
Am.. Warm. Comfortable. Snug. Happy. Like, really grand, not 
nervous anyway. Not that I said warm I'm feeling cold. Don't 
know if that's what's supposed to make me make different moves. 
Aware of the sounds, from the halls, think that's where the draft is 
coming from. Everything around me. Calm. Thinking. Yeah, that. 
P40 
What the hell am I feeling. Nothing. I guess my mind is 
wandering through the college. Like right now I'm mentally 
walking through the college. I'm thinking of the layout of the 
media labs up here, it's like a maze. Part of a maze 
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P41 
I'm feeling very punctual, like.. [pause] I'm feeling like I'm taking 
part in a study. Done loads of these before. I feel really focused on 
the task. I'm trying to get a range of possibilities, so that I like, 
know the rules of the game. I mean at this stage I definitely prefer 
number 3 I think. I don't lose a lot of points with that one. I'm 
building up my points again. 
P42 
It’s a controlled room. I know that I’m in a lab, I’m part of the 
room …(…)...and um… the smell of damp from my umbrella 
(laughs)…It's really bad actually sorry. It stinks a bit, it was in my 
bad. I think that's what I'm experiencing now. It's really there. 
Like I'm here [laughs] Okay that doesn't make sense, but I feel 
present. Like aware of my place in the room… I’m only aware of 
the lab, the chair… my fingers pressing the keys. 
P43 
I feel like I'm very aware of my body at the moment actually, like 
I'm concentrating on how I'm feeling. Especially since I know I 
have to talk about it. I feel apprehensive about going with a 
definitive answer. I'm grand, almost forgot about the buzzer going 
off.  
P44 
Right now I feel like my shoes are sore, like I hurt my ankle 
before. So these were a bad choice. Uncomfortable. That's my 
experience at the moment. How much detail do you need will I 
talk more? Alright, am. I feel… [pause] I feel like am… Honestly 
I don't know 
P45 
I'm experiencing pleasure at the moment. I feel like I did well 
now, I know what to do. I'm kicking it's ass after that card took 
away so many of my points. Not going with that one, so I'm 
studying, like I'm learning. I'm gathering info as I go along, and 
I'm feeling hopeful too. Yeah, jovial almost. Happy out with it 
now.  
P46 
Oh I don't know actually. Am… [pause]. I feel good. I think I'd be 
doing as well as anyone. Like I don't know how other people 
would have, unless they're just lucky.  
P47 
What am I experiencing right now? The room I guess. The 
brightness of the room, the sounds coming from the hall. The 
smell of the computer lab. All these things are what I'm 
experiencing right now. I'm very aware of them and can tune in to 
either, like the walls are really bright and the college is nice and 
busy, there's a great buzz I mean. Yeah like that. That's what I feel 
like is immediately in my experience. It's what I'm experiencing 
right now. Oh and the task, like I'm trying to play the game so I'm 
concentrating on my next moves, or trying to  anyway. It's a little 
predictable at times. I actually wasn't thinking about the beeper 
going off again actually 
P48 
I think it’s going well actually. Maybe I’m just lucky but I’m 
feeling really good about how it’s going so far. I’m feeling 
comfortable in the room too. Like I don’t feel anything weird.  
P49 It’s impossible to predict what’s coming next. That’s the only 
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thing I was aware of. I don’t know what way they are working. 
Can’t figure it out. Everytime I think I can or that I do I lose. I 
don’t feel bad or anything, but not great either. Like it’s like an 
uneasy feeling. Everytime I feel like I know what one is my 
favourite, it changes. I pressed a lot of that one actually, but like, I 
think there are better ones. So like, I’m thinking of what’s coming 
next, like what’s going to happen of I change tactics and go mad. 
Like I get confused when I press other cards. They all seem to be 
random. There are no good or bad ones. I’m probably just 
experiencing task anxiety, if that’s a thing. It’s hard to talk about 
though, like I don’t know, I might not be that invested in it. But I 
definitely think I’m thinking about strategies. That’s at the 
moment the thing went off anyway.  
P50 
There's no way I did good there. Oh it's not over yet is it? Oh ok. 
My experience right now. I'm very disappointed actually, I 
thought it was over. I didn't do good, I can't figure out why I think 
I did good with that one there. Like the decks are swapping on me 
I think. I'm really aware of the task. I actually feel like I was 
playing it for ages actually. Yeah [pause] I guess yeah it's going a 
bit like, I'm feeling that. But at the same time I can redeem myself 
can't I? I want to do better in it. And now I know I'm staying away 
from that one there. It's been killing my points every so often, but 
like, I got a load from it. Not enough to make up for it, I lost like 
so much there, did you see that like? Like the 2 times I picked it. 
But anyway, yeah. I'm very competitive  
P51 
I think they are changing on me every time I pick a card, there’s a 
pattern I think that I’m aware of. I’m very focused on the decks to 
see which ones are switching on me… 
P52 
Honestly I'm really not feeling anything. I don't have any strong 
feelings for right now. Like if I were to tell you anything it would 
be a lie. I'm tired from college, that's not a lie, from assignments, 
but that was me before I came in here. It's nice to sit and do 
something that's unrelated. I'm feeling that at the moment for sure, 
dreading going back [laughs] 
P53 
I'm just pressing random keys. I'm trying to do like, 10 of each, 
because I saw that there were different results from picking either. 
So now I have a strategy. I'm going to pick 10 of each for a while, 
it worked well so far but I haven't picked a lot from the 4th one 
yet. I'm actually not at all focused on my score, I actually only 
realised that now. You probably want me to say that I'm keeping 
track of my points, but I'm not. I'm not at all. That's something I'm 
not experiencing you could say. Yeah. I'm just trying to pick a set 
because playing all over the place isn’t working for me.  
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P54 
I'm feeling like am… I feel warm. The room is stuffy. I'm 
experiencing that at the moment. I find it a little hard to 
concentrate I guess at the moment. Am… [pause] Well like I think 
I'm doing ok but it's hard to tell or something. Yeah. I'm feeling 
warm and okay I guess 
P55 
Am… apprehensive. Calm. Comfortable I suppose. Aware of 
surroundings. Trying to plan my moves. For sure, thinking ahead. 
Like what my next move would be.  
P56 
Calm. Happy. Softness. And hardness. From the chair and from 
the table. Am… absence of strong feelings. I don’t care either 
way. Just happy out. That’s probably just me though, I’m the most 
laid back person ever. I don’t worry a lot. So I’m thinking of that, 
that I don’t worry. It’s grand. Yeah. Calm.   
P57 
I can feel my heart at the moment, and my breathing. I'm trying to 
focus on right here right now, I was wandering in and out of that 
feeling since the start. I feel alert at the moment. Like sometimes I 
know exactly what's expected of me, but right now I don't know 
how to talk about it, articulate it exactly. I feel very present when 
talking now. And I have for a while. I'm focused on the task 
P58 
Anger. But like, not actually really angry. I’m annoyed with 
myself. And I don’t think I have much to report. My moves were 
wrong there. I think.  
P59 
I feel like experiencing great pressure, because you're sitting next 
to me. I mean I think I just hit a bunch of random keys at the start, 
but it was like, oh yeah, I remember what I have to do. I can 
describe it only my own words but like, I feel normal for this kind 
of test. Like the right amount of pressure. It's not stress, just aware 
of my performance. I want to figure out the game more than do 
well I think, because if I figure it out I might do better or maybe 
there's something more going on that I don't know. That's usually 
the case I think, that I don't know what else is coming up in the 
cards. Yeah I'm feeling that, that's my experience of the situation 
right now. Anyway, I suppose that my hangover isn't helping. I 
don't know how much of that is causing the feeling, like I wasn't 
expecting it to be like this. It's weird because when I lost a load of 
points I didn't really feel anything, but as I won them back I felt 
like I had to. Does that make sense? Like to describe it, it feels 
like a kind of pressure, not a bad pressure. Yeah. 
 
 
 
